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FORENSIC SCIENCE:
THE NEED FOR REGULATION
Randolph N. Jonakait *
INTRODUCTION
Justice and liberty often depend on the reliability of forensic labora-
tories. Analytical errors can mean freedom for the guilty and incarcera-
tion for the innocent. As this Article demonstrates, however, poor
quality pervades forensic science. It is time to stop the miscarriages
of justice "which result. Forensic laboratories can improve, and a
mandatory regulatory system will help bring needed improvement.
Section I of this Article surveys information revealing the
widespread, poor quality of work done in forensic science laboratories.
Sections II and III explore the underlying reasons for the current inade-
quacies. Section IV describes a regulatory system that has produced
better quality in clinical labs and shows how similar regulations would
improve forensic science laboratories. Section V discusses differences
between clinical and forensic facilities that might make the imposition of
the clinical laboratory regulation model difficult. An alternative regula-
tory system that only requires proficiency testing is proposed as an initial
step towards the full regulatory model.
I. FORENSIC LABORATORY PERFORMANCE
Since forensic labs have never allowed a detailed look at the caliber
of their work, only fragmentary information is available. Those frag-
ments, however, reveal a consistent pattern of unacceptable errors and
inaccuracies.
A. LEAA Proficiency Testing
A 1978 study funded by the Law Enforcement Assistance Adminis-
tration ("LEAA") provides the most detailed picture available of the
quality of our crime laboratories. 1 Although some sporadic proficiency
* Professor of Law, New York Law School; A.B. 1967, Princeton University; J.D. 1970,
University of Chicago Law School; LL.M. 1971, New York University Law School.
1. PETERSON, FABRICANT & FIELD, CRIME LABORATORY PROFICIENCY TESTING
RESEARCH PROGRAM 26 (1978) [hereinafter LEAA]. A test of this magnitude has never
been repeated.
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testing of crime labs had been done previously, this three-year investiga-
tion was the first broad, nationwide proficiency examination. Known
samples in a wide range of forensic specialties were sent to labs for ana-
lyses.2 Participation in the testing was high3 since laboratories were
guaranteed anonymity.
4
A disturbing pattern emerged. A surprisingly large number of reports
contained erroneous results.5 Indeed, only one quarter of the participat-
ing labs provided entirely acceptable responses in all cases.6 Two-thirds
2. This approach typified the entire proficiency program. "To test the accuracy of these
crime laboratories, the Project Advisory Committee prepared samples and submitted them
to the laboratories for evaluation. The Committee knew the data that a proper forensic
analysis of the samples would generate, and the Committee judged the laboratories' reports
against the known data." Imwinkelried, The Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative
Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 621,636 (1979).
3. "Most crime laboratories in the country elected to participate.... Participation for the
initial three test samples, for example, was 90%, 78% and 81% .... " LEAA, supra note 1,
at 1. "Overall, 219 laboratories in the United States and Canada participated with an aver-
age of 188 laboratories for each of the 23 tests." Lucas, Leete & Field, An American
Proficiency Testing Program, 27 FORENSIC SCL INT'L 71, 73 (1985).
4. "Laboratory directors were initially somewhat reluctant to participate based upon con-
cems about their independence, that standardized methods might be required, and particu-
larly about confidentiality and anonymity of results." Id. Cf. LEAA, supra note 1, at 1.
"Because this constituted a pilot study utilizing untried manufacturing and sample distribu-
tion techniques, untested questionnaires and completely new methods for analyzing
responses from the crime laboratories, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and
the Forensic Sciences Foundation assured all participating laboratories that they would
remain anonymous and that all research and statistical data would be considered
confidential." Id. Of course, these reasons would not support a continuing need for
anonymity in proficiency testing once the pilot study was completed, but interestingly, the
report's findings, which recommend continued proficiency testing, conclude, "Laboratory
anonymity and the confidentiality of the submitted data are the key factors to insure a high
participation rate in a voluntary program such as this one." Id. at 257.
5. A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL
CASES 5-6 n.10 (3d ed. 1986). See also Imwinkeiried, supra note 2, at 623: "[The] report
revealed a startlingly high incidence of errors in analyses performed by police laboratories."
The study itself concluded that a "wide range of proficiency levels among the participat-
ing laboratories exists, and in general, there are several evidence types with which the
laboratories are having serious difficulties." LEAA, supra note 1, at 257. An author of that
report later stated, "I acknowledge that a disturbingly high percentage of laboratories are
not performing routine tests competently, as shown by our proficiency testing." Symposium
on Science and the Rules of Legal Procedure, 101 F.R.D. 599, 645 (1983) [hereinafter
Symposium] (remarks of Professor Joseph Peterson).
6. LEAA, supra note 1, at 255 (Table 91), summarizes:
Percentage of Percentage of All
Total Responses Participating Labs
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of the labs rendered unacceptable responses for at least 10% of the
analyses.
7
The problems, moreover, were not confined to any particular kind of
test or evidence. Thus, the percentage of unsuitable conclusions reached




7. Unacceptable responses included not only wrong outcomes, but also correct answers
given for the wrong reasons, unnecessarily equivocal results, and inconclusive results
unsupported by the analytical work or based on improper or inedquate methods. Id. at 239.
The report noted that "there is nothing inherent in an inconsistent opinion that demonstrates
proficiency." Id. at 238.
All such results, as the report recognized, could pose dangers to criminal justice. For
example, an inconclusive response could seem inculpatory although it should have pro-
vided exculpatory evidence. The report gave many such illustrations. A particular paint
comparison provides an example. In that test, a fifth of the labs reported that two different
paint samples could have shared a common origin. The results of their analyses were not
wrong, but if the labs had done all the testing they should have, they would have concluded
that the paints did not come from the same source. Thus, instead of presenting what should
have been exculpatory information, these facilities would have presented an inculpatory
report. This error, moreover, was inexcusable:
The Committee does not condemn in any way the reporting of inconclusive results,
where appropriate. Situations in which such a response would be appropriate might
include an inadequate amount of evidence, a contaminated sample, or where the
sample possesses few inherent characterizing features. This is not the case in this
test sample. The state of the art in criminalistics is certainly advanced to the point
that these samples of paint should be easily distinguished by techniques available to
any laboratory attempting to conduct paint examinations. The Project Advisory
Committee believes that an inconclusive report in this sample is not supportable.
Id. at 203. See also Starrs, In the Land of Agog: An Allegory for the Expert Witness, 30
J. FORENSIC SCI. 289, 303-06 (1985) (discussion of imprecise forensic testing contribut-
ing to the conviction of an innocent man).
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analysis of some representative errors indicates the dangers posed to
criminal justice.
The validity of firearms comparisons is well accepted, and labora-
tories should, therefore, provide conclusive and reliable results.9 The
straightforward firearms test revealed otherwise. Each lab was sent three
.25 caliber bullets that had been fired from two distinct guns.
[Of the laboratories, 5.7%] misidentified one projectile,
incorrectly reporting that all three projectiles had been fired
through a single weapon.... 3.4% of all laboratories
responding, incorrectly reported that none of the three projec-
tiles could have been fired through the same weapon. [There-
fore,] 9.1% of the total responding, reported results that are
clearly in error. 10
Such errors have disastrous implications for justice, since a criminal












LEAA, supra note 1, at 251 (Table 89). Several types of tests were performed in more than
one version with different levels of complexity. For example, two blood tests were per-
formed, one simple (3.8% unacceptable answers) and one difficult (71.2% unacceptable
answers). See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
9. Professor Giannelli, who contends that the prosecution should have to establish the
validity of a scientific technique beyond a reasonable doubt before it is admitted, concludes
that firearm comparisons would satisfy this burden. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel
Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REv.
1197, 1248 (1980).
10. LEAA, supra note 1, at 238. In addition, 4.6% of the labs reported inconclusive
results. Id.
This test was not an aberration. In a previous test done in the study, each lab was sent
three projectiles and two cartridge cases and asked if the samples had been fired from the
same weapon: 3.8% of the laboratories "misidentified a projectile, reporting that one of the
projectiles actually fired through [one of the guns] had been fired through the other weapon
.... [3.8%] misidentified a cartridge case, reporting that one of the cartridge cases actually
fired through [one weapon] had been fired in the other weapon .. " Id. at 207.
11. LEAA, supra note 1, at 238. See also Bradford, Barriers to Quality Achievement in
Crime Laboratory Operations, 25 J. FORENSIC SCI. 902, 904 (1980). Bradford asserts,
"This kind of error has been documented in several cases at trial in the United States in
recent years through the discovery or reexamination process." Id.
[Vol. 4
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analyses are one of the most frequent forensic procedures, 12 a one in
eleven error rate has a widespread impact.
Soil comparison may not always be as crucial as a firearm examina-
tion, but its proficiency test produced an even higher error rate. Three
samples were sent, two of which were duplicates. The labs were asked
whether either of the two could have shared a common origin with the
third specimen, which in fact differed from the other two. While about
two-thirds of the labs provided correct analyses, over thirty percent were
incorrect. 13
In one physiological fluids test, participating labs were asked whether
two bloodstains could have shared a common origin. 14 Only 52 out of
132 responding facilities correctly reported that the stains were different.
But, fourteen of these made errors in typing. Therefore, only 28.8% (38
out of 132) did the analysis completely and correctly. 15 Fifty other labs
incorrectly reported that the stains could have shared a common origin,
while another twenty-six reported inconclusive results. The study
labelled those inconclusives as unacceptable. Even if they are disre-
garded because they would not lead to court testimony, only thirty-eight
labs, or 37.2%, got correct results, while sixty-four had it wrong.
16
In another test, the labs were given a sample of paint removed from a
12. See Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mahajlovic, The Uses and Effects of Forensic Sci-
ence in the Adjudication of Felony Cases, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1730, 1733 (1987) (fire-
arms analysis is one of five categories of scientific evidence found most often in prosecu-
torial files).
13. LEAA, supra note 1, at 218.
14. A second physiological fluids examination was simpler. Laboratories only had to
test for the ABO factor in an uncontaminated bloodstain on clean cloth. Three percent got
that factor wrong. A number of labs tried to do more sophisticated analyses to identify
other factors. Many of those labs did not do well. For example, only 60% of the labs
attempting to type MN in blood got it right. LEAA, supra note 1, at 200-01.
15. The study concluded, "The Project Advisory Committee wishes to point out that a
correct answer which is only coincidental still constitutes an error." Id. at 210.
16. Id. at 209. Many of the labs reached the wrong result because they only did ABO
typing and more tests were necessary to distinguish the stains. Even so, the level of
incorrect typing was high. The report stated:
1.6% of the laboratories reporting [the ABO] system [made errors]. Six laboratories
... of the 30 ... reporting [the MN] system reported incorrect results.... Five of
the 20 laboratories reporting results for the Rh system reported incorrect results....
6.1% of the 33 laboratories attempting the PGM system reported incorrect results.
One laboratory of the 8 ... reporting Esterase D results reported an incorrect type.
One laboratory of the 7 attempting [the] AK system reported incorrect results, and 1
of the 15 labs reporting the Hemoglobin type reported an incorrect result.
Id. As discussed below, infra note 38, an error in typing any one factor makes the entire
result erroneous. In other words, the typing errors are cumulative so that the more systems
typed, the higher the error rate.
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burglarized building's door jamb, and two samples representing paint
found on separate suspects. The paints on the suspects differed from the
building's paint. Only 48.9% of the labs, however, reported this conclu-
sion. All the others concluded that one or both paint samples recovered
from the suspects could have come from the building. In other words,
more than half of the labs would have presented inculpatory information
when the evidence actually showed the contrary. 17
Incorrect analyses can lead to miscarriage of justice not only by con-
demning the innocent, but also by helping to free the guilty. In an arson
examination, one piece of cloth was cut in two, with one half soaked in a
sample of leaded gasoline. The labs were asked whether the gasoline
sample and the gasoline in the soaked cloth could have shared a common
origin and, furthermore, whether the two pieces of cloth could have
come from the same source. Ten percent of the labs wrongly concluded
that the gasoline sample and the gasoline in the cloth were different, and
3.4% incorrectly found that the two pieces of cloth had separate ori-
gins. 18 In other words, one-in-seven labs would have reported falsely
exculpatory information that might have helped free a guilty person.
Such illustrations are numerous, but the point ought to be clear-the
most thorough study of crime labs ever done proves crime lab perfor-
mance is dangerously poor.
Moreover, error rates in actual casework can be expected to be higher
than in the proficiency tests for several reasons. First, only volunteer
laboratories were tested, and each participated only in the areas of its
choice.19 Proficiency testing in other areas has established that the better
labs voluntarily undergo such examination. 20 Consequently, the error
17. Id. at 213. An automobile paint comparison produced better data, but still a large
percentage of wrong results. While 97 out of 121 labs gave a correct response, "[t]wenty-
four laboratories reported results at variance with the manufacturers' statement and the
results of the referee laboratories." Id. at 203.
18. Id. at 224.
19. Some of the labs only participated in one of the 21 tests. Decker, Access to Exper-
tise, 101 F.R.D. 636,637 (1983).
20. See Health Care Financing Administration's Management of Medical Laboratories:
Hearings on S. 765 Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management of the
Sen. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1988) [hereinafter Hear-
ings] (comments of Dr. Paul Fischer, Associate Professor, Medical College of Georgia):
"A laboratory [in a physician's office] which voluntarily participates in PT [proficiency
testing] is usually a very good lab.... The fact that most office laboratories do not partici-
pate in PT is therefore indirect evidence, in my opinion, that there may be some problems
with office testing." Cf. LaMotte & Robinson, Federal Implementation, in FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AND THE CLINICAL LABORATORY 71 (M. Schaeffer ed. 1981) (discussing
proficiency tests for toxicology labs).
Nonparticipation, of course, does not necessarily mean that a laboratory could not
perform adequately. Experience has suggested, however, that these laboratories
have so little confidence in their test results that they do not report their results ...
[Vol. 4
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rates in the LEAA study would probably increase if all labs had been
tested in all subject areas in which they routinely do work. Second, the
proficiency analyses were not necessarily done in a blind fashion. The
analyst performing the work was not shielded from learning that he was
being tested. The analyst will likely be more careful with specimens
known to be test samples than with routine work.21 Empirical data
indeed confirm that non-blind proficiency testing leads to more accurate
results than when the samples are treated as regular laboratory work.
22
Third, the test samples were much simpler than those a forensic scientist
faces in actual casework.23 Obviously, more difficult and complex sam-
ples of actual casework will lead to more errors.
This study of practical forensic science, then, showed most starkly
that crime laboratory performance is routinely unreliable24 and that the
quality of forensic science needs drastic improvement.25 These
for evaluation. One can speculate that the laboratories that do not participate need
improvement at least as much as those that do participate.
Id. See also Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational
Knowledge: The Lessons of Handwriting "Expertise," 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731, 749
(1989), who state about the handwriting proficiency tests:
[C]onsider the possible effect on any aggregate conclusions of the fact that, of the
more than 250 police laboratories that perform handwriting examination.. ., only a
fraction even ordered test materials in the first place. It is at least arguable that, by
self-selection, the sample is inherently biased in favor of the more conscientious and
capable practitioners to begin with. If this is true, the reported results would over-
state the accuracy of the handwriting examination field generally.
21. Investigators examining the continuing proficiency program, see infra text accom-
panying notes 27-32, have found that in those non-blind tests most labs "do more work on
each sample than may be required or than would be done on an actual case." Lucas, Leete
& Field, supra note 3, at 75-76.
22. See LaMotte, Guerrant, Lewis & Hall, Comparison of Laboratory Performance with
Blind and Mail-Distributed Proficiency Testing Samples, 92 PUB. HEALTH REP. 554
(1977). These investigators sent duplicate specimens disguised as patient samples to drug
laboratories that were participating in non-blind proficiency testing. The labs were more
accurate on the specimens known to be proficiency testing samples than with the samples
thought to be routine patient specimens. See also LaMotte & Robinson, supra note 20, at
72-73 (summarizing study).
23. LEAA, supra note I, at 257: "Many of the evidence types that were selected for
sample manufacturing were not fully exploited and were often presented in their simplest or
most unchallenging form.... The samples can become more realistic by incorporating
contaminants and by minimizing sample size and quantity."
24. Cf. Imwinkelried, supra note 2, at 637: "[The report unquestionably documents a
very real possibility of error in the forensic analyses conducted by police laboratories in the
United States."
25. The authors of the LEAA report were not surprised by their findings:
During the course of the proficiency testing program, it was quickly recognized that
many of the laboratories were experiencing difficulty in the examination and
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conclusions seem to be confirmed by the experiences of independent
forensic scientists. 26 Data produced since the LEAA study continue to
document the pervasive problems in forensic lab analyses.
B. The Continuing Proficiency Program
A continuing proficiency testing program administered under the
auspices of the Forensic Science Foundation provides more recent data
on crime lab performance.27 These data are less complete than that fur-
nished by the LEAA study partly because fewer laboratories participate
than did in the earlier government-funded program.28 No lab, of course,
analysis of various physical evidence types. To be perfectly candid, this could be
expected. All of the previous reports which have addressed the issue have inferred
the likelihood of such a finding.
LEAA, supra note 1, at 261. See also M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, THE USE OF
SCIENTIFIc EVIDENCE IN LITIGATION 10 (1983): "Given the low pay and slight
emphasis on education and professional qualifications in many forensic science labora-
tories, [the LEAA] result ought not to be as surprising as it seems." But cf.
A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 5, at 5 n.10 ("It was believed that
such a testing program would establish that crime laboratories performed at high levels of
professionalism and obtained accurate results in their examinations .... ").
26. Some in forensic science stated that their own experiences affirmed the report's
findings. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 11, at 904-05:
These proficiency test findings are reinforced by the work of independent forensic
scientists who have the opportunity, through the discovery process in criminal law,
to examine and evaluate prosecution evidence from many different crime labora-
tories. Through the process of discovery, fundamental errors in identification and
faulty methods have been found in numerous cases at the trial or trial preparation
phase.
27. See Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 74.
In spite of the strong feelings existing in 1978, many laboratory directors ...
expressed a desire for a continuing proficiency testing program, albeit one without
governmental involvement. Collaborative Testing Services Inc. with the affiliation
of [the Forensic Sciences Foundation] developed and offered such a program on a
subscription basis.
Id. See also Bashinski, Laboratory Standards: Accreditation, Training, and Certification
of Staff in Forensic Context, in BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND
FORENSIC SCIENCE 165 (J. Ballantynb;G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989).
28. Cf. Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 74:
While the laboratories participating initially were understandably fewer than in the
earlier "free" program, the numbers have continued to increase. In 1984, approxi-
mately 142 laboratories subscribed to one or more tests.
Labs must now pay subscription costs for the tests. In 1989,.those costs were either $104
or $52 per year for each area of testing. COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVICES, INC.,
[Vol. 4
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must take part.29 A participating laboratory need not be tested in all
areas in which it does casework; instead, it can select the areas in which
it will be tested.30 A lab need not even submit responses to the test
specimens it obtains. 3' In fact, only a fraction of the labs subscribing to
any proficiency test turn in data.
32
The continuing proficiency program also provides less information
than the LEAA study because the test results are not published or other-
wise made available to the public.33 For unknown reasons, this valuable
information about a vital part of our criminal justice system largely
remains hidden.
The incompleteness and secretiveness of these results make it difficult
to draw firm conclusions, 34 but the data that have surfaced confirm the
FORENSIC PROFICIENCY TESTING PROGRAM: 1989 [hereinafter BROCHURE].
The participation varied from a high of 114 labs for a drugs test to a low of 40 for a
questioned documents test, with an average participation of 82 labs for each of eight tests
conducted in 1984. By contrast, for the LEAA study, "219 laboratories in the United States
and Canada participated with an average of 188 laboratories for each of the 23 tests."
Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 73. A description by the Collaborative Testing Ser-
vices, Inc. of the 1989 program indicates proficiency tests in the following areas: drugs,
physiological fluids, latent prints, questioned documents, firearms, tool marks, fibers,
flammables, footwear impressions, hair, glass, and paint. BROCHURE, supra.
29. Bashinksi, supra note 27, at 165.
30. BROCHURE, supra note 28.
31. Id.
32. In 1985 it was reported, "The response rate is now ranging between 44% and 73%
and is gradually increasing .... " Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 74. The average
response rate for the eight 1983 tests was 57%. Id.
33. The Collaborative Testing Services refused to provide copies of the reports to this
author.
Much effort is spent to ensure that only the participating lab has access to its perfor-
mance results on any test. "To ensure the confidentiality of data and anonymity of partici-
pating laboratories, no lab code numbers are assigned and no laboratory can be identified."
BROCHURE, supra note 28. See also Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 75:
Confidentiality is assured by providing two envelopes with each test to each partici-
pant. A responding laboratory seals its answer sheet inside a plain envelope which
is placed inside another envelope and mailed to a member of the [Project Advisory
Committee]. The inner envelope is removed and forwarded to [Collaborative Test-
ing Services]. Neither the answer sheet nor the inner envelope has any marks. As a
result, no one knows to what laboratory any result can be attributed or, in fact, what
laboratories have responded at all.
Of course, summaries of the data could be made available with lab identities still kept
confidential. Although that was done in the LEAA study, such data is not available from
the continuing program.
34. See Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at 76: "Since the response rate is limited and
since it is not known whether a laboratory routinely examines a particular type of evidence
or is simply 'testing the waters', the data in the summary reports may or may not represent
practices and results of the forensic science community as a whole. Extreme care must
therefore be exercised in drawing inferences from the results."
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findings of the LEAA study-that forensic lab performance is
dangerously unreliable. The two proficiency programs for which results
are known-handwriting and physiological fluids-support this con-
clusion.
Professors Risinger, Denbeaux, and Saks obtained the handwriting
identification proficiency tests from 1984-1987. Their summary of those
tests discloses an astonishing lack of proficiency on the part of crime
labs.
35
A rather generous reading of the data would be that in 45% of
the reports forensic document examiners reached the correct
finding, in 36% they erred partially or completely, and in 19%
they were unable to draw a conclusion. If we assume that
inconclusive examinations do not wind up as testimony in
court, and omit the inconclusive reports, and remain as gen-
erous as possible within the bounds of reason, then the most
we can conclude is this: Document examiners were correct
57% of the time and incorrect 43% of the time.
But let us turn to more meaningful readings of the aggre-
gate data. The pilot test in 1975 may have been unrealistically
easy.... Omitting the 1975 data, the examiners were correct
36% of the time, incorrect 42%, and unable to reach a conclu-
sion 22% of the time. Even these results are biased in favor of
accuracy because of the intentional ease of the 1987 test. Dis-
guised handwriting fooled them all and forged printing fooled
two-thirds of those who hazarded an opinion about it.
36
The authors concluded that "the kindest statement we can make is that
no available evidence demonstrates the existence of handwriting
identification expertise."
37
The results of physiological fluids proficiency tests support similar
conclusions. A summary of the continuing physiological fluids
proficiency program concludes, "From 1978 to 1989, the number of
laboratories making one or more errors has ranged from 7% ... to 78%
35. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 20, at 743-51.
36. Id. at 747-48. The authors report, "Because of complaints from document exa-
miners that prior tests were too difficult, the Proficiency Advisory Committee decided to
make the 1987 test easy" Id. at 747.
37. Id. at 750-51. The authors also noted that "the studies failed to reveal that
certification or experience enhanced accuracy." Id. at 749.
[Vol. 4
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... with an average of 25% .... ,38 Certainly, an average error rate of
one in four represents an unacceptable threat to life, liberty, and safety.
A closer look at one of the tests where the labs did better than usual
underscores this point. A brief scenario accompanying the 1988 test
indicated that a one month old child was missing. Several weeks after
the disappearance, a blood-stained apron was found in a pile of rags.
The adoptive mother said that the blood on the apron was hers. Three
bloodstains were submitted for analysis: one representing the apron
stain; another from the mother; and the third from the adoptive father.
39
The labs were asked whether the blood on the apron could have come
from mother, father, or child.
The samples were sent to 169 labs, but only 67 returned results.
Seven of those labs reported at least one result that differed from the
correct result. This alone constitutes an error rate of over 10%, but the
real rate was even higher. The supplier had difficulty obtaining enough
infant or fetal blood from one source, and instead fifteen fetal samples
were pooled to make the apron stain. Because of this mixture, the stain
38. B. GRUNBAUM, COMMENTS ON THE ADMISSIBILITY OF DNA TYPING EvI-
DENCE IN AMERICAN COURTS OF LAw 12 (Unpublished, Presented in part, Arbeitsge-
meinschaft fir Gen-Diognositc E.V., Tiibingen, W. Ger., Sept. 11-13, 1989). A survey of
the proficiency tests from 1979 through 1983
shows a 6.3 percent rate of error in ABO determinations of bloodstains. The rate of
error in ABO typing of secretion stains (semen, saliva, mixtures of body fluids) is
8.4 percent. The rates of error in the electrophoretic determination of genetic mark-
ers in bloodstains are as follows: PGM (2.8 percent), EsD (3.2), EAP (2.1), ADA
(0.3), AK (0.7), GLO (5.2), and HP (3.4).
Grunbaum, Physiological Stain Evidence-Assuring Quality Analysis, CAL. DEFENDER,
Spring, 1985, at 20, 20. The true error rate for these tests is not the number of times a par-
ticular factor was mistyped divided by the total number of times all the tests were done.
Instead, on any particular sample a number of tests are done. ABO typing may reveal a fac-
tor shared by a third of the population. PGM typing may do the same, but together the two
tests show that only one in nine have that particular combination of ABO and PGM types.
Consequently, the more systems typed, the more the blood can be individualized. That also
means, however, that the error rates are cumulative. A typing error in any one system
makes the entire result wrong. "Each successive genetic marker determination increases
the probability of exclusion but also increases the probability of error." Id. See also Bretz,
Scientific Evidence and the Frye Rule: The Case for a Cautious Approach, 4 COOLEY L.
REV. 506, 518 (1987) (expert stated that the proficiency tests showed that error rate for
electrophoretic typing in blood was 1.9%, but then admitted that the error rate was 10.9% if
computed per sample of blood). Moreover, casework submitted to a lab does not consist of
just one blood or bloodstain sample, but of three or more-a sample from the victim, one
from the suspect, and one or more crime-scene samples.
39.- COLLABORATIVE TESTING SERVICES, INC, PHYSIOLOGICAL FLUIDS
ANALYSIS: REPORT No. 88-14 at 45. (Proficiency reports will be referred to as "CTS"
followed by the number of the report. The first two digits of that number indicate the year
in which the report was done.)
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could not be typed for anything but the presence of fetal hemoglobin.
Many of the labs, however, did attempt more. At least three in this
group did an erroneous analysis. As the report concluded, "[T]he three
labs which reported group 0 for sample 'a' . . . should review their tech-
nique since this is an impossible result for this sample." 40 The report
also noted that another lab "reported spermatozoa in sample 'a.' The
manufacturer has assured the [Project Advisory Committee] that such
contamination could not have occurred in the production process."
41
All told, of the sixty-seven labs submitting results, at least ten made
mistakes, for an error rate of about fifteen percent. Moreover, this was a
relatively simple test. No special problems of aged or degraded samples
were presented. The stains, unlike real case work, appeared on clean
cloth so contamination did not exist.42 Even so, more than one in seven
labs obtained an erroneous result.4 3 Even with error rates of this
40. Id. at 2. The Report continued, "The 15 sources for the pooled sample 'a' consisted
of 8 A, 2 B, 1 AB and 4 0. Since ABO isoagglutination production normally begins at
about 3 months, no levels of ABO antibodies were expected or reported. The control per-
son found that, by absorption elution, the stain sample 'a' gave a strong A reaction and a
weak B reaction." Id. One of the labs that erroneously reported 0 also made other typing
errors.
41. Id. at 2.
42. While the narrative indicated that the stain must have aged for several weeks and
was on an apron, which probably would have been contaminated with many biological pro-
ducts in addition to blood, the actual stain was made on white unwashed cotton cloth, and
sent two days after it was made. Id.
43. Even though these reports are not intended to be made public, the report did not give
a true error rate. Cf. supra note 38. Instead, it stated, "Of the approximately 1,000 typing
results reported in total, there were 15 incorrect." Id. at 2. But 15 incorrect typing results
in a thousand translates to 10 erroneous reports out of only 67.
Other reports which I have obtained paint a similar proficiency picture. Thus, in one
1987 test, two samples were sent to 123 labs. Sixty-eight responded, with 16, or 23.5%,
giving wrong results. CTS 87-2. In that year's companion examination, 15 out of 54 labs,
or 28%, were in error.
In 1986, a hit and run scenario was presented with blood-stained samples, including
clothing from the victim, scrapings from the suspect's car, and cloth from the suspect's gar-
bage, and blood from the suspect. Sixty laboratories out of 123 receiving the samples
returned information. Fifteen gave incorrect results. CTS 86-11, at 13. In its summary,
the Report states, "Of the approximately 1300 results reported, there were 13 which were
incorrect." Id. at 1. Table 4, id. at 13, indicates, however, that 30 errors were made by
fifteen different labs.
The other 1986 test was easier since only two stains were sent to the labs. The labs
were asked to type the stains for all the systems used by the laboratory. Sixty-six labs
returned data; seven reported wrong results for the first sample, and fourteen were in error
on the second. There was an overlap in these wrong results, and sixteen labs in all gave
wrong results, for an error rate of 24%. CTS 86-2, at 25-26.
The Project Advisory Committee said about one of its 1985 tests, "The samples were
adequate and uncomplicated but the results disappointing." CTS 85-11, at 1. Seven stains
were sent out: one semen, three blood, and one saliva. Fifty-one labs responded.
"Twenty-two labs (43%) reported at least one result different from the manufacturer's
data." The other test that year was once again a simpler one'with only two samples to be
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proportion, and the summary of the proficiency reports indicates that on
most tests the error rates were significantly higher, 4 crime labs must be
making thousands upon thousands of mistaken physiological fluid ana-
lyses each year.
C. Other Recent Proficiency Studies
A test of forensic toxicologists not part of the continuing proficiency
program also confirms that problems in forensic labs are widespread.45
The one-year research program "was designed to simulate case samples
seen in typical forensic toxicology laboratories." 46 Over one hundred
labs participated, and their identities were kept confidential. Blind test-
ing was not required. Thus, performance was probably better than on
real casework.
The study found that fewer than seventy-five percent of the labs
detected a drug present in seven of the twenty samples sent.4 7 By the
study's generous definition, problems were apparent in thirty-five per-
cent of the samples. Indeed, although the study did not choose to report
typed using all relevant systems in the lab. The Report "noted that 50 of the 62 reporting
laboratories got all of the results they reported correct." In other words, the error rate was
12 out of 62, or 19%.
44. As with the LEAA tests, see supra text accompanying notes 19-23, the high error
rates reported in these two tests indicate an even higher error rate for real casework. The
samples in the continuing program are not as complex as those in actual cases. The tests
"are not 'real world' by their very nature. The samples must be available in sufficient quan-
tity for identical samples to be sent to up to 115 or more laboratories, they must impose
only reasonable demands on time and equipment for the laboratory, they must be amenable
to a range of analytical techniques and there must be no tricks." Lucas, Leete & Field,
supra note 3, at 77. Blind testing is rare: "No instructions are given as to how to examine
the sample. Some laboratories assign their most experienced examiners while others use
the samples for training new examiners. In a few instances, laboratory directors have
repackaged the samples and assigned them as real cases." Id. at 76. The voluntariness of
the proram, of course, points toward a higher error rate if all labs participated, as does the
fact that only a fraction of the subscribing labs return results. Cf. Risinger, Denbeaux &
Saks, supra note 20, at 748-49: "Assuming that an examiner who has worked on an
answer and then decides not to return it has serious doubts about its accuracy, then the sam-
ple of respondents is composed of an unrepresentatively large proportion of those who
obtained-or at least think they obtained-correct answers."
45. Cf. Imwinkelried, The Standard for Admitting Scientific Evidence: A Critique From
the Perspective of Juror Psychology, 28 VILL. L. REV. 554, 561 (1983) ("The results of
[the toxicology] survey are consistent with the findings of the [LEAA] Laboratory
Proficiency Testing program.").
46. Peat, Finnigan & Finkle, Proficiency Testing in Forensic Toxicology: A Feasibility
Study, 28 J. FORENsIC SCL 139, 140 (1983).
47. Id. at 149. The tested laboratories were also asked for quantitative analyses of the
detected drugs. These results also revealed problems in the analyses. The report con-
cluded, "These particular examples demonstrate the considerable interlaboratory variation
in quantitation." Id. at 157.
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its data this way, the total percentage of correct positive results for the
entire proficiency test was only seventy-one percent.4 8 This study, there-
fore, revealed a pervasive problem for forensic toXiCology.
49
DNA analysis proficiency testing has found problems consistent with
the studies from other areas. A test conducted by the California Associa-
tion of Crime Laboratory Directors reported that "two of the three
private laboratories made an error in analyzing samples. One company
was wrong in one of the forty-four matches it identified, another was
wrong in one of fifty matches, and only the third company was correct in
all of its matches."50 While this level of proficiency seems much better
than that reported on other tests, the New York State Panel assessing
forensic DNA analysis labelled these outcomes "disturbing." The panel
noted that "These results fall far short of the private laboratories' claims
of absolute certainty of forensic DNA testing."
51
Information which surfaced later indicates that the results of that test-
ing were more disturbing than first thought. Documents obtained
through discovery in a criminal case indicated that one of the three tested
labs had actually produced two reports. The first response "contained an
48. Calculated from id. at 145 (Table 3) which indicates that the total number of poten-
tially correct positive analyses was 4,142, but that the laboratories only performed 2,924
correctly. Unfortunately, the study did not present complete information about false posi-
tives. It gave details only about the percentage of positive responses for each sample
without giving a full listing of all the falsely "detected" drugs. See id. at 145 (Table 3).
The report merely concluded, "The rate of false positive results was particularly low with
one notable exception." Id. at 144. For that sample, 13% of the labs falsely "detected" one
drug and 11% incorrectly reported another. No further information about false positives
was presented. The overall rate was not given, nor can it be calculated from the data pub-
lished.
49. These toxicology findings confirmed results from an earlier proficiency report. See
Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-Laboratory Survey of Forensic Toxicology
Proficiency, 22 CLINICAL CHEM. 843 (1976). See Kelly & Sunshine, Proficiency Testing
in Forensic Toxicology: Criteria for Experimental Design, 22 CLINICAL CHEM. 1413
(1976); McCloskey & Finkle, Proficiency Testing in Forensic Toxicology, 22 J. FORENSIC
SCL 675 (1977); Dinovo & Gottschalk, More on Proficiency Testing in Forensic Toxicol-
ogy, 22 CLINICAL CHEM. 2056 (1976). "The major finding of this proficiency study was
that the toxicological laboratories ... varied considerably in the precision and accuracy
with which they performed drug assays." Dinovo & Gottschalk, Results of a Nine-
Laboratory Survey of Forensic Toxicology Proficiency, supra. The authors noted that this
variation could have significant consequences: "[Slince there exists a wide interlaboratory
variance in the detection, accuracy, and precision of toxicological analysis, this wide vari-
ance is probably reflected in the drug-death statistics and drug-death certification in these
and other cities in the United States." Id."
50. J. POKLEMBA, DNA: REPORT OF THE NEW YORK STATE FORENSIC DNA
ANALYSIS PANEL 28 (1989). See also Note, The Dark Side of DNA Profiling: Unreliable
Scientific Evidence Meets the Criminal Defendant, 42 STANFORD L. REV. 465, 493 (1990)
(two out of three labs "did not complete fifty tests without inculpating an innocent
person- surely an unproficient report").
51. J. POKLEMBA, supra note 50, at 28-29.
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extraordinary number of misclassifications, including one false positive,
at least three false negatives ... and at least two incorrect reports of
mixed stains." 52 A commentator, after reporting this further information,
concluded that this "study is the only meaningful blind trial of the
proficiency of DNA laboratories" and it "raises serious concerns" about
the quality of the work being done.
53
In sum, a review of the data revealed by proficiency studies indicates
that lab performance is inadequate and unreliable. 54 The most thorough
52. Thompson, Cellmark's Errors on the CACLD Proficiency Study, in 2 DNA:
UNDERSTANDING, CHALLENGING AND CONTROLLING THE NEW EVIDENCE OF THE
90'S 2 (1990). See also Thompson, Letter, CAL. LAW., July, 1989, at 11, 11. "Mhe
President of the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors... helped cover up
errors made by a commercial DNA laboratory in a 'blind' test of its accuracy.... She con-
tacted Cellmark officials, met with them to review the problems, and allowed them to sub-
mit cleaned up conclusions three months later." Id. This conclusion was hotly denied by
the DNA Committee of the California Association of Crime Laboratory Directors:
Our committee found Cellmark's initial blind trial report incomprehensible and
impossible to score. Since Cellmark's Dan Garner was also unable to interpret this
report, we asked him to submit another one in an understandable format. We also
discussed with him the one error we noted in the autorads which we had reviewed
out of his presence. No other information regarding the "correct answers" was
revealed to or discussed with him. The blind aspect of the test was never comprom-
ised.
Bashinski, Kuo & Hartstrom, More on DNA, CAL LAW., Sept., 1989, at 17, 17. Thomp-
son, however, has stuck by his conclusions. "The claim that Cellmark's initial blind trial
report was 'incomprehensible and impossible to score' is nonsense. Anyone who compares
Cellmark's report with the CACLD records showing the true identity of the samples will
readily comprehend that Cellmark made a number of errors." Thompson, Letter, CAL.
LAW., Sept., 1989, at 18, 18.
53. Thompson, Cellmark's Errors on the CACLD Proficiency Study, supra, note 52, at
1. Other reports indicate that this study was not truly a blind test. "[The laboratories made
the mistakes knowing that their results would be scrutinized carefully." J. POKLEMBA,
supra note 50, at 29. See also Note, supra note 50, at 493 ("Although Lifecodes called all
fifty correctly, its researchers, rather than the technicians who usually perform it, completed
the test.").
54. One article does indicate excellent forensic science proficiency, but it does not
present enough information to begin to rebut the rest of the data about crime lab quality.
Scientists from the national laboratory of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
("ATF') described a quality assurance program there for arson and explosives cases, which
includes blind proficiency testing. Brunelle, Garner & Wiseman, A Quality Assurance Pro-
gram for the Laboratory Examination of Arson and Explosives Cases, 27 J. FORENSIC
SC. 774 (1982). The authors reported, "All blind tests so far have resulted in 100% correct
identifications by the examiners tested." Id. at 780. The authors also state that in the test's
final step "results are evaluated and necessary corrective action is identified and imple-
mented as necessary." Id. The authors do not explain what corrective actions could be
necessary when the examiners have only produced all correct identifications.
Other than the barest outline of the program, however, no additional, useful data about
the testing was published, and the bureau has refused to make such information public.
This author requested the results of ATF's proficiency testing. By a letter dated September
21, 1989, Richard E. Tontarski, Chief, Forensic Science Laboratory of the ATF replied that
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of the tests, the LEAA study, showed abysmal performances, and all
subsequent testing indicates that problems persist.
II. FORENSIC SCIENCE EDUCATION
AND RESEARCH
A. Forensic Science Education and Training
The generally poor training and education of forensic scientists is one
cause of substandard performance. There is no defined or organized
preparation for the profession of forensic scientist.
55
[There] is no uniform or core curriculum or internship that
leads to the practice of criminalistics[;] there are no minimum
course requirements in terms of a structured program[;] there
is not even a consensus of what the educational requirements
should be in the specialized forensic science subjects[;] and
there are no codified standards of practice, either formal or
informal, in the identification aspects of criminalistics toward
which an educational program can be planned.
56
While forensic science has gained importance in the criminal justice
arena, it has not enjoyed a similar rise in stature in the academic corn-
the testing was an "internal review process," was used only for internal quality control, and
could not be made available to outside sources. Basically, then, one has to take it on faith
that this blind proficiency testing was well-designed and run. Such a proficiency program
does not support a general conclusion that forensic laboratories perform well.
55. The title of this law-science profession is not certain. It is referred to by a variety of
appellations including criminalistics and forensic science. See generally Blanke, Discus-
sion of "The Desirability of a Ph.D. Program in Forensic Science," 30 J. FORENSIC SCL
309 (1985); Kirk, The Interrelationship of Law and Science, 13 BUFFALO L. REV. 393
(1964); Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, 54 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE
SC. 235 (1963); Peterson & DeForest, The Status of Forensic Science Degree Programs in
the United States, 22 J. FORENSIC SC. 17 (1977).
56. Bradford, supra note 11, at 905. For similar discussions by others noting the lack of
specific requirements in some forensic science subspecialties see Risinger, Denbeaux &
Saks, supra note 20, at 772 n.183 (handwriting analysis); Peterson & DeForest, supra note
55, at 18 (examination of questioned documents); Cowger, Moving Towards Professionali-
zation of Latent Print Examiners, 24 J. FORENSIC SCL 591, 591 (1979) (fingerprinting
identification); Koenig, Spectographic Voice Identification, 13 CRIME LAB. DIG. 105,
115-16 (1986) (voiceprint examination); Winek, The Adversary System: Role of the Foren-
sic Toxicologist, 18 J. FORENSIC SC. 178, 179 (1973) (forensic toxicology); Wilkinson &
Gernghty, Bite Mark Evidence: Its Admissibility is Hard to Swallow, 12 CAL. W. L. REV.
519,538-39 (1985) (forensic odontology).
[Vol. 4
Spring, 1991] Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation
munity.57 Instead, the number of forensic science academic programs
has been declining.58 The remaining group has done little to define edu-
cational requirements.
The Council of Forensic Science educators has recently been
formed with the specific goal of developing standards for
forensic science education.... However, a uniform core cur-
riculum has not yet been adopted in the field, nor are intem-
ships widely available to enrich academic programs.
59
Furthermore, the few academic forensic science programs that do
exist are not particularly strong.6° Since they have modest enrollments,
57. The relationship between academic and practicing forensic science has been hapha-
zard. Cf. Peterson & DeForest,.supra note 55, at 25 ("Although at the local level colleges
and universities do interact with neighboring crime laboratories, there is no systematic or
regular exchange of information among schools and laboratories at a national level.").
58. "The number of college and university-based programs in forensic sciences... prob-
ably reach[ed] a high watermark of about 25 around 1978. [Since then] the number of
academic programs has been declining. At present, there are about 15." Gaensslen & Lee,
Regional Cooperation and Regional Centers Among Forensic Science Programs in the
United States, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1069, 1069 (1988). Many of the about 600 criminal
justice programs offer some courses in forensic science without offering a forensic science
degree. See Peterson & DeForest, supra note 55, at 18. See also Bashinski, supra note 27,
at 161: "Formal academic course work in forensic science is available in a few institutions
at both the undergraduate and graduate levels, the latter most notably in the Department of
Public Health at the University of California at Berkeley and in John Jay College of Crimi-
nal Justice at City College of New York."
59. Bashinski, supra note 27, at 161.
60. Crime laboratory managers and other forensic scientists have regarded degrees in
forensic science with suspicion. One survey concluded:
Another result ... which stands out is the lack of preference for the B.S. in
Crirninalistics/Forensic Science.... In the case of the crime lab directors, [it]
ranked last among the seven alternatives presented. Those who commented stated
that they felt that too many programs passing themselves off as forensic science
programs were actually little more than criminal justice programs with a forensic
science internship and a smattering of "hard" science.... [Tihere is apparently little
uniformity among programs which call themselves forensic science.
Siegel, The Appropriate Educational Background for Entry Level Forensic Scientists: A
Survey of Practitioners, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1065, 1068-69 (1988). See also Higgins &
Selavka, Do Forensic Science Graduate Programs Fulfill the Needs of the Forensic Science
Community?, 33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1015, 1017 (1988). (Summarizing another survey
which reached similar conclusions and elaborated on the preference for chemistry degrees
over Forensic Science Degrees); Peterson & DeForest, supra note 55, at 31 ("the capabili-
ties of graduates from the respective institutions are not uniform. Laboratories are forced to
evaluate each graduate individually .... ") Others have advocated that a forensic science
degree is better because
the forensic science major has selected his field and has demonstrated the motiva-
tion and ability to handle such a curriculum: he may have completed course work in
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university support is limited. Consequently, "few if any of the programs
can cost-effectively support a full-time faculty and staff appropriately
representative of the many subspecialties that make up forensic sciences
"61
As a result, forensic science faculty have heavy teaching loads, are
disproportionately composed of adjuncts, 62 and are not highly regarded
by academics in other areas. 63 Students, often not the strongest in the
institution,64 do not get the best possible education. 65 Because entry-
such areas as law, evidence, ethics, and criminal investigation which will speed his
transition into the field; he has acquired basic scientific concepts with an emphasis
on forensic science applications; and perhaps most important, he has developed a
forensic science ethic or way of thinking which is unique to this particular profes-
sion.
Id. Cf. Blanke, supra note 55, at 309 ("[O]ne can no more offer a Ph.D. degree in forensic
science than a Ph.D. degree in general science. Is it really possible for one individual to
master forensic pathology, forensic psychiatry, and all the other forensic specialties, to the
extent implied by a Ph.D. degree?").
61. Gaensslen & Lee, supra note 58, at 1069 ("there tends to be limited support for
space, equipment and supplies").
62. One survey found that forensic science specialists are much more likely than crimi-
nal justice faculty generally to be at a two year college than a four year institution and are
two-and-a-half times more likely to be an adjunct than the criminal justice faculty gen-
erally. These and other factors indicate that the forensic science faculty's "affiliation with
the university is temporary and not like likely to result in a stable, long-term relationship."
Peterson & Angelos, Characteristics of Forensic Science Faculty Within Criminal Justice
Higher Education Programs, 28 J. FORENSIC SCI. 552, 555 (1983). See also Higgins &
Selavka, supra note 60, at 1018.
63. Forensic science faculty do little research and produce few publications. See infra
text accompanying notes 90-93. "One cannot escape the fact that publications constitute
the primary means by which faculty are evaluated and in this regard the record of the foren-
sic science faculty... is not impressive." Peterson & Angelos, supra note 62, at 558.
64. "When questioned, institutions reported that most students [in a forensic science
degree program] fell into the 'above average' category but that very few could be rated as
'excellent."' Peterson & DeForest, supra note 55, at 32.
65. Peterson and DeForest report:
While many of the programs possess faculties with both specialized training and
experience in the forensic science field, others do not and depend entirely on adjunct
faculty for professional expertise .... The use of adjunct lecturers is quite accept-
able for the teaching of specialized courses but cannot- take the place of dedicated,
qualified full-time faculty....
Teaching environments should be avoided where experienced forensic scientists
serving as adjunct faculty are teaching courses where their own employees make up
the majority of students.... Ideally, educational institutions should introduce stu-
dents to a variety of alternative procedures so that the graduate can possess a
broader perspective upon entering the field.
Id. at 31-32.
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level salaries in forensic science are low, the top graduates often pick
other careers.
66
Since few colleges and universities provide adequate preparation for
potential forensic scientists, the real training and education occurs during
employment. "At present, professional training is achieved primarily
through on-the-job apprenticeship, workshops, and seminars.... The
major burden falls on the crime laboratories themselves to ensure the
professional development of their staff by providing in-house training
programs .... 67 This on-the-job training is often insufficient. "The
quality of training will be dependent on continued budgetary support.
Inasmuch as education is not the mission of a public service laboratory,
it will necessarily take on secondary importance when funding becomes
restricted or when services are in great demand.
'68
Reliance on on-the-job training is especially troublesome for the
numerous small forensic labs69 and for "many so-called 'full-service'
laboratories [where forensic scientists] are expected to be generalists
with expertise in several diverse areas such as drug chemistry, arson and
explosives, ballistics, toxicology, and trace evidence analysis."
70
Although some labs continue a generalist approach, even when unneces-
66. Salary data indicate:
While the median salary for new M.S. graduates in chemistry was near $27,000 in
1985, that is, a 13% increase over the 1984 figure of $24,000, a quick survey of the
offers expressed in the want ads for forensic science positions in the past six months
revealed that the median starting salary would fall between $22,000 and $25,000 for
similarly trained individuals in forensic science.
Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at 1016.
67. Bashinski, supra note 27, at 161-62. Many others have noted this fact. "Without a
standardized and relevant university education, a substantial amount of fundamental
instruction must be provided within the individual forensic science laboratories." Stoney, A
Medical Model for Criminalistics Education, 33 J. FORENsIc Sci. 1086, 1087 (1988). at
1087. See Bretz, supra note 38, at 511. See also Grunbaum, Professional Responsibility:
Development and Enforcement of Standards with United States Crime Laboratories for the
Genetic Marker Typing of Physiological Stain Evidence in ADvANCES IN FORENSIC
HAEMOGENETICS 501, 502 (B. Brinkmann & K. Henningsen eds. 1985) ("Most crime
laboratory analysts learn these techniques on the job or [in] workshops that are oriented
toward the transfer of technical skills."); Winek, supra note 56, at 179 ("The remainder of
[the forensic toxicologist's] training comes from the less formal 'on the job' or apprentice
type training.',).
68. Stoney, supra note 67, at 1088.
69. A recent survey found that half of the forensic science laboratories employed six or
fewer scientific personnel. Peterson & Angelos, supra note 62, at 13.
70. Grunbaum, supra note 67, at 502. See also Peninger v. State, 721 P.2d 1338 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1986); Rogers v. State, 721 P.2d 805 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986) (forensic scien-
tist who had typed blood and semen also did hair comparisons).
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sary,71 training anyone adequately for such positions seems impossible.
As a distinguished British forensic scientist recognized a generation ago,
"If forensic science is to grow as it should ... or is even to use all the
scientific knowledge which even now it could, it just has to be a colla-
borative affair. No one can now be an expert in all its branches."
72
Thus, a person does not become a forensic scientist through formal edu-
cation or a prescribed apprenticeship, but by convincing the right agency
to employ him and by having his work accepted in court.
What are the entry requirements [to forensic science]?
Employment and function. One joins the profession when one
is hired by a crime laboratory and when one begins to write
reports and to testify in court. In effect, the entry gate of our
profession has been delegated to individual civil service
boards and to individual judges. Educational requirements,
such as they are, are determined by individual laboratories.
73
One forensic scientist maintains, "The fundamental requirements of
achieving a high standard of performance and accuracy in forensic sci-
ence are a good general scientific education coupled with specialised
training in the subject and a constant monitoring of performance." 74 if
accurate and reliable work demands these components, the quality of our
crime laboratories is in trouble. American forensic science has no
guarantee that its practitioners have that necessary education or special-
ized training.
75
71. "In many crime laboratories, forensic scientists are specialists in one of these subdis-
ciplines of criminalistics. In other laboratories, a 'generalist' approach is employed, with
analysts rotating through various areas of the laboratory." Bashinski, supra note 27, at 160.
72. Walls, Whither Forensic Science?, 6 MED. SC. & L. 183, 183 (1966).
73. Stoney, supra note 67, at 1088. The standards for consultant forensic scientists are
even less. Criminalists who work as private consultants are neither licensed by the state nor
certified by any professional group. They are self-appointed experts." Grunbaum, Prob-
le'ns Inherent in the Analysis of Rape Evidence-State of the Art, FORUM: CAL. ATT'YS
FOR CRIM. JUST., SepL--Oct., 1986, at 30, 31.
74. Pereira, Quality Assurance in Forensic Science, 28 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 1, 1
(1985).
75. A reliance upon on-the-job training has proved detrimental to clinical laboratory
quality.
In its development, this complex scientific activity has been beset with a variety of
problems'relating to quality assurance. Initially, [clinical] tests were performed by a
limited number of skilled persons and by individuals receiving varying amounts of
on-the-job training. As the technology developed, these marginally trained indivi-
duals could not keep pace with the introduction of newer and more complicated
methods. The need for scientific education was recognized early by some workers
in the field; while others erroneously held to the position that on-the-job training
was sufficient if certain external controls were applied.
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Furthermore, forensic scientists are not required to establish com-
petence by obtaining a license or certification. Although states require
licenses for many occupations, 76 no jurisdiction requires a forensic
scientist to be licensed.77 Even when the forensic scientist performs the
same analytical procedures that require a licensed professional outside
the crime laboratory, he is not required to be licensed. For example, to
determine whether a bloodstain at the crime scene came from the defen-
dant, the forensic scientist must type the defendant's blood. This typing
uses the same procedures used in a blood bank or a hospital. States that
are concerned about the accuracy of clinical typing, require clinical
analysts to be licensed. However, they make no such demands on the
forensic serologist. "To reduce error [in medical laboratories], you have
to prove and demonstrate competency in that lab or office where the tests
are being done."78 This concept is simply not applied by the states to
forensic science laboratories.
Forensic scientists have failed to rectify the lack of governmental
oversight with a self-regulation system. A few voluntary certification
programs do exist,79 but forensic science has not developed general,
national standards to assure competency. 80 Indeed, the largest segment
of forensic science has fiercely resisted even a voluntary certification
program.
Bodily, Foreword to FEDERAL LEGISLATION AND THE CLINICAL LABORATORY at x
(M. Schaeffer ed. 1981).
76. "License" means a mandatory permit required to practice a profession legally.
"[Professionals, including lawyers, doctors, nurses, clinical analysts, pharmacists, teachers,
even hairdressers and barbers, must meet certain educational standards and qualify to be
licensed to practice their profession." Grunbaum, Genetic Typing of Physiological Stain
Evidence: A Proposal for Quality Assurance Guidelines, FORUM: CAL. ATr'YS FOR
CRIM. JUST., Nov.-Dec., 1984, at 11, 14.
77. "Thus far, no state has enacted licensure for crime laboratories, although several
have requirements in restricted areas such as forensic alcohol analysis." Bashinski, supra
note 27, at 166.
78. Hearings, supra note 20, at 43 (statement of Dr. George M. Hoffman, American
Society of Clinical Pathologists).
79. See, e.g., Bashinski, supra note 27, at 166 (noting the uneven pace at which
certification programs have developed in various areas of the forensic sciences).
"Certification" is used in the sense of a profession regulating itself: "a voluntary process of
peer review whereby a practitioner is recognized as having attained the minimum
qualifications necessary to practice in one or more particular disciplines of criminalistics."
Id. "Certification" is, thus, being used differently from its use in other fields where
certification only comes after a license to enter the profession has been obtained.
80. E.g., Bretz, supra note 38, at 511. See also Giannelli, The Admissibility of Labora-
tory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 01HO ST. L. J.
671, 690 (1988) ("National standards to ensure the competency of [forensic] examiners
have not been developed.").
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A proposal for national certification [of criminalists] was
made in 1979 by the national [Criminalistics Certification
Study Committee] on the basis of a 3-year study of the issues
conducted under the auspices of the [Law Enforcement Assis-
tance Administration.] This proposal did not receive support
of the majority of the profession at the time, and the profes-
sion has yet to adopt a national certification program.
8'
That the proposal did not receive support is an understatement. It was
"resoundingly rejected by the criminalists. ' '82 It "was defeated by a
2-to-1 margin."
83
Voluntary certification, even if widely prevalent, would have only a
limited effect on forensic science quality even if widely prevalent. As
clinical laboratory studies establish, nonmandatory regulatory systems
are not as effective in producing quality control as are mandatory
programs.
84
Moreover, certification can be meaningful only if it has important
consequences. "The value of certification is in the prestige and
economic advantage afforded to those certified. '85 For example, physi-
cians certified as specialists "benefit economically and [are] eligible for
more hospital affiliations." 86 However, no consequences flow from the
lack of a forensic science certificate. Courts do not deny forensic scien-
tists expert status because they lack certification. 87 The forensic scientist
continues to work with or without participation in one of the few existing
certification programs. The following statement concerning certification
for fingerprint analysts applies generally to all forensic scientists:
In a 1982 report on a certification program given to "existing
fingerprint experts," fifty-three percent failed the exam.
Because fingerprint "experts" need not be certified to qualify
81. Bashinski, supra note 27, at 166-67.
82. Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 14.
83. Peterson, Ethical Issues in the Collection, Examination, and Use of Physical Evi-
dence, in FORENSIC SC. 34,43 (G. Davies ed. 1986).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 6-11. Consequently, as one health worker con-
cluded, "Delegation of authority to peer review organizations is clear abdication of the
regulatory role." Hearings, supra note 20, at 59 (statement of Herbert W. Dickerman, New
York State Department of Health).
85. M. BARAM, ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION: MANAGING RISKS TO HEALTH,
SAFETY AND THE ENVIRONMENT 62 (1982).
86. Id. at 64.
87. Or at least I have found no such cases. Cf. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra
note 25, at 61 ("We found [forensic science certification programs] virtually unknown to
the bar and bench.").
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as experts, those that failed the test can be expected to testify
in court.88
Not surprisingly, no published study has shown that the few certified
forensic scientists perform any better than their uncertified colleagues.
89
Since forensic scientists as a group are not well educated or trained,
since they are not required to demonstrate their capabilities, and since
most resist voluntary programs requiring demonstrations of their abili-
ties, good reasons exist to distrust the quality of their work. There are,
however, further causes of poor crime lab performance.
B. University and Crime Laboratory Research
While one might expect universities to be a major source of forensic
science research, 90 they actually do very little of it.
As a matter of practice, academic institutions are heavily
involved in basic scientific research, so it seems only logical
that graduate programs in forensic science should be actively
88. Bretz, supra note 38, at 511 (citing Bonebreak, International Association for
Identification, Newsl. to Chesapeake Division (1982)).
89. Certification can only be effective if the certifying bodies have an effective disci-
plinary mechanism in the event of incompetence. At the present time, courts make some
attempt to control forensic experts. See McCarty v. State, 765 P.2d 1215 (Okla. Crim. App.
1988). The court reversed a capital murder conviction because a forensic scientist, Joyce
Gilchrist, gave personal opinions on scientific matters beyond her scientific capabilities.
Even though the court concluded that Ms. Gilchrist had violated the ethical code, she was
not reprimanded. See also Fox v. State, 779 P.2d 562 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (court
found that Gilchrist again gave an opinion outside of her scientific knowledge). But cf.
M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 78 (reporting the statement of a former
chair of the ethics committee of the American Academy of Forensic Sciences that the com-
mittee had never concluded that an expert witness had asserted an opinion unwarranted by
the available data).
90. All forensic science practitioners, however, do not welcome more research from
academic institutions. A survey found that many forensic scientists
felt that an atmosphere should exist where the research conducted in this country is
the result of a combined effort by academia, state, federal, and local laboratories and
national research laboratories. Many others felt that the state laboratories know the
problems, have more experience with them on a "grass-roots" level, and therefore
should do more research, but that these laboratories lack time and funding.
Academic laboratories were posited to have time, and the federal laboratories to
have funding and time, but the respondents felt that these labs conduct too much
esoteric research that is useless for practitioners who lack the instrumentation or
skills to utilize such research.
Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at 1019.
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involved in such research. However, the fact remains that far
less than what is expected is actually performed in the
academic atmosphere.
91
A survey of forensic science academies showed that "95% spent less
than 25% of their time on research ... , and none of the respondents
reported that they devoted more than 50% of their time to research
activities .... 92 Furthermore, those few with a research orientation
have difficulty finding money to support their efforts. "[O]pportunities
for external grants and contracts to which many parent institutions
expect programs to look for additional support of both programmatic and
research activities are very limited." 93
The absence of university research harms the quality of the forensic
sciences 94 and forces the research on to the crime laboratories. These
facilities, however, cannot produce much significant research. Those
who go into crime labs typically lack the training and skill required to be
good research scientists. As noted above, the academic programs that
produce many forensic scientists often have low status and do not attract
the best students.95 Research-inclined students are unlikely to enter such
programs. Forensic science instructors, not themselves researchers, are
unlikely and probably unable to teach their students the fundamentals of
good research.
Moreover, well-educated forensic scientists with good research skills
have little time and few resources for research. "[H]igh case backlogs
are the rule, not the exception, in forensic science, and there is generally
little time or money available to allow for research in this environ-
ment. '96 Surveys find that the mean amount of time spent in crime labs
researching new laboratory techniques is 4.4%97 and that those
91. Id. at 1016; but see Smith, Liu & Lindquist, Research Experience and Future Crimi-
nalists, 33 J. FORENsIC SCi. 1074, 1075 (1988) (supporting the assertion that "a substan-
tial portion of forensic science research does originate from universities").
92. Peterson & Angelos, supra note 62, at 555.
93. Gaensslen & Lee, supra note 58, at 1069.
94. "The lack of [research and writing] hinders the faculty member's long-range profes-
sional development and learning. It also retards the development of new scientific pro-
cedures and knowledge that are crucial to the growth of-the forensic science profession."
Peterson & Angelos, supra note 62, at 558. See also Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at
1018 (noting that the heavy reliance on adjuncts for forensic science education bodes ill for
research).
95. See supra text accompanying notes 60-66.
96. Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at 1016.
97. See Peterson, Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, The Capabilities, Uses, and Effects of the
Nation's Criminalistic Laboratories, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 10, 19 (1985); but see id. at 20
("In terms of published journal articles, 36% of the laboratories surveyed reported they had
at least one article published in a scientific journal in 1982.").
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laboratories not involved in research outnumber those that are.98 Com-
mentators have concluded that "American crime laboratories are not
research laboratories, and many crime laboratory analysts have neither
the education, training, time nor resources to conduct extensive reliabil-
ity experiments." 99
C. Peer Review and Forensic Science
This research picture indicates that good forensic studies are few, and
that forensic scientists are generally outside of the peer review system.
Science usually takes place in a setting where the scientific community
judges the work of fellow scientists. As one commentator notes,
"[S]cience is in some respects a self-governing republic, with scientists
deciding what is good work and what is not." 1°° This self-governance
takes place through peer review. 10 1 "Peer review has ... been labeled
'institutional skepticism' and is best understood as a process that allows
the scientific community to police itself."' 0 2 Although peer review may
encompass many formal and informal procedures, 10 3 one of the two
98. See Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at 1019.
99. Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 13. Since few people in universities and practicing
crime labs are doing research, a small number of federal laboratories are the major source
of good, extensive research. However, they cannot truly fill the need.
Thus, the onus is placed on others to perform the basic research required for the
improvement of the discipline. Three large national laboratories, the Drug Enforce-
ment Administration (DEA), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF),
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), have the funding and facilities avail-
able for the basic research in forensic sciences. However, it is clear that these three
organizations cannot be solely responsible for fulfilling all the research needs of the
entire forensic science community. The DEA laboratory reported a decline in the
amount of time devoted to research from 4 to 1.5% for the 1978 to 1982 interval,
and the ATF's decrease ranged between 5 and 7% for the same period.
Higgins & Selavka, supra note 60, at 1016.
100. Goldberg, The Reluctant Embrace: Law and Science in America, 75 GEO. LJ.
1341, 1361 (1987).
101. Cf. Anderson, The Federal Government's Role in Regulating Misconduct in
Scientific and Technological Research, 3 J.L. & TECH. 121, 125 (1988) ("The three princi-
pal self-correcting mechanisms of science are replication of experimental work, peer review
of proposals for funding, and merit review of articles before publication in scientific jour-
nals.').
102. Note, Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies,
and the Courts, 7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 32 (1987) (quoting W. LOWRANCE,
MODERN SCIENCE AND HUMAN VALUES 85 (1985)).
103. See, e.g., Woolf, Deception in Scientific Research, 29 JURIMETRICS J. 67, 81-82
(1988) ("[P]eer review is often quite narrowly construed as consisting only of editorial peer
review.... Mhe definition [should include] all the evaluative processes of collegial
interaction-from lab seminars to public professional meetings, from reading a paper for a
friend to assessing it for grant support.") (emphasis in original).
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major peer review mechanisms is the critical review that takes place
when a scientist seeks funding for research. Most granting agencies rely
on panels of experts to assess the worth of a proposal. 1°4 "Research
funded by such agencies, therefore, has often survived intense and
highly competitive screenings.
10 5
Scientific publishing provides the other major peer review mechan-
ism. In determining whether a manuscript should be published, the edi-
tors of most respected scientific journals seek the comments and analyses
of the author's peers. 10 6 Thus, published articles must also have sur-
vived an intense and highly competitive screening.
The peer review process in funding and journal decisions requires
scientists whose careers are dependent on grants and publications to con-
tinually propose and carry out projects that will be carefully assessed for
their scientific rigor. This provides a powerful inducement to do quality
work. 10 7 Since forensic scientists do not spend much effort on research,
rarely publishing or seeking grants, they do not experience the forces of
the peer review system that push science towards quality.
10 8
104. The funding system for the National Institutes of Health ("NIH") provides a typical
example. The NIH
use advisory panels, known as "study sections," which consist of fourteen to twenty
independent nongovernmental scientists that review the scientific and technical mer-
its of all research grant proposals. These study sections make recommendations to a
separate advisory council, which in turn makes funding recommendations on indivi-
dual grant proposals to NIH.
Note, supra note 102, at 33-34. See also Monahan & Walker, SocialAuthority: Obtaining,
Evaluating, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 500 (1986)
("Federal funding agencies generally rely on an expert review panel to evaluate the metho-
dological adequacy of research proposals.").
105. Monahan & Walker, supra note 104, at 500.
106. Cf. id. at 500 (discussing peer review in the context of research publications within
the social sciences).
107. These peer review processes serve not only as inducements to do quality research,
but also have an educational function. The reviewers for the funding agencies and the pub-
lishers usually give written critiques of the proposals. Scientists who make submissions
learn how some other scientists believe better quality science can be done. Indeed, many
proposals that are rejected are improved as a result of peer review evaluation, resubmitted,
and then accepted for funding or publication. Thus, this peer review process is an active
process impelling scientists towards better science as well as a mechanism for quality con-
trol.
108. Forensic science operates more like an industrial science than an academic science.
Because industrial science is subjected to little peer review, it tends to be less reliable than
science produced in other areas. Furrow, Governing Science: Public Risks and Private
Remedies, 131 U. PA. L. REv. 1403,1411 (1983).
Compare the view expressed in J. POKLEMBA, supra note 50, at 44, which argues that
courts should not look to publications in peer review journals to determine whether DNA
profiling should be admitted, but instead suggests the creation of a Scientific Review Board
to act as an adviser to the courts by assuming "some of the traditional functions tradition-
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D. Forensic Scientists and Scientific Thinking
Forensic scientists are neither trained nor forced to think like "scien-
tists." Scientists seeking to advance knowledge about the empirical
world do not rely on assertions, convictions, or mere logic. Instead, they
analyze and test hypotheses. 0 9 The process is always dependent on
skepticism and doubt.'10 Skepticism promotes inquiry, experimentation,
and validation that may remove that doubt.111 The scientist looks at
hypotheses and determines how they can be proved wrong by reproduc-
ible experiments."I2 Only after the possible shortcomings of an assertion
are tested and the experiments fail to discount the hypothesis does a new,
accepted scientific thesis emerge.
113
ally performed by publications and peer reviews."
109. Sir Karl Popper, the distinguished philosopher of science, has explained:
A scientist... puts forward statements, or systems of statements, and tests them
step by step. In the field of the empirical sciences,... he constructs hypotheses, or
systems of theories and tests them against experience by observations and experi-
ment.
K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 27 (1968). See also Black, A
Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 622 (1988), (quoting
Afterword to THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES at 650 (F. Suppe 2d ed. 1977)).
110. "Of course, there is no one scientific method. The techniques used to develop and
test hypotheses necessarily vary for different disciplines." Note, The Scientific Model in
Law, 75 GEO. L.. 1967, 1970 n.16 (1987) (emphasis in original).
111. Cf. Note, Different Standards and Conflicting Results: A Re-Evaluation of the Test
for Admitting Novel Scientific Evidence in Light of Decisions Involving Spectrographic Evi-
dence Introduction, 5 REV. LITIGATION 327, 364 (1986) ("Science thrives on doubt.
Scientific skepticism promotes inquiry and experimentation, and, hence, advances our
understanding of the world around us.").
112. Sir Karl Popper states:
Theories are ... never empirically verifiable.... [But a system is] empirical or
scientific only if it is capable of being tested by experience. These considerations
suggest not the verifiability but thefalsifiability of a system is to be taken as [the]
criterion of demarcation.... [lIt must be possible for an empirical scientific system
to be refuted by experience.
K. POPPER, supra note 109, at 40-41 (emphasis in original). Popper points out that exper-
iments must be reproducible to be part of scientific proof. See also Walls, supra note 72, at
187 (explaining that scientific hypotheses can only be disproved).
113. The emergence of a thesis has been compared to the process of evolution:
[W]hat characterizes the empirical method is its manner of exposing to falsification,
in every conceivable way, the system to be tested. Its aim is not save the lives of
untenable systems but, on the contrary, to select the one which is by comparison the
fittest, by exposing them all to the fiercest struggle for survival.
K. POPPER, supra note 109, at 42. See also Goldberg, supra note 100, at 1342-43; Black,
supra note 109, at 623. Cf. Monahan & Walker, supra note 104, at 502 (referring to con-
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The good researcher must either have or develop a probing, skeptical
mind that can design experiments to test scientific assertions. Most
forensic scientists have not been placed into a crucible that is likely to
forge that kind of analytical thinking. They are unlikely to have had the
opportunity to learn how to design experiments which answer rigorous
questions. Even if they have the abilities, most forensic scientists have
not been educated to ask and answer probing questions; they have not
been taught to develop skepticism and curiosity; they have not been
trained to do experiments."14 As a consequence, the research that they
do is frequently of low quality."15 Forensic scientists often lack the
capability to do rigorous research validating their analytical tech-
niques. 116 And techniques without thorough validation can only produce
suspect results.
sensus among social scientists that research methods must justify the investigator's conclu-
sions). One court rejected the testimony of a graphologist who formed opinions about per-
sonality and mental states from handwriting. The court concluded, "[G]raphology is not a
science because its results are neither verifiable nor repeatable." State v. Davis, 154 Ariz.
370, 375, 742 P.2d 1356, 1361 (1987).
114. Cf. Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 13 ("There is a general uncritical belief that accep-
tance of a method within the community of crime laboratory analysts is proof of its reliabil-
ity.").
115. See Shapiro & Charrow, Scientific Misconduct in Investigational Drug Trials, 312
NEW ENG. J. MED. 731, 736 (1985) (concluding that one of the chief reasons for the
incompetent scientific work presented to the Food and Drug Administration is that "some
investigators have neither the research training nor the inclination to undertake serious,
rigorous scientific trials").
116. These patterns also raise the question of how many "forensic scientists" are "scien-
tists." If "scientist" means one who seeks to advance knowledge about the empirical world
by testing ideas in a scientifically rigorous manner, then few in forensic science are scien-
tists. Instead, the profession is heavily peopled with those that merely apply techniques
that they have been taught; it is populated with scientific technicians. But cf. Kirk, The
Interrelationship of Law and Science, supra note 55, at 394.
Others seek to distinguish forensic technicians from those who can interpret the results
of a procedure.
By definition, the role of the criminalist includes the interpretation of physical evi-
dence in written reports and in court testimony. Although crime laboratories may
use technicians for some restricted routine analytical tasks, most forensic scientists
practice at the professional level and are directly responsible for both the analytical
work and the interpretation, reporting, and testimony derived from that work.
Bashinski, supra note 27, at 162. Merely interpreting and reporting results, however, does
not make one a scientist. A person may be able to interpret a sphygmomanometer and
report blood pressure. That ability does not make a scientist.
Lawyers tend to group all technically trained persons under the generic title scien-
tist. We have mentioned laboratory technicians who are skilled in a number of rou-
tine analyses.... At another level are scientists who make inferences from the
results of those tests. For example, how reliable is the presumption that a person
recently fired a handgun if a swab of the palms reveals a certain concentration of
barium or antimony?
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E. Lack of Empirical Validation
Forensic science is supported by almost no research. 117 The labora-
tory practices are based on intuitions and deductions, not on empirical
proof. For example, "the forensic profession has not undertaken ...
research to determine the optimal conditions in which to do their work
and maximize their accuracy. One can only be astounded at the volume
of research on eyewitness accuracy and the paucity of parallel work on
forensic science accuracy."'
1 8
Fiber comparisons provide an illustration. Wilkaan Fong, a Califor-
nia forensic scientist, noting a three-decade absence of literature on the
methodology of textile fiber evidence, set out to detail better analytical
methods for fiber. identifications. 19  These procedures included
"[c]omparisons against fibers of similar description, but from another
source .... done through the rapid interposition of the two slides." 120 In
a conclusion crucial to the validity of such a procedure, he contended,
"The ability to compare the directly viewed fiber with the retained men-
tal image of another fiber is sufficient in virtually all instances."
121
Strong criticism followed: "The available scientific literature on suc-
cessive color matches does not support Fong's ... belief that reliable
color matches can be made with retained mental images.... The pro-
cedure suggested by Fong is therefore likely to introduce a systematic
Symposium, supra note 5, at 633 (comments of Ann Hurley). The scientist is the one who
answers that reliability question not by deduction or assertion, but by trying to find alterna-
tive explanations for the presence of those substances and by subsequently examining the
empirical proof about those possibilities.
117. Little basic research of any kind gets done in forensic science.
[Forensic science) progress has been technical rather than fundamental, practical
rather than theoretical, transient rather than permanent. Many persons can identify
the particular weapon that fired a bullet, but few if any can state a single fundamen-
tal principle of identification of firearms. Document examiners constantly identify
handwriting, but a class of beginners studying under these same persons, would find
it difficult indeed to distinguish the basic principles used. In short, there exists in
the field of criminalistics a serious deficiency in basic theory and principles, as con-
trasted with the large assortment of effective technical procedures.
Kirk, The Ontogeny of Criminalistics, supra note 55, at 235. See also Koblinsky &
Sheehan, The Desirability of a Ph.D. Program in Forensic Science, 29 J. FORENSIC SCI.
706, 707 (1984) (stressing the unrecognized need for forensically oriented basic research).
118. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 20, at 775 n.189.
119. Fong, Fiber Evidence: Laboratory Methods and Observations from Casework, 29
3. FORENsIc SCI 55,55 (1984).
120. Id. at 58.
121. Id. at 97.
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bias into color comparisons.""12 Fong responded by questioning the
relevancy of the other scientific literature and concluded, "Whether or
not a comparison microscope is an essential need is to be left to the indi-
vidual worker as determined by his or her work situation. However, no
one can deny that an essential need in the practice of the criminalistics
art is wisdom."
1 3
The response, however, misses the point. Wisdom may be valuable
in science, just as wisdom may be valuable elsewhere, but wisdom has
little use without a scientific answer to the question. Science requires
that skeptical, probing questions be met with testable answers verified in
a reproducible manner. Only empirical work can provide an answer to a
scientific dispute. Fong did not supply the necessary empiricism; he just
made an assertion. That is not science.
Fiber comparisons comprise only a tiny segment of the forensic sci-
ences. Fong's dispute with his critics would be insignificant if it did not
typify a frequent pattern in forensic science. Forensic science is not an
abstract, theoretical undertaking. It is a practical, real life endeavor
which purports to employ the workings of the empirical world. 124 No
matter how intelligent the forensic scientist, he cannot prove that a foren-
sic science technique works as claimed with nothing more than a clever
explanation. He can only establish efficacy through empirical validation.
The electrician can give a perfectly sensible explication of why her wir-
ing job is perfect, but the homeowner should be satisfied only after turn-
ing on the lights and verifying that everything works as claimed. The
same should be true for forensic science, 125 but the basic maxim of
122. Rowe, Discussion of "Fiber Evidence: Laboratory Methods and Observations from
Casework," 30 1. FORENSIC SCL 602, 602-03 (1985) (citing Newhall, Burnham & Clark,
Comparisons of Successive with Simultaneous Color Matching, 47 J. OPICAL SOC. AM.
43 (1957)). See also Preliminary Report-Committee on Forensic Hair Comparison,
CRIME LAB. DIG., July, 1985, at 50, 53 ("The use of a high quality comparison micro-
scope is mandatory when comparing the microscopic characteristics of hairs to distinguish
between subtle or slight differences that may exist between hairs from different individu-
als.").
123. Fong, Author's Response, 30 J. FORENSIC SCI. 603, 603 (1985) (emphasis in ori-
ginal).
124. Cf. S. GOULD, HEN'S TEETH AND HORSES TOES 254-55 (1983) ("The final
proofs of logic and mathematics flow deductively from stated premises and achieve cer-
tainty only because they are not about the empirical world.") (emphasis in original).
125. In fact, forensic scientists should take particular care:
The question whether someone or some technique can do what it purports to do
is fundamental, not only for handwriting identification, but for a great variety of
endeavors. Can astrology predict the course of a person's life? Can a biomedical
test detect the presence of a particular disorder? ... The answers to these and simi-
lar questions are generally pursued by conducting empirical studies to evaluate the
extent to which the claims are fulfilled.... These kinds of empirical evaluations
enable us to separate the more effective from the less effective techniques and the
[Vol. 4
Spring, 1991] Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation
science often gets ignored in forensic science, where claims without
empirical validation are frequently presented as fact. 126
Identification by foot impressions provides another example. Foot-
prints with details like fingerprints -friction ridges, scars, and wrinkle
patterns-may be as unique as fingerprints. 127 But forensic scientists
have claimed that foot impressions without such delineations are also
unique. Dr. L. M. Robbins, writing in 1978, asserted that "[t]he informa-
tion on footprint (and foot) morphology is especially significant because
it elucidates the individuality of each person's footprints.... The com-
bined effects of heredity and life experiences are operative in determin-
ing the size and shape of our feet; and for each of us, the manifestation
of those effects is uniquely our own." 12 That assertion, however, has
not been validated by scientific experimentation. As two forensic scien-
tists recently noted, "There is ... little or no published data that support
valid from the invalid theories .... There is no other way to determine which is
which.
Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 20, at 735-37.
126. See Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1238 ("Overstatements by experts about the conclu-
sions that can be drawn from various scientific techniques are not uncommon."). See also
Starrs, supra note 7, at 289 (describing many unsupported opinions by forensic scientists.)
Edward T. Blake, a forensic scientist associated with a DNA typing lab, has noted:
We should be quick to debunk the untenable claims for DNA technology. For
example, we have heard claims of [DNA] analysis on vaginal swabs collected more
than 24 hours postcoitus.... We know from routine casework that 24-hour vaginal
swabs do not ... provide the requisite amount of DNA. These uncritical claims
damage the credibility of DNA technology.
Blake, Scientific and Legal Issues Raised by DNA Analysis in BANBURY REPORT 32:
DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 115 (J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh &
J. Witkowski eds. 1989).
127. See Grubb & Morton, Discussion of "The Individuality of Human Footprints," 25
J. FORENSIC SCI. 271, 271 (1980); see also Commonwealth v. Bartolini, 299 Mass. 503,
13 N.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 304 U.S. 365 (1938). The Court noted:
There was no error in permitting the witness Wentworth to testify that [bloody]
footprints of a naked foot on the linoleum floor of the bathroom at the house of the
deceased were made by the same person who had made prints at the police station
identified as those of the defendant.... There was also ample evidence that foot-
prints, like finger prints, remain constant throughout life and furnish an adequate
and reliable means of identification.
Id. at 513, 13 N.E.2d at 388.
128. Robbins, The Individuality of Human Footprints, 23 J. FORENSIC SCI. 778, 784
(1978). See also Laskowski & Kyle, Barefoot Impressions-A Preliminary Study of
Identification Characteristics and Population Frequency of Their Morphological Features,
33 J. FORENSIC SCI. 378, 379 (1988) (listing similar assertions from other sources).
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these conclusions. These statements have either gone unnoticed, or have
been accepted without equivocation by a large part of the forensic sci-
ence community."'129
Bite mark evidence provides yet another illustration of untested asser-
tions. Although courts have admitted such evidence for decades, 130 they
have not xequired forensic odontologists to demonstrate empirically the
validity of their proposition that bite marks are unique. For example, in
the Missouri case of State v. Sager,131 a dentist, after examining photo-
graphs of a bite mark on the victim's breast and a cast of the defendant's
teeth, concluded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant had
made the bite mark.132 The appellate court, after reviewing the trial
court record and the literature about bite mark identifications, concluded
"that forensic odontology, inclusive of bite mark identification, is an
exact science. It is exact in the sense that through acceptable scientific
procedures, an expert can form an opinion useful to the courts in their
quest for the truth." 133 Perhaps the odontologist can give a useful opin-
ion for the courts, but that does not make the opinion scientific. Science
is not the acceptance of assertions that seem to make sense; science is
the search for empirical data that confirms or disproves the assertions.
The Sager court did not point to any studies that validated the asser-
tion that bite marks could be used to make unique identifications.
129. Laskowski & Kyle, supra note 128, at 379. Grubb and Morton assert:
Dr. Robbins offers the idea that in the absence of the individualizing detail of this
type footprints are unique with respect to their morphology, but she leaves us
without the pertinent information to accept the idea.... [Before accepting the vali-
dity of Dr. Robbins' idea, we need to answer important questions such as] how
much variation can occur between consecutive footprints of an individual, and ...
how much variation occurs among many different individuals [with] approximately
the same foot size.... How much variation is allowed before one can form an
opinion of exclusion? ... How closely do two impressions have to correspond
before they can be identified as originating from the same individual?
Grubb & Morton, supra note 127, at 271. Laskowski and Kyle do provide some empirical
.data, but as the title of their article indicates, their work can be seen as preliminary at best.
For example, they studied footprint impressions from 107 adult men made in a wooden tray
containing a mixture of fine clay, fingerprint powder, and bathroom scouring powder. How
would conclusions reached from such research translate into the actual forensic practices of
impressions left in the soft soil of a garden bed or the marks left by bloody feet? No pub-
lished study appears to give answers. Despite this, defendants often do not challenge this
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Farmer, 47 Cal.3d 888, 254 Cal. Rptr. 508, 765 P.2d 940
(1989) (defendant did not dispute the identification of his footprints).
130. See Wilkinson & Gerughty, supra note 56, at 529-35 (discussing cases which have
admitted bite mark evidence).
131. 600 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980).
132. See id. at 563.
133. Id. at 569.
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Indeed, almost no such research exists. Forensic scientists writing after
Sager have concluded, "Few experimental studies have been carried out
to determine the reliability of comparative techniques of bite marks in
food or skin.... Where is no generally accepted approach to the
evaluation of bite marks ...... ,134 There is no science of bite mark
analysis.
135
While fiber, bite mark, and footprint analyses may seem to be on the
fringe of the forensic sciences, the patterns they represent are not.
136
Conclusions are frequently presented by people claiming to be scientists,
134. Rawson, Vale, Sperber, Herschaft & Yfantis, Reliability of the Scoring System of
the American Board of Forensic Odontology for Human Bite Marks, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI.
1235, 1236 (1986). See also Rawson, Ommen, Kinard, Johns & Yfantis, Statistical Evi-
dence for the Individuality of Human Dentition, 29 J. FORENsIc SCL 245, 245 (1984);
Wilkinson & Gerughty, supra note 56, at 536-37 (noting the failure of bite mark studies to
address the question of specificity of bite mark analysis).
135. While a group of scientists has attempted to fill the research gap, they could only
conclude, "The scoring guide evaluated here is the beginning of a truly scientific approach
to bite mark analysis." Rawson, Vale, Sperber, Herschaft & Yfantis, supra note 134, at
1259. See also Wilkinson & Gerughty, supra note 56, at 547.
[T]hat a standard technique for analyzing bite marks has not been established speaks
strongly for the proposition that bite mark analysis remains in its incipient stages of
development.... [r]here also does not appear to be any established plan or pro-
cedure for advancing forensic bite mark knowledge along the scientific lines neces-
sary for testing the validity of the fundamental hypothesis underlying the principle
of bite mark analysis, namely, its uniqueness.... Exhaustive research has failed to
reveal any published data concerning the classification of bite mark characteristics
on any segment of the population.
Id.
136. Human hair comparisons provide yet another area where assertions have been
presented without research. See Barnett & Ogle, Probabilities and Human Hair Com-
parison, 27 J. FORENsIc SC. 272, 272 (1982) (reviewing the literature on hair comparis-
ons).
Beginning in 1974, [two forensic scientists] published a series of papers con-
cerning the probabilities of human hair comparison. Their conclusions are cited by
expert witnesses when asked about the certainty of a hair comparison. Nonetheless,
in the seven years that have elapsed since the publication of the first of these arti-
cles, there has been no attempt reported in the literature to confirm [the] work or cri-
ticize [the] treatment of [the] data.
Id., but see Gaudette, A Supplementary Discussion of Probabilities and Human Hair Com-
parisons, 27 J. FORENSIC SC. 279, 279 (1982) (responding that Barnett and Ogle do not
understand well the "underlying principles and concepts" of the work on hair comparisons).
Writing more recently, Aitken and Robertson conclude, "The benefit of following the
[published] method of evaluating hair evidence ... would be that it would encourage the
use of standardized nomenclature and a uniform approach to hair examination [that] should
improve the overall ability of hair examiners to discriminate hairs. However, ... [the
necessary] data base lies some way in the future, and to date, there has not been the willing-
ness on the part of funding agencies to support such a scheme." Aitken & Robertson, A
Contribution to the Discussion of Probabilities and Human Hair Comparisons, 32
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but who have neither analyzed the basis of their own assertions nor
undertaken experiments to test those hypotheses. 137 When they do test
their claims, they too often do it only after having already relied upon a
new technique. Research patterns indicate that testing is frequently
motivated not by the forensic scientists' scientific impulses but because
of probing questions about the accuracy and reliability of forensic pro-
cedures raised by those outside of the field. 138 Voiceprints, identification
of protein markers in bloodstains, and the recent DNA "fingerprinting"
all illustrate this pattern.
The high speed sound spectrograph is a device for the study of acous-
tics. Some researchers, believing that every person's voice patterns are
unique, concluded that the spectrograph could be used forensically to
make "a graphic representation of the frequency spectrum of a segment
J. FORENSIC SCI. 684, 689 (1987). See also, Note, Splitting Hairs in Criminal Trials:
Admissibility of Hair Comparison Probability Estimates, 1984 ARmZ. ST. L.J. 521, 530
(reviewing the scientific research and concluding that "[t]here are no available studies that
have determined a forensically significant level of dissimilarity between hairs").
137. Sometimes even when a forensic scientist has collected data that would be useful to
forensic science, the scientist does not analyze and present it. For example, an FBI review
article on gunshot residue ("GSR") explains that tests for GSR examine hands for traces of
barium and antimony. The article notes that this test is not foolproof because hands may
have traces of these elements without having fired a gun, and people can fire guns without
leaving barium and antimony on their hands. See also Kilty, A Review of the FBI
Laboratory's Gunshot Primer Residue Program, CRiME LABORATORY DIG., April, 1986,
at 54, 57. The article concludes that there can be several explanations for the lack of
antimony and barium deposits on the hand. The FBI in its test firings surely has generated
data that sheds light on how often a gun is fired without leaving gunshot residue, but even
so, the FBI does not present that information. It leaves completely speculative the question
of how exculpatory it might be for a suspect to have hands free of these elements when the
criminal has fired a gun. See Reed, McGuire & Boehm, Analysis of Gunshot Residue Test
Results in 112 Suicides, 35 J. FORENSIC SCI. 62 (1990) (GSR tests in suicides by firearms
only found residues consistent with firing a gun 38% of the time). See also Stone, Capabil-
ities of Modern Forensic Laboratories, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 659, 666 (1984) ("Over
the last ten years in Dallas, the forensic laboratory has reported positive evidence of
gunshot residue metals in about forty percent of all suicides with handguns. In analyzing
handwipings from live suspects, fewer than ten percent revealed positive evidence of resi-
due.").
This data makes the testimony reported by Saks and Van Duizend interesting. The
prosecution produced a forensic expert to prove that defendant's companion had not fired a
gun. He said that he found no gunshot residue on the companion's hand, "that this was
indicative of his not having fired a gun ... [, and] that residue is found through this test in
75 to 80 percent of the cases." M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZAND, supra note 25, at 41.
138. For example, many probing questions about bite mark identifications seemed to
have been raised first in an influential law student article written after People v. Marx, 54
Cal. App. 3d 100, 126 Cal. Rptr. 350 (1975) (admitting bite mark evidence). Note, The
Admissibility of Bite Mark Evidence, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 309 (1978).
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of recorded speech."' 139 The resulting "voiceprint" could absolutely
identify a voice, it was declared. With some research undertaken, the
advocates of voiceprints began to use the spectrograph forensically. A
number of courts allowed this evidence to be used in criminal cases.
140
The forensic science community did not skeptically examine the
claims made for voiceprints. A scientific controversy erupted only when
scientists in other fields questioned the adequacy of the spectrograph
research and produced studies indicating much less accuracy than that
asserted by the proponents. 141 Meanwhile, voiceprint identifications
continued.
In response to this debate, the Federal Bureau of Investigation asked
the National Academy of Sciences to review voiceprint technology. A
Committee on Evaluation of Sound Spectrograms analyzed the research
and concluded that the underlying theory of voiceprints had not been
validated and that existing data did not support the proponents' claims of
high accuracy. 
142
Even after the report, many courts continued to allow the introduction
of such evidence. 143 Nevertheless, one group reported that as of 1985
no further respected scientific studies have been published
which alter or invalidate the findings of the 1979 National
Academy of Sciences study. There still is no scientific data
that proves the fundamental premise upon which the technique
is based, namely: voice uniqueness. Nor is there available
authoritative data on the effect on voice spectrograms of nasal
or oral surgical operations, muffling of the voice, mimicking
[and so on]. Such data would appear to be a necessary prere-
quisite to scientific acceptance based on proven reliability. 144
Indeed, only in 1986 did a forensic scientist, in a study with important
139. Note, supra note 111, at 333.
140. Not all courts, however, admitted the voiceprint evidence. See A. MOENSSENS,
F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 5, at 665-69 (surveying cases).
141. The history of the scientific research is presented in Note, supra note 111, at
332-40.
142. Committee on Evaluation of Speech Spectrograms, On the Theory and Practice of
Voice Identification (1979). The report is summarized in A. MOENSSENs, F. INBAU &
1. STARRS, supra note 5, at 663-64. See also Note, supra note 111, at 339-40.
143. See A. MOENSSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 5, at 669 ("[E]arlier
court trends, some going away from admissibility, others going towards it, continued").
144. Id. at 684.
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limitations,145 produce research to fill any of these gaps."46 Even with
his work, the scientist could still only conclude that the future of forensic
spectrographic analysis remained unsettled.
147
Another example of this research pattern can be found in the area of
conventional genetic marker analysis. In the late 1960's, forensic scien-
tists began to use electrophoresis, a procedure with many scientific appli-
cations, to type various proteins in bloodstains. By the late 1970s, the
technique was widely used,148 and in 1981 the first appellate court to
consider the issue upheld the admissibility of this form of blood typ-
ing.1
49
The next year, however, a law review article by this author surveyed
145. The researcher issued an important caveat about his study: "Mhe error rates were
determined from direct feedback from field investigators which may not always be
correct .. " Koenig, supra note 56, at 115. Indeed, his method of determining voiceprint
mistakes hardly seems scientific:
After each [FBI] examination ... , a written report of findings is mailed to the con-
tributor... If an identification or elimination is made, the contributor is contacted
by telephone and asked if the results are consistent with interview and other evi-
dence in the investigation. If other information strongly supports the voice com-
parison result, the contributor is told to contact the FBI if later developed evidence
contradicts the finding. If the voice comparison results contradict the other evi-
dence, the matter is closely followed until legally adjudicated or investigatively
closed. In the few occurrences where no final determination was possible, the voice
comparison result was considered a "no decision."
Koenig, Spectrographic Voice Identification: A Forensic Survey, 79 J. ACOUSTICAL Soc.
AM. 2088,2089 (1986).
Koenig also noted that "the educational and training requirements of the FBI examiners,
the criteria for quality and quantity of comparable words, and the sophisticated scientific
procedures available to the FBI exceed the standards normally used and/or available to
most other practitioners in the field." Koenig, supra note 56, at 115.
146. See Koenig, Spectrographic Voice Identification, supra note 145, at 2089.
147.
[The future for forensic spectrographic comparisons will] probably lead in one of
two directions: either to providing testimony using the FBI standards and the admis-
sion in court of a realistic error rate of approximately 1% ... or to severely limiting
testimony and using the results principally as an investigative aid for law enforce-
ment.
Koenig, supra note 56, at 117.
148. "[Protein gel electrophoresis] was used in thousands of cases in the late 1970's and
was accepted by courts in several states." Note, supra note 50, at 510 n.273. See also
BUDOWLE & MURCH, ELECrROPHORESIS RELIABILITY. II. HISTORICAL USE IN THE
FBI LABORATORY, VALIDITY, AND SCIENTIFIC SCRUTINY (unpublished manuscript)
(history of electrophoresis development in FBI Laboratory).
149. State v. Washington, 229 Kan. 47, 622 P.2d 986 (1981).
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the scientific literature on bloodstain genetic marker analysis. 150 It found
that almost no research had been published demonstrating that such
analysis could be done reliably on the kinds of bloodstains actually
encountered in forensic work-bloodstains that are aged, degraded, or
contaminated. Further, some of the sparse research actually indicated
the likelihood of producing inaccurate typing results on such samples.
151
In 1986, the Michigan Supreme Court held electrophoretic protein
typing inadmissible because the technique's reliability on real crime
samples had not been established:
Reliability remains in dispute and unresolved because of the
questions unanswered. The questions are not likely to be
answered and the reliability of electrophoresis of evidentiary
bloodstains established until independently conducted valida-
tion studies on the thin-gel multisystem analysis are under-
taken and comprehensive control tests evaluating the effects
of different contaminants are run, and the results have been
subjected to the scrutiny of the scientific community. The evi-
dence produced by electrophoresis should, therefore, not have
been admitted.
152
Only after these events did forensic scientists produce and publish
research attempting to prove that they could accurately type the proteins
in the kinds of bloodstains associated with real crimes. Even if that
research could answer the previously raised questions about the forensic
application of the technique, 153 the unscientific pattern is important.
150. Jonakait, Will Blood Tell? Genetic Markers in Criminal Cases, 31 EMORY L.
REV. 833 (1982).
151. See id. at 875-912.
152. People v. Young, 425 Mich. 470,476,391 N.W.2d 270,272 (1986).
153. See Wraxall & Stolorow, The Simultaneous Separation of the Enzymes Glyoxalase
I, Esterase D, and Phosphoglucomutase, 31 J. FORENSIC SCL 1439 (1986). This "Techni-
cal Note" was criticized by FBI scientists:
The majority of the space in their paper is devoted to reporting work that was com-
pleted before 1978.... It appears that the paper was submitted and published only
in an attempt to satisfy criticism which has been leveled at the authors by certain
factions. One of the criticisms is that the method was never properly subjected to
the scrutiny of the forensic science community through its publication in a reputable
scientific journal.
Murch, Kearney & Budowle, Discussion of "The Simultaneous Separation of the Enzymes
Glyoxalase L Esterase D, and Phosphoglucomutase," 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1498, 1498
(1987). After further analysis of the article, the authors concluded that "the paper by Wrax-
all and Stolorow did little to strike at the heart of the criticisms confronting its use. The
paper did not support their scientific claims...." Id. at 1499. Wraxall and Stolorow
responded:
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Conclusions preceded research. Untested assertions remained accepted
until they were challenged from outside forensic science. 1
54
The rapidly unfolding DNA profiling saga also fits this pattern. DNA
evidence has been used in numerous cases 155 even though many com-
mentators have pointed out that almost no research exists to support the
reliability of the technique on forensic samples. 156 Only now, after
forensic s~ientists have attested to reliability many times in court, has
some of this necessary research started to appear. 157 Once again, the
We are gratified to see that the FBI used and taught the Group I method from 1979
to 1986 and found the method to be a reliable and valid electrophoretic approach for
the analysis of serological materials. We note that the FBI has accumulated a large
amount of data on the validation of the Group I system and would encourage them
to contribute this data in published form which, by their own account, is long over-
due.
Wraxall & Stolorow, Author's Response, 32 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1500, 1500 (1987). Black
summarizes these exchanges and concludes, "To some extent, even the developers of the
multi-system test have acknowledged the need for more data to establish its validity and
reliability." Black, supra note 109, at 634 n.201.
154. See Budowle & Allen, Electrophoresis Reliability: 1. The Contaminant Issue, 32
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1537 (1987) (written in response to People v. Young). The article
attempts to establish that contamination of forensic samples is not a problem for protein
marker typing because the effects of contamination can be predicted and recognized by a
competent analyst.
155. Note, supra note 50, at 466. ("Forensic DNA testing has been employed in hun-
dreds of criminal cases nationwide.").
156. See, e.g., Comment, DNA Printing: The Unexamined "Witness" in Criminal Tri-
als, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 665,671-72 (1989).
Government scientists, primarily those of the British Home Office, have published a
few studies of DNA printing under forensic conditions. In 1988, however, the head
of the [FBI's] serology unit admitted: "We've only done a limited number of tests
yet. So we can't say with absolute certainty that [the technique] works on different
sizes of stains, aged stains, [or] putrefied stains."
Scientists from Lifecodes Corporation ... have published articles discussing tri-
als of their technique under modest simulations of forensic conditions....
The other two commercial laboratories have offered even less information about
the reliability of their methods of forensic testing.... Independent verification of
forensic DNA printing's reliability is clearly necessary.
Id. See also Thompson & Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic
Identification Tests, 75 VA. L. REV. 45, 107 (1989) ('To meet a more rigorous application
of Frye, ... proponents of the test will need to make a better showing of reliability on
forensic samples"); Note, supra note 50, at 482-83 ("Not enough research has been done
on contaminated samples at this point to understand exactly how contamination affects the
results.").
157. See, e.g., McNally, Shaler, Baird, Balazs, DeForest & Koblinsky, Evaluation of
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) Isolated from Human Bloodstains Exposed to Ultraviolet
Light, Heat, Humidity, and Soil Contamination, 34 J. FORENSIC SCL 1059, 1059 (1989);
McNally, Shaler, Baird, Balazs, Koblinsky & DeForest, The Effects of Environment and
Substrata on Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA): The Use of Casework Samples from New York
City, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1070, 1070 (1989) (noting the deficiency of published reports
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point is not whether this research answers the critical questions, 158 but
whether the conclusions given by forensic scientists are supported by
accepted research. 1
59
addressing the environmental and substrata effects on DNA). These two papers were the
product of the Lifecodes Corporation. Scientists from that company had testified many
times to the reliability of DNA typing before these studies were done.
Certainly all the needed research has not been produced. See, e.g., Neufeld & Colman,
When Science Takes the Witness Stand, SCI. AM. May, 1990, at 46.
Two years ago, when DNA evidence was first introduced in U.S. courtrooms,
most forensic DNA scientists rejected the existence of band shifting. But now some
experts think band shifting occurs in perhaps 30 percent of forensic DNA tets.
There are now many theories about the cause, but as of this writing not one refereed
article on the subject has been published.
Id. at 51.
158. A news article written after some of the recent research concludes:
Leading molecular biologists say [that DNA profiling] is too unreliable to be used
in court.... Many say they are leery enough of the method that they would not
allow their DNA fingerprints to be taken if they were innocent suspects in a criminal
case.
The problem, the scientists say, is that the DNA fingerprints can stretch and
shift, like a design printed on rubber, making them difficult, if not impossible, to
interpret. They say that even without these shifts, DNA patterns can be almost
impossible to compare. And they say the scientific underpinnings have not been
established for determining just how unlikely it would be for DNA fingerprints from
two people to match by accident.
Kolata, Some Scientists Doubt the Value of "Genetic Fingerprint" Evidence, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 29, 1990, at 1.
159. The FBI has indicated that they will continue to follow this pattern. "John Hicks,
the assistant director of the laboratory division at the F.B.I, said his unit had brought DNA
evidence into court 35 times since December 1988." Id. at 1, 18. Cf. Note, supra note 50,
at 471 n.31 ('I]he FBI has conducted over 500 DNA tests and already has a backlog of
150 cases."). Earlier at a conference on the forensic applications of DNA profiling, Hicks
stated that the FBI has
tried to address the questions that we know are of concern to the courts. But we are
going to [keep] moving forward with the technology without having it in publica-
tion. The papers are being prepared and will be published; but knowing the publica-
tion process, it will be months from now, a year perhaps, before the studies that we
have carried out will be in print. In the meantime, we are going to be doing the
work.
BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 101
(J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989) [hereinafter BANBURY REPORT]
(comments of John W. Hicks).
The willingness to present untested assertions as established fact is not limited to those
forensic experts who work in crime labs. See, e.g., Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony to
Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383 (1989). Levy discusses how a California
psychiatrist, Roland Summit, formulated the "child sexual abuse accommodation syn-
drome" not as a test of whether abuse had occurred, but to improve therapy. The formula-
tion was based on impressionistic findings, not on empirical data. Id. at 393-95. Even so,
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These examples covering diverse areas of forensic science- from
fiber comparisons to DNA profiling, from bite marks to voiceprints-
indicate a widespread pattern of poor research practices. Forensic scien-
tists present opinions and conclusions without research. They fail to test
the accuracy and reliability of their work until questions are raised by
others.
These practices raise concerns about the quality of the forensic sci-
ences. Certainly, the results of procedures and techniques supported
only by the assertions or deductions of some forensic scientists, rather
than by rigorous research, are suspect. But the research patterns raise a
more fundamental concern. They indicate that substandard scientific
thinking pervades these fields. Since the lack of scientific rigor is so
widespread, even forensic science research which does occur may not be
done adequately. Techniques and procedures based on inferior research
should be as suspect as those based on no research. Even though inferior
scientific techniques may not exist in all areas of the forensic sciences,
enough substandard practices exist to suggest severe quality problems
for crime laboratories.
F. The Special Needs of Forensic Science Research
Forensic science requires good research perhaps more than any other
area of scientific inquiry. Unlike many other endeavors, forensic science
is often unable to adopt scientific knowledge and techniques from related
areas. Frequently, there is no related discipline to draw upon. Only the
forensic scientist is interested in studying for identification purposes such
things as bullets, toolmarks, and fingerprints.
In addition, even when a crime lab field relates to other scientific
areas, the work done by forensic scientists is fundamentally different
from work done in the other areas. Their mission is not to identify a
sample in the way other scientists might, but instead to distinguish the
sample from other specimens. 16° Crime scene samples are often unique,
experts now rely on the syndrome in their testimony to establish that abuse took place. Id.
160. "The real aim of forensic science is to establish individuality, or to approach it as
closely as the present state of science allows. Criminalistics is the science of individualiza-
tion." Kirk, supra note 117, at 236. "Above all, the criminalist is a specialist in
identification and determination of the source of evidence items." Kirk, supra note 116, at
394. Cf. Comment, supra note 156, at 667 ("All forensic identification methods aim to iso-
late physical qualities or traits that vary among individuals. The value of any particular
method lies in its ability to individualize a subject.").
The forensic scientist does not just try to catalog the components or the characteristics
of an object, but instead tries to determine if two objects had a common origin. This makes
forensic science identifications unique. See also Barnett & Ogle, supra note 136, at 272:
"Most of the evidence examined by criminalists falls into the category of associative evi-
dence, that is, evidence that tends to associate one person, place or thing with another per-
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of unknown origin and unascertainable history. In contrast, most
scientific researchers know what they are working with and its history.
Whereas most scientists would not work with samples that have been
dropped on the floor, the samples for a DNA identification quite literally
may have been scraped off the linoleum. 161 It cannot be assumed that
research on pristine, known samples applies to the contaminated,
degraded, aged samples of unknown history confronted by the forensic
scientist. Validation studies must be done specifically on samples
approximating forensic condition. This issue, which has been raised
with respect to DNA profiling162 and blood tests, 163 is relevant to many
other areas of forensic science as well.164 It is only conjectural to
son, place or thing." Since the goal of the work is different from the work of other scien-
tists, the procedures and knowledge from those other areas can not always be simply
transferred to forensic science. "Common origin determination is often what is sought, and
this too sets the crime lab apart from other types of testing laboratories. No other
proficiency testing program concerns itself with the possibility of common sources of test
samples. These different approaches do not lend themselves to the type of testing that is
carried out by most other types of 'testing' laboratories." LEAA, supra note 1, at 26.
161. Biochemist Richard Roberts of the Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory explained that:
samples in the lab are sterile; if a sample fell on the floor, he would throw it out and
start over, "but in forensics, all of the samples have been on the floor, so you don't
really know what you have got."
Note, supra note 50, at 481 (quoting Cooke, Standards Sought for DNA Testing, Newsday,
June 15, 1989, at 27). Significantly, an expert in medical laboratory testing indicated that
the main reason for analytical inaccuracies in medical laboratories is "[s]pecimen contami-
nation or deterioration." Hearings, supra note 20, at 356 (statement of Mark S. Birenbaum,
American Association of Bioanalysts).
162. Comment, supra note 156, at 670-71 (comparing forensic DNA analysis unfavor-
ably with clinical DNA analysis).
163. See, e.g., Jonakait, supra note 150, at 841 (stressing that the forensic serologist
works with dried blood which is obviously different than the fresh blood with which other
scientists normally work).
164. The issue of whether a scientific technique can be validly applied to forensic situa-
tions is a frequent one.
For many applications of science to forensics, the underlying theory is well esta-
blished, and legal debate rages mainly over whether one must prove only that a
technique is generally accepted for scientific research or, more strictly, that the tech-
nique is reliable when applied to forensics.
Why the distinction between nonforensic and forensic applications? Scientists
commonly accept that when any technology is tried in a different application, such
as forensics, it must be tested thoroughly to ensure an empirical understanding of
the technique's usefulness and limitations. Indeed, many a technique that has
proved reliable for research... has turned out to be of questionable reliability when
applied to forensic casework.
Neufeld & Colman, supra note 157, at 49.
Bite marks provide yet another example. While it may be that each set of teeth is
unique, it does not necessarily follow that uniqueness can be established in the materials
150 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 4
conclude that the techniques and tools developed for related disciplines
can be accurately applied to crime lab work without first validating those
scientific procedures under forensic conditions.165 The assumption that a
method proved valid in one area can be applied in crime laboratories has
frequently led to faulty results.
166
with which a forensic scientist has to work.
While dental chart analysis allows comparison of inlay substances, root abnormali-
ties, and other factors not directly related to anatomical configuration, bite mark
analysis relies solely on the comparison of anatomical features. Bite mark analysis
thus rests on two additional postulates: first, that the anatomical configuration of
every mouth is unique, and second, that this asserted uniqueness is graphically
displayed in the bite mark.
Note, supra note 138, at 323. See also Rawson, Ommen, Kinard, Johns & Yfantis, supra
note 134, at 252 ("This mathematical evaluation of a general population sample demon-
strates the uniqueness of the human dentition beyond any reasonable doubt.... The real
concern now is the determination of the match between the dentition and the impression or
bruising of the skin or other material.").
165. Cf. Frank & Gunn, Standardization of Forensic Drug Analyses, 19 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 163, 163-65 (1974) (comparing the work of inspectors for the Food and Drug
Administration and those doing forensic drug analyses).
[FDA] evidence is usually in a bottle or container labeled with the manufacturer's
name, active drug components, etc. The composition of the material is known
because the product must meet FDA standards....
To determine whether or not a drug meets the requirements, it is subjected to
physical and chemical tests that have been established to specifically demonstrate
that the substance is, or is not, the same as that identified on the label of its con-
tainer. Since the composition of the material is on file, specific tests, which have
been set up for the particular product and subjected to scientific scrutiny, can be
used for the examination....
[On the other hand, forensic drug] evidence is frequently obtained in undercover
buys in unmarked containers; it may be a pure drug or may be cut with diluents or
excipients. The illicit manufacturer is not a member of the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association ... , and the illicit distributor ... is not concerned with
labeling his product....
In short, because there is a great variance in the type of material being submitted
for the [forensic drug analyst's] examination, it is necessary to use a wide range of
methodology in analyzing the material.
Id.
166. See Strong, Questions Affecting the Admissibili of Scientific Evidence, 1970
U. ILL. L. F. 1, 18. See also Starts, supra note 7, at 296 (examples of valid techniques
inappropriately applied to novel areas). Cf. Starrs, "A Still-Life Watercolor": Frye v.
United States, 27 J. FORENSIC Sci. 684, 686 (1982) ("The distinction between the validity
of a principle and the validity of a technique applying it in concrete circumstances is crucial
in determining whether expert testimony should be admitted or not."). Cf. Giannelli, supra
note 9, at 1212.
A novel forensic technique, however, may involve either the new application of a
well-established theory or the application of a new theory. In the latter case, the
theory can be validated only empirically or inferentially, not deductively. In other
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Since a cautious forensic scientist cannot readily use research tech-
niques from other areas, forensic science has a greater need for research
than other areas. This characteristic, however, is not the only one indi-
cating that forensic science has exceptional needs for research. Special
needs arise in forensic science because the use of a technique or test will
not validate or expose the flaws in those procedures as it does in other
scientific and technical areas.
[A] new scientific procedure will normally go through a
three-step process.... Suppose, for example, that some types
of blindness are caused by tiny blood vessels in the eyes wear-
ing out and bursting. A scientist... [w]orking on animals...
develops a laser surgery technique that he believes can stop
the bleeding without doing damage to the rest of the eyeball.
He publishes his results.
Other eye specialists reading this report may be impressed
by it, agree with the theory behind it, and understand how the
new procedure should alleviate the condition. They would not
yet, however, accept the procedure as reliable. Instead,
verification through the use of controlled studies would next
be required ... to see if the procedure worked the cure as
claimed; and.., to see if any limitations, such as side-effects,
could be discovered.
If the new procedure passed the controlled studies.... [t]he
ultimate test would be the actual use of the technique in gen-
eral practice. Any limitations that were not unearthed in the
studies would surface as the procedure was used under various
circumstances. It might be eventually learned that while the
surgery at first seem to be successful with diabetics, after a
words, the successful application of the technique proves the validity of the underly-
ing theory or principle.
Id. Some courts do recognize this critical issue. Compare State v. Huynh, 49 Wash. App.
192, 742 P.2d 160 (1987) (noting that gas chromatography was validly accepted as a
method of determining the type of accelerant used in an arson and for comparing for
identification purposes liquid gasoline samples. The technique, however, was used to iden-
tify a weathered and burned accelerant at the fire scene. The court held that the resulting
evidence was inadmissible because of insufficient empirical validation of gas
chromatography's ability to identify this kind of forensic specimen) with Santiago v. State,
510 A.2d 488, 489 (Del. 1986) (allowing the evidence to be admitted after concluding "that
the gas chromatograph is commonly relied upon by forensic scientists throughout the coun-
try"). It may be that this result is correct, but the court did not ask the right question. The
court should have asked whether the technique was reliable or relied upon for the particular
forensic purpose that generated the evidence.
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year or so the blood vessels burst again causing greater prob-
lems than before. Certainly, only when a procedure has gone
through these three steps -development of methodology,
verification of the claimed results, and actual employment of
the new technique can the community of concerned scientists
know both the procedure's reliability and its limitations.
1 67
The last step, however, is often absent in forensic science because the
use of a forensic technique will not necessarily show its flaws. For
example, the use of a hospital blood test will reveal its limitations, but
the use of the seemingly related forensic method will not:
Unlike hospitals that test undeteriorated, uncontaminated
blood using established techniques designed to assure safe
transfusions, crime labs have no way of knowing if they are
right or wrong in finding a match based on deteriorated, con-
taminated blood samples examined with a technique
developed by police scientists. In the hospital, patients would
die if the blood test did not work, but complaints from inno-
cent defendants cannot be distinguished from the protestations
of the guilty.
168
167. Jonakait, supra note 150, at 846-52. Cf. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra
note 25, at 74. Saks and Van Duizend assert: "A scientific or professional field has a
powerful defense against unsubstantiated or exaggerated conclusions: replication. Profes-
sional/technical fields that apply such knowledge have a 'defense': erroneous principles
will be found out because patients will not get well, planes will not fly, or chemicals will
not [be] synthesized." Id. For further comments on replication and the peer review system,
see Neufeld, Admissibility of New or Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases in BAN-
BURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 80 (Q. Ballantyne,
G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989); Woolf, supra note 103, at 82; Symposium on
Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 188 (1983) (comments of Renee Fox); Note,
Of Reliable Science: Scientific Peer Review, Federal Regulatory Agencies, and the Courts,
7 VA. J. NAT. RESOURCES L. 27, 31-32 (1987) (quoting Hamad, Creative Disagreement,
19 SCIENCES 18-20 (1979)).
168. Black, supra note 109, at 634. If the procedure has erroneously exculpated some-
one, no protest whatsoever may be heard. See also Jonakait, supra note 150, at 851.
mhe forensic scientist does not put his results to a scientific use that invariably
show the limitations and liabilities, if any, of the procedures. When the forensic
laboratory classifies a blood sample's PGM into one of its genetic variants, this
classification is not merely a research step upon which that forensic scientist or oth-
ers will continue to build. The scientist's job conversely, ends with that categoriza-
tion rather than putting these findings to any further use. Consequently, if for some
reason the procedures to detect genetic markers in dried and aged blood falsely
detect PGM "I" as "2-1," this incorrect result will not necessarily be discovered by
any subsequent scientific use or practice.
Id. Neufeld, supra note 167, at 80:
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This pattern, of course, is not restricted to blood tests. It applies to
many forensic methods including the ballistics procedure, fingerprint
comparison, and drug analysis.
In addition, the possible effects of crime laboratory errors should
compel extra research. Liberty and even lives are at stake in forensic
work. While this may be true for the medical lab, crime laboratory
errors can be even more significant. Medical procedures often have
inherent quality checks that tend to disclose errors.169 Moreover, abso-
lute precision is not required for many medical tests. A test that reports
a cholesterol level of 150 when the result should have been 165 is prob-
ably precise enough. Ninety percent accuracy may still mean that a
medical test is performing adequately in all cases.
170
The same would not be true for many forensic procedures. They
often are not quantitative. Their function is to present a clearcut "yes or
Regrettably, in most forensic science-although the initial stages of validation are
generally complied with-once a new technique is developed, it is put into
immediate use in crime laboratories and no further nonforensic research is con-
ducted. The results are not carried forward in ways that would detect any limita-
tions.
169. For example, only four bands are possible in DNA profiling for diagnostic pur-
poses, and this limitation provides a consistency control on the work. By contrast, the
probes used in forensic DNA can produce a hundred bands, many of which will occur close
to, or even overlap with, each other. Note, supra note 50, at 484. Moreover, in clinical
testing, a physician may recognize a lab result that is inconsistent with a physical examina-
tion or with the patient's history. A re-test may be ordered, and lab errors may conse-
quently be discovered. See Bogdanich, Medical Labs, Trusted as Error Free, Are Far
From Infallible, Wall St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at. 1, col. 6 ("Sloppy lab work isn't as obviously
dangerous as incompetent surgery [since] errors are often caught by a patient's physician.").
See also Caplan, Drug Testing in Urine, 34 J. FoRENSIC SCe. 1417, 1420-21 (1989) (com-
menting that incorrect forensic reports have serious ramifications because they do not come
with the information normally included in a personal history).
170. Additional medical procedures make absolute accuracy unnecessary:
The results of clinical laboratory procedures are provided to the patient's physi-
cian who combines this information with the patient's medical history and clinical
symptoms to either make a diagnosis, prescribe treatment, or monitor a patient's
health or medical treatment. ... In most instances, the accuracy of clinical labora-
tory procedures is much greater than that required by the clinician who utilizes the
information.
Hearings, supra note 20, at 354 (statement of Mark S. Birenbaum, American Association
of Bioanalysts).
The consequences of a mistaken medical report, while important, will often not be as
irreversible as the mistaken forensic analyses. For example, a clinical test that reports a
cholesterol level at 260 when it should have read 190 may cause medicines, diet, and exer-
cise to be prescribed, but the competent physician will continue to monitor the cholesterol
level, and soon the doctor will conclude that the elevated reading was an aberration. Once a
case is closed, however, forensic evidence is unlikely to be questioned further.
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no" answer. Are these the defendant's fingerprints? Was the bullet fired
from this gun? Does the bloodstain on the defendant's clothes match the
victim's blood? Answers to such questions are either right or wrong.
Ninety percent precision will not lead to a procedure that works well in
all cases, but to a procedure that is wrong in one out of ten cases. Since
forensic tests may require more precision than tests in other areas, foren-
sic procedures need extra experimental development.
Moreover, poor training and education create special needs for
research and validation. Few of the needed empirical studies, however,
are done. As a consequence, the quality of crime lab work suffers.
III. QUALITY CONTROL PRACTICES
A. Lack of General Quality Control Programs
The effect of inadequate education, training, and research on reliable
and accurate forensic results might be mitigated if these facilities had
meaningful quality control programs-formally instituted procedures
that, if followed carefully, assure the best possible results.171 Crime labs,
however, are not required to follow quality control plans. 172 Thus,
171. Cf. Hearings, supra note 20, at 225 (statement of Virginia L. Worrest, Medical
Consultant) ("Quality control is a series of regularly followed procedures that assure a cer-
tain level of accuracy to a test result.").
The FBI draws a distinction between quality control and quality assurance programs:
Although often used interchangeably, QA [quality assurance] and QC [quality con-
trol] refer to specific quality functions. The function of QA is to provide evidence
that the QC function is being performed adequately. This is accomplished through
the use of external QA requirements .... such as analysis of blind and open
proficiency samples and audits. The QC functions are internal activities .... which
ensure that the quality of the product ... is maintained and will meet and satisfy
specified criteria.
Mudd & Presley, Quality Control in DNA Typing: A Proposed Protocol, 15 CRIME.
LABORATORY DIG. 109, 111 (1988). See also Kearney, Guidelines for a Quality
Assurance Program for DNA Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Analysis, 16
CRIME LABORATORY DIG. 40,41 (1989).
172. Just as individuals do not have to be certified to work in crime laboratories, see
supra text accompanying notes 76-84, laboratories as entities do not have to be licensed or
certified to operate, and thus, no mechanism now exists to ensure that laboratories follow
good quality control measures. See Comment, supra note 156, at 673-74.
[U]nlike clinical laboratories and blood banks, forensic laboratories need no
certification to operate.... A private forensic laboratory typically is not subject to
government regulation, inspection, or licensing with respect to performance stan-
dards. Government-operated crime laboratories set their own standards; there are
accrediting organizations, but accreditation is voluntary.
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"[q]uality control in American crime laboratories remains on the honor
system."'173 This system, however, has not produced widespread quality
control programs. 174 Instead, forensic science has often treated the topic
of quality control with hostility.175
Id. The American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors formed a Laboratory Accredita-
tion Board in 1981, and in the next year accredited the forensic labs in the Illinois state sys-
tem. Moenssens, Admissibility of Scientific Evidence-An Alternative to the Frye Rule, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 545, 561 n.64 (1984). This accreditation is a totally voluntary
program, and thus, "[a]t present, forensic science is virtually unregulated-with the para-
doxical result that clinical laboratories must meet higher standards to be allowed to diag-
nose strep throat than forensic labs must meet to put a defendant on death row." Lander,
Population Genetic Considerations in the Forensic Use of DNA Typing, in BANBURY
REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 505 (J. Ballantyne,
G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989).
173. Comment, supra note 156, at 674.
174. "The application of formal [quality assurance and quality control] programs to
forensic laboratories is not widespread ...." Mudd & Presley, supra note 171, at 109. See
also Keamey, supra note 171, at 41; Peterson, The Crime Lab in THINKING ABOUT POL-
ICE 184, 196 (C. Klockars ed. 1983) ("Crime laboratories are unique among publicly sup-
ported scientific operations in that few participate in external quality assurance programs.").
Cf. BANBURY REPORT, supra note 159, at 244 (comments of C. Thomas Caskey, Institute
for Molecular Genetics, Baylor College of Medicine) ("[W]hile the mechanisms for quality
control are being put in place in forensic laboratories, it is clear that they are not very far
along that pathway compared to other types of diagnostic laboratories."); Mudd & Presley,
supra note 171, at 109 ("Although the application of formal [quality assurance and quality
control] programs to forensic laboratories is not widespread and little information has
appeared in the forensic science literature...., a great deal has been written on the applica-
tion of [such] programs to clinical and federally operated laboratories.").
Some laboratories, of course, have instituted quality control programs on their own.
For descriptions of several such attempts, see Brunelle, Garner, & Wineman, supra note 54,
at 774; Keamey, supra note 171.
Forensic science has not even developed widely accepted criteria for quality control.
See J. POKLEMBA, supra note 50, at 15 ("There are no widely accepted criteria for quality
control or proficiency testing for forensic laboratories at a state or national level."). See
also Pereira, supra note 74, at 1.
Part of the reason for the lack of consensus on quality control, as well as for other
forensic science issues, is the fierce independence many labs maintain. See Lucas, Leete &
Field, supra note 3, at 72.
Forensic science laboratories ... developed for the most part independently of
each other.... While there is considerable professional cooperation between labora-
tories particularly through the various scientific societies, there is also some
jealously guarded independence particularly between local, State and Federal
authorities. As a result, a national blind proficiency testing program is beyond
comprehension.
Id.
175. "The topic of quality control is one that is regarded with suspicion and contempt by
most scientists, including those in the forensic laboratory." Thomson, Bias and Quality
Control in Forensic Science: A Cause for Concern, 19 J. FORENSIC SCI. 504, 510 (1974).
510.
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Assuring quality, however, is crucial for forensic laboratories.
Experience and data have shown that quality control programs are neces-
sary for guaranteeing proper clinical lab performance. 176 The absence of
such plans from crime laboratories only assures unreliable testing by
forensic facilities.1
77
Instead, of instituting and following good, formal quality control pro-
cedures, forensic laboratories too often cling to methods and routines
that only decrease accuracy and reliability. A few of these practices
illustrate the depth of the problem.
B. Lack of Protocols
Scientists in other areas live by protocols. Protocols, the lists of
instructions for performing scientific procedures, are the recipes of sci-
ence. Like good recipes, good protocols are tested procedures that, if
followed, assure that the desired results are most likely to occur.
178
Scientific procedure and common sense dictate the use of such proto-
cols. If the scientist and others are to have confidence in the results,
tested procedures must be followed to get those results. Procedures that
do not follow an established protocol can only produce experimental out-
comes. Of course, a crime lab should not be reporting these experimen-
tal results as scientific fact. 179 The importance good science places on
adherence to protocols is illustrated by a study of scientists disciplined
by the Food and Drug Administration. Eighty percent of those disci-
176. "The farther a lab operates from a quality assurance system that includes personnel
standards, proficiency testing, and inspection, the less accurate its results are likely to be."
Hearings, supra note 20, at 392 (statement of the American Association of Clinical Chem-
istry). "[Elvery laboratory needs an internal quality control program to assure I) that the
staff understands and properly uses procedures, 2) that reagents, media, solutions, equip-
ment, and procedures perform as expected, and 3) that only reasonably accurate and reliable
information is reported to the clinician." LaMotte & Robinson, supra note 20, at 48.
177. Cf. Brunelle, Garner & Wineman, supra note 54, at 774 ("Quality assurance in
forensic science laboratories is no less important than quality assurance or control in
government regulatory laboratories, clinical laboratories, or in industry. The prosecutor,
defense attorney, judge or jury, and, of course, the defendant have every right to expect
accurate and reliable results from forensic science laboratories."); Pereira, supra note 74, at
1; Caskey & Hammond, DNA-based Identification: Disease and Criminals, in BANBURY
REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 128 (J. Ballantyne,
G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989).
178. Even when tested procedures are followed, results will not always be accurate. As
biologist Franklin Berger notes about DNA profiling: "Just like baking a cake, results are
not always ideal. Day-to-day variability in the quality of test results may occur." Berger,
Chromosomes in the Courtroom, Legal Times, Nov. 20, 1989, at 19.
179. Cf. Grunbaum, supra note 67, at 502 ("The bench analyst does not and should not
experiment with evidence materials or offer untested hypotheses to explain ambiguous or
inconclusive results.").
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plined had failed to follow protocols.
1 80
Crime laboratories, however, frequently perform analyses without
adhering to established procedures. "In many crime laboratories in the
United States, the analyst is not required to possess or to follow a printed
protocol, nor is he required to heed any instructions or warnings."18 1 In
some areas of forensic science, established protocols do not even
exist.
182
An absence of tested protocols means that crime lab analysts are left
to determine for themselves what modifications in established pro-
cedures or what new procedures will best fit their abilities, their equip-
180. Shapiro & Charrow, supra note 115, at 733. See also Woolf, supra note 103, at 74
(reviews scientific misconduct and concludes that failures to adhere to protocols "speak
directly to concerns about authenticity of the data.").
181. Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 13. Cf. Bradford, Quality Assurance-Considera-
tions in the Expression of Professional Evaluations From Examinations, 30 J. FORENSIC
SCI. 981,981 (1985).
It was only after I began to review and study the work of other laboratories that I
gained an insight into the extent of a lack of a standard of practice which exists in
crime laboratory operations.... In the capacity of an independent consultant, one is
in a position to review physical evidence examination results from a broad base of
crime laboratory sources. The scope of variation in the form and method of expres-
sion of evaluations is surprising and in some instances dismaying.
Id.
Frequently, forensic laboratories have inadequate standards for performing par-
ticular scientific analyses. Laboratory examiners also have substantial discretion in
selecting the methods of analysis they will use.... These examiners may choose
inappropriate methods instead of more accurate methods.
Moenssens, supra note 172, at 570.
Even within the well-regarded California Department of Justice laboratory system,
"there are no standardized protocols. According to the DOJ Bureau of Forensic Services, 'a
pre-set list of minimum performance does not apply to forensic science where the indivi-
dual skill, judgment, and experience of the scientist are the final determiners of what
specific tests are required in each instance."' Grunbaum, supra note 73, at 31 (quoting
STATE OF CAL. DEPT. OF JUsTICE, BUREAU OF FORENSIC SERVICES, TECHNICAL
GUIDELINE 85-1 SEROLOGY 1).
See also Lander, supra note 172, at 505 (discussing a case in which questions were
raised about the interpretation of DNA results because adequate controls had not been
used.)
182. See, e.g., Koenig, supra note 56, at 115 (no standard procedures used to make spec-
trographic comparisons); State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541, 563 (Mo. App. 1980) (no stan-
dard procedure for arriving at conclusions by forensic odontologists). Cf. Lander, supra
note 172, at 153 (citing urgent need for agreement of general guidelines for the practice of
DNA typing).
158 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 4
ment, and the evidence. 183 Forensic scientists, then, are often using pro-
cedures that have never been truly scientifically tested.'
84
Forensic scientists defend the absence of tested procedures by assert-
ig that such protocols cannot be used. They maintain that standardized
practices can only be used with standard samples and crime labs do not
analyze such samples.
185
183. One commentator summarized testimony about one forensic technique as follows:
Professor Sensabaugh agreed with Dr. Grunbaum that there was no uniform pro-
cedure of electrophoresis being used in crime laboratories. Each analyst used pro-
cedures with which he or she was most comfortable. Sensabaugh explained that
analysts routinely modify the electrophoretic techniques as fits their convenience
and equipment.
Bretz, supra note 38, at 518.
184. See Comment, supra note 156, at 674:
The crime laboratories' diversity of procedure reflects ... disunity. For example,
individual laboratories, and even individual technicians, frequently set their
own idiosyncratic standards concerning testing protocols for the same basic serolog-
ical test. Variation of protocols ("Protocol Drift") may cause inconsistent test
results. Especially troublesome, the interpretation of test results may represent only
one analyst's opinion.
Cf. Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 13:
[Because established protocols are not consistently used,] it is hard to determine
whether the most reliable methods of examination are used. There is no way of
knowing what innovations [the analyst] has made to a standard reliable method, and
it is difficult to establish whether or not he is using the method within its limits of
reliability.
185. See Peterson, Observations on Access to Expertise, 101 F.R.D. 642,643 (1983). A
report by the Forensic Science Foundation, the research arm of the American Academy of
Forensic Sciences, makes this contention: "[A] basic requirement of a standard method is a
standard sample. In reality, such samples rarely exist in the forensic sciences. Conse-
quently, forensic scientists are reluctant to use the standard or official approach, preferring
instead, to use the methods they themselves have validated." Forensic Sciences Founda-
fion, Foreword to CRIMINALISTICS METHODS OF ANALYSIS FEASIBILITY STUDY
(1980), quoted in Grunbaum, Potential and Limitations of Chemical Analysis of Physiolog-
ical Evidence, in ANALYTICAL METHODS IN FORENSIC CHEMISTRY 417, 426 (M. Ho
ed. 1990). A pair of forensic drug analysts have concluded "that the use of standard
methods of analysis is not applicable to the field of forensic drug chemistry." Frank &
Gunn, supra note 165, at 163. They reasoned that
because there is a great variance in the type of material being submitted for [the
analyst's] examination, it is necessary to use a wide range of methodology in
analyzing the material. Where one method of analysis may be suitable in several
instances, the same method may give inconclusive results in other situations....
[S]tandardization of chemical procedures is of value only under controlled cir-
cumstances, that is, when dealing with products of known composition or when
examining a product to determine whether it meets certain established criteria.
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This assertion is simply bad science. Although the forensic sample
may be unknown, proper analysis will not be enhanced by introducing
additional unknowns. Accurate analytical determinations require the
elimination of variables, not the introduction of more. Adherence to pro-
tocols eliminates unnecessary unknowns. A distinguished scientist has
asked, "If there is a proper way to do it, why not do it that way every
time?" 186 If there is no proper way, how can anyone be confident of the
results?
Even though samples may be non-standard, standardized methods
must be devised and followed if consistently accurate results are to be
obtained. The protocol, like a recipe that gives additional high altitude
baking directions, should consider variability of the sample. 187 DNA
profiling illustrates that variation can be included. The samples analyzed
by DNA technology vary-dried blood, fresh blood, hair roots,
semen-and often have unknown histories. Even so, forensic scientists
are capable of devising protocols for DNA profiling.' 88 If protocols can
be established for DNA identifications, they can be devised for any area
Id. at 166-67. See also LEAA, supra note 1, at 26 ("These different approaches do not lend
themselves to the type of testing that is carried out by most other types of 'testing' labora-
tories wherein a set protocol for the examination of a given sample of anything must be fol-
lowed.").
186. BANBURY REPORT, supra note 159, at 186 (comment of Dr. Richard Roberts,
Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory).
187. Cf. Peterson, supra note 185, at 643 ("Mhe uniqueness of a case does not justify
use of methods that have not been evaluated by other scientists in other laboratories.");
Bashinski, supra note 27, at 161 ('The evidence samples to be analyzed are uncontrolled
and unpredictable, often minute in quantity, and contaminated or degraded by the environ-
ment. The criminalist must be capable of assessing the potential effects of these factors on
the analysis and of adjusting the procedures accordingly.").
Good scientific practice also requires the keeping of records indicating how the protocol
was carried out. Unfortunately, inadequate recordkeeping appears to be endemic in crime
labs. See Comment, supra note 156, at 674 n.49 ("[A]dequate test records are neither con-
sistently generated nor preserved. Again, the adequacy of record-keeping varies from facil-
ity to facility, and examiner to examiner."). See also Note, supra note 50, at 492; Winek,
supra note 56, at 181; Kearney, supra note 171, at 46.
188. See, e.g., Note, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 WASH. L. REV. 903,
927 (1988) ("[T]he Central Research Establishment, a government forensic lab in the
United Kingdom, has produced a 51-page lab protocol outlining the procedure for receiving
a sample for DNA analysis and describing in detail the isolation, sorting, and probing of the
DNA.") See also Kearney, supra note 171 (twenty page outline for assuring quality in
DNA analysis). Cf. Sensabaugh, Forensic Biology-Is Recombinant DNA Technology in
its Future?, 31 J. FORENSIC SCI. 393, 394 (1986).
The fact that some labs have drafted protocols does not mean that all labs have. See,
e.g., Note, supra, at 928 ("[Not all [DNA] labs have clearly codified their protocols or
made them available for peer review."). The fact that a lab has a protocol does not mean it
is followed. For a discussion of a DNA lab deviating from its protocol, see generally
Lander, supra note 172.
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of forensic science.189 That forensic scientists in fact do not institute and
routinely follow tested analytical procedures is an indication that foren-
sic labs cannot produce consistently accurate results. 90
C. Bias and Subjectivity in Forensic Laboratories
Failure to follow established protocols is not the only inferior analyti-
cal technique. Another is the failure of forensic scientists to shield them-
selves from possible bias.
Evidentiary material often is presented to the forensic scientist in a
needlessly suggestive manner. The analyst is given crime scene evi-
dence (hair, fingerprints, blood) and ond other sample, labelled as the
defendant's (or victim's). This is frequently accompanied by a synopsis
of the investigation indicating the reasons that the investigators believe
the suspect is guilty.191 Such a presentation, of course, suggests to the
189. "Some procedures (for example, firearms identification) lend themselves to stan-
dards more easily than do other procedures (that is, handwriting comparisons), but each
procedure is subject to standards, which can be composed by a group of qualified experts
from the fields involved." Thomson, supra note 175, at 510.
190. "The key for a forensic confirmation is to establish objective criteria for testing and
reporting and then apply the objective criteria to the laboratory data, reporting as positive
only those specimens that fully meet the criteria." Council on Scientific Affairs, Scientific
Issues in Drug Testing, 257 J. AM. MED. A. 3110, 3111 (1987). See supra Parts I and II.
191. See, e.g., State v. Sager, 600 S.W2d 541, 564 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), (where the court
indicates tha only the picture of the bite mark on the victim and the dental casts of appel-
lant were delivered to the forensic odontologist for identification; Miller), Procedural Bias
in Forensic Science Examinations of Human Hair, 11 LAW AND HUM. BEHAv. 157, 158
(1987).
In the examination and identification of human hair, the usual procedure involves
obtaining hair samples from a suspect for comparison purposes (known versus ques-
tioned). Police investigators usually submit the questioned and known suspect hair
samples along with a synopsis of facts surrounding the investigation. The main pur-
pose of the synopsis is to provide information to the examiner that may assist in the
analysis. The synopsis usually contains the facts and circumstances leading to the
arrest of a suspect. In some cases, the synopsis may even include eyewitness
accounts, other forms of physical evidence collected in the case, and admissions or
confessions made by the suspect.
Id. Use of lineups overcomes many prior abuses, and a parallel can be drawn with other
investigative techniques. When the crime laboratory for the prosecution is presented with
handwriting samples, hairs or other biological specimens, voice exemplars, and similar evi-
dence, the laboratory personnel know that they are from persons accused of crime. There
are no blind experiments in which some false samples deliberately are introduced to test the
validity of results. This is standard procedure in many aspects of scientific methodology,
et we do not take sufficient advantage of it in our forensic applications. See id.; Starrs,
Comments on Discovery and Its Application to the Lindbergh Kidnapping Case, 101
F.R.D. 625, 626-27 (1983).
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analyst what the "right" answer should be. 192" This suggestiveness cou-
pled with the understandable prosecutorial orientation of many forensic
scientists 193 will naturally, even if unconsciously, skew subjective judg-
ments.
194
The effects of suggestiveness and bias are well-known generally in
the scientific world1 95 and have been empirically validated in a forensic
192. Miller observes:
In criminal investigations, the police generally have little or no doubt regarding the
suspect's guilt. Their preoccupation lies with obtaining sufficient proof for a con-
viction.... That attitude may be communicated to the forensic examiner through
personal interaction or through the written synopsis accompanying the evidence to
be examined. It is conceivable that the forensic examiner may unconsciously
believe that the suspect must be guilty or the police would not have made the arrest.
Such unconscious beliefs may potentially create prejudice, bias, and stereotypes on
the examiner's part regarding conclusions about the evidence.
Miller, supra note 191, at 158. See also Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 15; Aitken & Robert-
son, supra note 136, at 687.
193. Thomson, supra note 175, at 509-10:
[The preponderance of well-qualified forensic laboratories are located within the
resources of the State.... They work hand in hand with the police from the begin-
ning of the case.... Is the witness who has his job and salary controlled by the
State completely free from pressure, conscious or unconscious, to be entirely impar-
tial?
See also Kates & Guttenplan, Ethical Considerations in Forensic Science Services, 28
J. FORENSIC SCI. 972, 972 (1983) (describing hand-in-hand relationship between the
forensic scientist and the prosecutor). A survey of forensic science laboratories found that
57% would only examine evidence submitted by law enforcement officials. Peterson,
Mihajlovic & Bedrosian, supra note 97, at 13. Cf. Lucas, Leete & Field, supra note 3, at
72 ("Of the more than 300 'crime labs' in the USA, about 80% are within law enforcement
agencies"); M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 53, conclude, "Given what is
known about reference group phenomena, the need that people have for social support of
attitudes and conduct-, and the process of socialization in occupational settings, it strains
credulity to believe that these experts do not identify with prosecutors"; Cf. Note, supra
note 50, at 500 ("The incentives for the private laboratories to get results that they can sell
to a legal community eager to convict create examiner bias.").
194. See Kates & Guttenplan, supra note 193, at 975 ('The expert witness realizes that
the testimony must be presented so that it is advantageous to the prosecutor, if the prosecu-
tor is to use that witness again."). See also Note, supra note 50, at 485 ("Mhe examiner
who looks for a match is more likely to find one particularly because it would be consistent
with the prosecutor's theory of the case."). Sometimes the prosecutorial pressure put on
forensic scientists to give "correct" opinions can be quite direct. See, e.g., McCarty v.
State, 765 P.2d 1215, 1219 (Okla. Cr. App. 1988) (The Oklahoma County District
Attorney's Office may have placed undue pressure upon the forensic analyst to give an
expert opinion beyond scientific capabilities.).
195. "Scientists are subject to self-deception or forms of experimental bias that they can-
not reasonably be expected to control. For example, science that relies heavily on human
observation skills is especially prone to the self-deception phenomena.... Experimental
bias in studies using human subjects is so common that the use of a 'double blind' has
become standard practice not only in human research but also in animal experimentation.
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science context. Half of a group of students trained in hair comparisons"
were given samples in the normal casework manner-two samples and
a statement that one sample was from the crime scene and the other from
the suspect. The remaining students were given hair from the crime
scene plus hair samples from five possible suspects. Thus, the experi-
menter presented the evidence in a suggestive method to half, and a
"lineup of hair" to the rest.
Startling differences were observed. While sixteen percent of all the
opinions rendered were wrong, 196 the error rate varied significantly
according to the method of presentation. When the hair was presented in
the usual suggestive crime lab manner, 30.8% of the conclusions were
wrong. When a lineup was presented, only 3.8% of the opinions were
incorrect. The investigator concluded:
A preconceived conclusion that a questioned hair sample and
a known hair sample originated from the same individual may
influence the examiner's opinion when the samples are simi-
lar. The data in the present study indicate that the method by
which hair evidence is submitted for analysis may encourage
unintentional bias on the part of the examiner.
197
A double blind prevents both the experimenter and the subjects of the experiment from
knowing which subject are the controls." Anderson, The Federal Government's Role in
Regulating Misconduct in Scientific and Technological Research, supra note 101, at
128-29.
196. The "crime scene" hair in fact did not match any of the other submitted samples. In
other words, the correct answer to each analysis was "no match." See Miller, supra note
191, at 160.
197. Id. at 161. Seven inconclusive results were omitted from the incorrect/correct tabu-
lations. All the inconclusives came from the lineup presentation. "Although an 'incon-
clusive' opinion may not be accurate, it is more correct than rendering an erroneous conclu-
sion based on a preconceived opinion. The 'line-up' method appears to have increased
opinion accuracy since none of the inconclusive opinions were expressed using the tradi-
tional method of hair analysis .. " Id.
The results for hair are generally applicable to the forensic sciences. For example:
Usually [the analyst] knows what genetic markers to look for to strengthen the evi-
dence against a suspect. For instance, he may analyze a victim's blood, a suspect's
blood, and [a] bloodstain found on the shirt of the suspect. Consciously or uncons-
ciously, he will be attempting to match the bloodstain with the blood of the victim.
Because of his mental set, he may "identify" a genetic marker that he would other-
wise declare to be inconclusive.
Grunbaum, supra note 76, at 15.
A similar bias may also affect validation studies done in research labs. Cf. Note, supra
note 102, at 44 ("Whether scientists admit it or not, their views as to what constitutes a reli-
able scientific study may depend upon the source of their paycheck...."); Thompson &
Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 VA.
L. REV. 45, 88-89 (1989).
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Since subjectivity is common in forensic science opinions, routine
procedures that induce bias can have a great effect on quality. 198 The
fact that laboratories do not rigidly employ systems insuring unbiased
examiners, even when that would be simple to do,199 again raises con-
cerns about the accuracy of crime lab work.
[I]t is important to realize that the priorities of forensic experts... may be quite dif-
ferent than the priorities of scientists working to validate DNA typing techniques.
mhe police criminalist ... may adopt a lower threshold for declaring a match in
order to avoid exculpating a guilty person. For a scientist employed by a company
attempting to market a DNA typing test, however, the key priority is to demonstrate
that there is a low probability of a match between samples from different individu-
als. These scientists may therefore adopt a higher threshold, in order to minimize
the number of coincidental matches.
Id.
198. Professor Giannelli has noted:
[M]any commonly employed procedures are based on subjective judgments....
Even apparently routine and objective procedures involve an element of objectivity.
For example, a firearms identification examiner may conclude that two bullets had
been fired from the same weapon. Although a positive identification is based on
objective data-the striations on the bullet surfaces-the examiner's conclusion
rests on a subjective evaluation. There are no objective criteria used for this deter-
mination.
Giannelli, supra note 80, at 691. See also Imwinkehied, supra note 2, at 638 ("Some
scientific fields have relatively objective standards for evaluating test results.... However,
other scientific fields have few, if any, objective standards.").
Certain types of evidence involve accepted scientific principles and the measure-
ment of scientific properties which can be described in absolute terms by the expert.
Others involve comparisons of individual characteristics on a case-by-case basis.
Here the expert opinion is based partially on scientific principles and supplemented
by the expert's personal opinion. An element of subjectivity will enter into the for-
mulation of opinion about the second form of evidence.
Note, supra note 138, at 328-29.
199. "The possibility of bias is minimized for any testing procedure if all analysts are
unacquainted with circumstances of the alleged crime and unaware of any previous results."
Selvin & Grunbaum, Genetic Marker Determination in Evidence Bloodstains: The Effect of
Classification Errors on Probability of Non-discrimination and Probability of Concor-
dance, 27 J. FORENSIC SCe. Soc'Y 57, 61 (1986). See Note, supra note 188, at 927
("Results should be interpreted by a technician who was not involved in the test and is
unaware of the sources of the sample."). See also Note, supra note 50, at 486
("[E]xaminers should be told neither the origin of the samples nor the prosecution's theory
of the case.").
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D. Lack of Replication
According to the demands of good science, the ability to replicate a
scientific finding must exist before the finding can be accepted. Forensic
science, however, employs careless procedures by not insisting on repli-
cation whenever possible.
2° °
Sometimes tests are not repeated because repetition is impossible. Fo-
rensic samples are often so minute that they may be consumed in a single
test or so degradable that they cannot be preserved. 20 1 Even with these
samples a form of replication can be obtained by having the results indepen-
dently interpreted by separate examiners. 20 2 This is not regularly done,
nor is it routine to replicate analyses when replication is possible.
20 3
200. "Scientific experiments which produce a finding of interest are usually repeated,
sometimes many times, to be sure they are accurate. Often several scientists will work
independently on a given problem.... The situation in a forensic laboratory is quite dif-
ferent. Tests often are not repeated." Thompson & Ford, supra note 197, at 56-57.
201. Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1242.
202. See Pereira supra note 74, at 5, discussing quality assurance in British crime labs
where a "particularly important requirement [of the program is] the confirmation of all
significant findings by an appropriate member of the staff." See Note, supra note 50, at 486
("[A]ny declaration of a match should be confirmed independently by at least two exa-
miners.").
203. "[M]ost case work is never reexamined by a second expert and, thus, many things
may go undetected. Of the cases we reexamined over recent years, some 15 to 20% could
be considered as having questionable procedures or deficiencies of some sort." De Zeeuw,
Procedures and Responsibilities in Forensic Toxicology, 27 J. FORENSIC SCI. 749, 752
(1982). See also Lavett, Electrophoresis: A Continuation of the Discussion, 29
J. FORENSIC SCI. 704, 704 (1984) ("In scientific laboratories, crucial tests are always
repeated. Although the results of criminal laboratories have an effect on the accused's life
and/or liberty, I have never seen a crime lab report that gives more than one test result on a
given sample.").
Thompson and Ford contend that only results unfavorable to the prosecutor are likely to
be reconsidered. "Errors 'stand out' and invite additional scrutiny only if they are incon-
sistent with the prosecution's theory of the case (of which the laboratory analyst is invari-
ably aware). The most dangerous errors, those which falsely incriminate someone on
whom suspicion has already focused, are likely to go unchallenged...." Thompson &
Ford, supra note 197, at 57.
[An electrophoretic run ... indicated an EsD type of 1 for the bloodstain taken
from the porch of the victim's home. This result was followed by a question mark
and the stain was retested on June 6, 1978. At the later testing, the same stain
showed an EsD type of 2-1. Without retesting a third time, [the forensic scientist]
only reported the latter result. Defendant's blood, tested on July 7, 1978, was an
EsD type 2-1.
Bretz, supra note 38, at 519.
Cf. Baird, Quality Control and Quality Assurance, in 3ANBURY REPORT 32: DNA
TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 175 (J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh &
J. Witkowski eds. 1989) ("If there appears to be a sufficient amount of DNA available for
analysis. ... the evidence should be analyzed in duplicate.").
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The failure to reproduce results is not good science and fails tominimize
errors.
20
E. Special Need for Crime Laboratory Quality Control
The concern about the lack of routine is magnified by the forensic sci-
ences' special needs for demanding analytical practices. The error rate
in a crime lab's analyses is inherently higher than the rate for other types
of testing.
Forensic facilities deal with more "unknowns" than other laboratories.
For example, a hospital lab typing blood for a transfusion types the ABO
factor in two unknowns-the patient's blood and the donated blood.
The parallel procedure in crime work, however, normally requires
analysis of at least three unknowns-the suspect's blood, the victim's
blood, and a bloodstain, perhaps found at the crime scene or on the
suspect's clothes. If the error rate for typing ABO is X, then for a
transfusion that rate will be 2X205 while in the crime lab it will be at 3X
if three samples are involved (and higher if more samples are
involved).20 6
204. See Grindon & Eska, Error Rate, Precision, and Accuracy in Immunohematology,
17 TRANSFUSION 425, 428 (1977): "If an error in ABO grouping is made once in 1,000
determinations, and a net error rate of that magnitude is felt to be unacceptable, it would be
important to have a second person perform the test independently and then have the results
compared. If the error rate remains constant under these conditions, the net error rate
becomes one per million." See also Saltzburg, Frye and Alternatives, 99 F.R.D. 208, 217
(1983) ("There is sufficient evidence that crime labs are not as careful and dependable as
they might be to warrant rules requiring second tests of physical evidence that may have an
important impact on trials. These tests should be blind-i.e., one tester should not know
what another has found.").
205. Actually, the rate is slightly less than 2X. If one imagines a simple system with
two possibilities, A or B, then a "correct" result is obtained if an error is committed in typ-
ing both samples. Such a result will occur with a probability of X2 . Thus, the true error
rate is 2X-X 2. For small error rates, this approximates 2X. For more intricate systems,
such as the ABO multiple allele bloodsystem, the calculations are more complex, but the
principle is the same. The resulting error rate is reasonably close to 2X.
206. This pattern is not limited to serology, but applies generally to all crime lab work.
Thus, if for some reason, a chemist wanted to know the paints on a car, he might examine a
paint chip from that vehicle. The forensic scientist might also examine the chip from the
car, but only to compare it with chips left at the scene of a hit and run accident-two un-
knowns versus one, and twice the inherent error rate. Cf. Lander, supra note 172, at 501:
DNA diagnostics requires simply identifying whether each parent has passed to a
child the ... pattern inherited from his or her mother or father. Because the four
discrete patterns are known in advance, these investigations have built-in con-
sistency checks which guard against many errors and artefacts.
DNA fingerprinting, by contrast, is more like analytical biochemistry: one must
determine whether two completely unknown samples are identical.
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These errors in the crime lab are also less likely to be noticed and
corrected than in other labs. Forensic tests may have fewer inherent con-
trols than other kinds of testing. 2° 7 Also, errors in forensic labs will not
be highlighted as are errors in research labs. Good researchers often
recognize incorrectly performed procedures because the results will
conflict with existing knowledge. 20 8 For example, a scientist studying
the effects of a drug on hormone levels would notice if the drug
appeared to elevate the hormone level higher than had been seen before.
The experiment certainly would have to be reproduced a number of
times before a result considered unusual would be accepted. If the first
result had been an error, it would be discovered. In contrast, if the foren-
sic scientist typing the ABO factor in a bloodstain incorrectly finds AB
instead of 0, that result often will not stand out as inconsistent with
existing knowledge. As a result, the test will normally not be repeated.
Since errors in the crime lab are inherently more frequent and less
likely to be noticed than in other kinds of facilities, forensic procedures
should be carried out even more meticulously than other kinds of tests.
Forensic labs should require more stringent quality control programs
than labs where errors will be fewer and more apparent.20 9
IV. THE COURTS AND FORENSIC
SCIENCE QUALITY
The courts seem to provide an external mechanism to enforce higher
quality in forensic science. However, they can not adequately accom-
plish this task. Courts only deal with the evidence in the cases before
them. This prevents them from confronting the full range of issues con-
ceming forensic laboratories.21 0 Courts only see a fraction of a forensic
scientist's analyses. 21t They almost never examine the inaccurate work
207. See supra text accompanying notes 167-170.
208. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 197, at 56 ("errors tend to stand out [in a
research lab] because they are inconsistent with scientific knowledge and theory").
209. "[R]esearch scientists can tolerate relatively high rates of error and unreliability in
their procedures [, but] ... error rates that are acceptable in research laboratories are intoler-
able in forensic laboratories." Id. at 56-57.
210. Cf. Comment, supra note 156, at 678. ("Because judges are limited to assessing the
admissibility of DNA printing as evidence, they are constrained, at least until the issues
reach them in a justiciable form, from examining the broader concerns of crime lab perfor-
mance.").
211. "The prosecution often uses scientific evidence to build a case but does not call
upon an expert to testify. In a recent national survey of forensic science laboratories,
respondents estimated that they testified in only about ten percent of the cases in which they
examined the evidence." Symposium, supra note 5, at 630 (comments of Prof. Joseph
Peterson).
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that produces inconclusive findings or leads to a false exclusion.
212
Indeed, despite widespread inaccuracies in forensic lab reports, courts
are unlikely to discover such problems, and are therefore unable to
remedy the widespread consequences of poor forensic work.
Courts are also unlikely to be effective reformers of laboratory quality
because of their limited tools. Courts are essentially restricted to exclud-
ing evidence. If the courts regularly refused to admit analyses when
laboratories had not followed programs assuring high quality work,
improvements could follow. 2 13 Judges, however, are unlikely to adopt
such a procedure. Furthermore, such court action would not be an
efficient way to produce the needed systemic reforms. For example,
until the highest court in a jurisdiction had ruled on an issue, laboratories
would have to guess what quality control efforts each court might
demand of them. Labs might be subject to as many regulators as there
are courts in a state. Such multiple regulation would lead to ineffi-
ciencies.
Even if the courts were willing to devise and supervise scientific qual-
ity control programs, the courts would be dependent upon the adversary
system. That system often does not operate effectively in assessing sci-
ence. An adversary process that performs properly requires lawyers who
can effectively expose weaknesses in scientific evidence and a judiciary
not overawed by science.214 These qualities are often absent because
lawyers and judges usually lack high levels of scientific training and are
212. Forensic testing often eliminates people as suspects. For example, David Werrett,
of the British Home Office, in referring to DNA profiling, stated, "When we began, about
15% of 'very good suspects,' according to the police, were eliminated. The current rate is
25%." Westin, A Privacy Analysis of the Use of DNA Techniques as Evidence in Court-
room Proceedings, in BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCI-
ENCE 25 (J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh & 3. Witkowski eds. 1989).
213. Cf. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 74. ("How can the courts
assure the integrity of the knowledge offered to them? One means is to ensure that indivi-
duals who testify as experts have the requisite training and experience and that forensic
laboratories maintain rigorous quality control.").
214. Cf. Levy, supra note 159, at 383: An effective adversary system for scientific evi-
dence requires that
litigants against whose interest scientific testimony has been introduced have avail-
able an adequately trained and effective expert to rebut its implications, a lawyer
who can effectively expose the weaknesses of the testimony through rigorous
cross-examination, a judge who is neutral and objective and willing to exercise his
evidence admissibility discretion wisely and unlikely to be seduced by the "aura of
infallibility" of the testimony.
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thus unable to challenge or evaluate science.215 Both prosecutors and
defense attorneys seem unwilling to challenge the accuracy of test
results. Even though shoddy forensic science may help free the guilty
more often than inculpate the innocent, prosecutors are unlikely to verify
whether the exculpatory finding is warranted. 216 Similarly, defense
attorneys often seem to trust the reliability of forensic test results.
21 7
Thus, despite the high error rates revealed by the LEAA testing program,
215. A. MOENNSENS, F. INBAU & J. STARRS, supra note 5, at 7:
[L]awyers as a group evidence an appalling degree of scientific illiteracy, which ill
equips them to educate and guide the bench in its decisions on admissibility of evi-
dence proffered through expert witnesses. This scientific illiteracy is shared by a
large segment of the trial and appellate bench; many judges simply do not under-
stand evidence based on scientific principles.
See also McCord, Syndromes, Profiles and Other Mental Exotica: A New Approach to the
Admissibility of Nontraditional Psychological Evidence in Criminal Cases, 66 OR. L.
REV. 19, 25 (1987) ('[M]ost lawyers and judges do not have extensive training or experi-
ence in dealing with scientific matters. Accordingly, many lawyers and judges are uncom-
fortable dealing with scientific evidence."); Sperlich, Social Science Evidence and the
Courts: Reaching Beyond the Adversary Process, 63 JUDICATURE 280, 288 (1988):
("Judges and their clerks are not normally able to distinguish relevant from irrelevant
materials and good science from bad."); but see Ellinger, DNA Diagnostic Technology:
Probing the Problem of Causation in Toxic Torts, 3 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 31, 54 (1990)
("The DNA fingerprinting cases support the thesis that courts are capable of familiarizing
themselves with the 'science' of DNA diagnostic technology and of reaching informed
decisions regarding the admissibility of test results.").
216.
Mhe legal community that is pushing the evidence through the courts appears
unconcerned about the possibility of spurious alteration of the [DNA] profile which
would exculpate the guilty, a far more likely result of this test than a false match
incriminating the innocent. If false incrimination does not give prosecutors pause,
false exculpation should. However, until squarely faced with a case where all cir-
cumstantial evidence except the DNA profile point to a defendant's guilt, prosecu-
tors will continue to opt for the odds that the test will be performed correctly.
Note, supra note 50, at 50 n.83.
217. See Symposium, supra note 5, at 634 ("Often the plaintiff or the prosecution alone
calls an expert who testifies with little or no cross-examination. The opponent more or less
accepts the expert's evidence as being true if it does not concern a major issue in conten-
tion.') (comments of Prof. Michael Graham). Even when novel scientific evidence is
presented, it often goes unchallenged by opposing experts. Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1243
(A "surprising number of novel techniques have gained admissibility without the presenta-
tion of defense expert testimony.'). Cf. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note
12, at 1749:
[D]efense attorneys [use] a variety of tactics ... to challenge forensic science evi-
dence, ranging from efforts to have the evidence ruled inadmissible... to attacks on
the expert's qualifications or intense cross-examination of the expert's conclusions.
Usually, however, defense counsel will attempt to "explain away" the physical evi-
dence by supplying a reasonable and lawful explanation for its presence. If the
above tactics cannot be used, defense counsel will usually stipulate to the evidence
and attempt to draw as little attention to it as possible. Contrary to a commonly
expressed attitude that defense attorneys distrust the analyses and testimony of
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"[t]here is little reason to think that many of such errors were detected by
counsel for the defense." 218 Furthermore, meaningfully challenging the
evidence may not be possible because of discovery limitations,2 19 the
inability to retest the evidence, 220 and the lack of adequate expert assis-
tance. 22 1 Courts, therefore, are unlikely to bring about better forensic
"prosecution" experts, defense counsel we interviewed are basically satisfied with
the competence and nonpartisanship of forensic scientist[s] with whom they have
contact.
218. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 10.
219. "[P]retrial discovery is critical when scientific evidence is admitted at trial." Gian-
nelli, Observations on Discovery of Scientific Evidence, 101 F.R.D. 622, 622 (1983). For a
discussion of the limitations on discovery in criminal cases as compared to civil cases, see
Saltzburg, Pretrial Discovery of Scientific Evidence, 101 F.R.D. 613, 613 (1983).
Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does permit defense access to the
results and reports of scientific tests and experiments, but this is of limited value because
Rule 16 excludes important items such as:
the identity of witnesses and discovery of the prior statements of any witnesses
other than the results or reports of a scientific expert.... Moreover, the provision
making scientific reports discoverable is of limited benefit since rule 16 does not
require that a scientific expert make a report and does not specify the data that must
be included in such reports. Hence, in those cases in which a report is prepared, the
defense lawyer facing a scientific expert will know the name of the expert and the
intention of the government to call him, but may have little other information to
help the lawyer prepare for cross-examination.
Eads, Adjudication by Ambush: Federal Prosecutors' Use of Nonscientific Experts in a Sys-
tem of Limited CriminalDiscovery, 67 N.C. L. REV. 577,583 (1989).
220. Although "reliability of a technique means that the test results can be reproduced
." Note, supra note 50, at 524, replication of crime laboratory analyses are rare. See
supra text accompanying notes 200-04. Sometimes retesting is impossible simply because
the sample was not saved. The Supreme Court, however, failed to find a constitutional vio-
lation where the prosecution did not preserve forensic science samples. California v. Trom-
betta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984) and Arizona v. Youngblood 488 U.S. 51 (1988). For a summary
of state law on the right of defendants to retest forensic evidence, see Note, supra note 50,
at 523-25.
221. Although Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985) held that an indigent defendant
had a due process right to a defense psychiatrist when the defendant's mental condition was
at issue: "the courts do not consider all denials of defense requests for expert services to be
constitutional violations." Note, supra note 50, at 521. See, e.g., Moore v. Kemp, 809 F.
2d 702 (1Ith Cir.)(en bane), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1054 (1987) (denial of the indigent de-
fendant's request for expert assistance did not violate the Constitution despite the state's
reliance on a microanalyst and serologist.) See Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert Psychiatric
Witnesses Remain Beyond Reach for the Indigent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 769-74 (1990)
(discussion of Moore.)
Even when jurisdictions allow indigents to employ experts, the pay for the experts may
be so low as to make it almost impossible to get expert assistance.
Texas, for instance, provides that indigents may receive five hundred dollars for
"expenses incurred for purposes of investigation and expert testimony." If the
expert is required to travel any considerable distance, it is reasonable to assume that
after expenses there would be little left with which to pay a fee for testifying, much
less any money to cover the costs of independent experimentation.
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science practices because those practices are seldom fully analyzed and
challenged in our adversary system.
Even if the courts had the technical ability to engage in such rigorous
analysis, they are unlikely to have the time. Because there are no
enforceable systems of quality assurance in place, the courts would have
to do in-depth, individualized examinations of the practices, routines,
and results of the laboratories in each case involving forensic science
evidence. The time required for such a process would be prohibitive.
Furthermore, the current legal standard for admissibility of scientific
evidence limits the courts' inquiry into the quality of the forensic work
performed. In determining admissibility, courts examine the reliability
and acceptance of a technique, but generally do not assess how well a
particular analysis has been performed or what quality controls were
used.22 2 The dominant position, echoed by the California Supreme
Court, states that the admissibility standard "tests the fundamental vali-
dity of a new scientific methodology, not the degree of professionalism
with which it is applied.... Careless testing affects the weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.
'22 3
Note, supra note 111, at 374 (quoting TEx. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 26.05(d) (Vernon
Supp. 1985)). See also Note, supra note 50, at 522. ("Although about half the states and
the federal government have statutes which provide funds for defense experts, those funds
are prohibitively low, and the statutes suffer from the problematic interpretations of what is
considered 'necessary' to a defense.").
Even when adequate funds are available, "a fundamental problem is locating a qualified
expert to analyze the testimony to be advanced by the opponent's expert." Imwinkelried,
Observations on Access to Expertise, 101 F.R.D. 639, 640 (1983). See also Neufeld & Col-
man, supra note 157, at 52 (describing the difficulties defense attorneys have had finding
qualified experts in DNA profiling cases). Sometimes defendants have trouble obtaining
experts because "the experts are either employees or former employees of law enforcement
agencies. This inhibits in particular the ability of the defense to present independent evi-
dence of ballistics and fingerprints." M. SAKs & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 26.
222. See Recent Development, DNA Fingerprinting: The Castro Case, 3 HARv. J.L. &
TECH. 223, 230-233. (Courts should look at the particular procedure performed, not just
the acceptance of that type of procedure.).
223. People v. Farmer, 47 Cal.3d 888, 913, 765 P.2d 940, 956, 254 Cal. Rptr 508, 524
(1989).
The refusal to consider the quality of the work in admitting crime lab evidence may
hdrm accurate factfinding. See, e.g., Symposium on Rules for the Admissibility of Scientific
Evidence, 115 F.R.D. 79, 135 (1987).
It is not difficult to determine that some technical methods, such as chromatogra-
phy, are generally accepted and can be used with confidence that they are reliable.
But it is an altogether different matter to determine whether a particular datum
derived from a specific sample of urine or blood is trustworthy. We should concern
ourselves with such matters as how the sample was collected, whether it was
correctly -identified, how it has been transmitted and stored, who performed the
analysis, whether the reagents were fresh and the instruments calibrated, and related
factors that bear on the reliability of the results.
Id. (comments of Vincent Dole).
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If the court system is to have a role in improving the quality of foren-
sic science, that job belongs not to the judiciary when it decides what
evidence is admissible, but to the jurors when they decide what weight is
to be given to scientific evidence.224 Unfortunately, there is little reason
to believe that jurors can make adequate assessments about the quality
control programs of labs when they weigh scientific evidence. 22 More-
over, while juries may determine that the crime lab work in a particular
Some courts do employ an admissibility standard that looks to how well the work was
performed. P. GIANNELLI & E. IMWINKELRIED, ScIENTIFIc EVIDENCE 39-43 (1986 &
Supp. 1988). (courts have divided on whether showing of proper application of a valid
technique affects admissibility or just weight of evidence). For example, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has held that the "admissibility of specific test results in a particular case
hinges on the laboratory's compliance with appropriate standards and controls . . ." People
v. Schwartz, 447 N.W. 2d 422i 428 (Minn. 1989). The dominant position, however, main-
tains that compliance with standards and controls only goes to the weight of the evidence.
See, e.g., Note, supra note 188, at 938 ("challenges to proper administration of [a DNA
test] go to the weight given to the evidence, not to the evidence's admissibility.") See also
Black, Evolving Legal Standards for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 239 SCI.
1508, 1508 (1988) ("Judges ... have generally refused... to hold experts to the standards
and criteria of scientific practice.").
224. Even if the courts used a different standard for judging the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence, the quality of forensic science work would still be largely left to juries.
Once appellate courts have found novel scientific evidence to be admissible, trial courts no
longer hold admissibility hearings. Instead, the evidence is heard by the jury, and the
opponent of the evidence is limited to attacking the weight of that evidence. See, e.g., Peo-
ple v. Kelly, 17 Cal.3d 24, 32, 549 P.2d 1240, 130 Cal. Rptr. 1240 (1976) ("Once a trial
court has admitted evidence based upon a new scientific technique, and that decision is
affirmed on appeal .... , the precedent so established may control subsequent trials, at least
until new evidence is presented reflecting a change in the attitude of the scientific commun-
ity."); People v. Brown 40 Cal.3d 512, 530, 726 P.2d 516, 230 Cal. Rptr. 834 (1985)
("appellate endorsement of a technique ends the need for case-by-case adjudication.").
225. See Note, The Frye Doctrine and Relevancy Approach Controversy: An Empirical
Evaluation, 74 GEO. L.J. 1769, 1776-87 (1986), for a discussion of recent research on
jurors' perceptions of novel scientific evidence. None of the studies examined whether
jurors were able to evaluate the effect of quality control programs on the reliability of
scientific evidence. Nevertheless, it seems to be asking a lot of jurors to make such evalua-
tions. See, e.g., Thompson & Ford, supra note 197, at 58:
If all that a court requires is acceptance of a general approach [to DNA typing], then
anyone with the requisite scientific training who sets up a laboratory to do [DNA]
analysis would, presumably, be able to testify about his or her results. It would be
up to the trier of fact ... to assess whether the techniques of [DNA] analysis had
been implemented properly by the lab. This is a heavy burden to place on the trier
of fact... [since] the procedures involved in DNA typing are quite complex. There
are many points in DNA typing where nuances of laboratory procedure can have a
dramatic effect on the reliability of the test. Evaluating the adequacy of laboratory
protocols is likely to be a difficult, time-consuming task for attorneys and jurors.
Finally, if juries were providing incentives for crime labs to improve their quality, then we
could expect prosecutors, concerned about losing future convictions, to demand better qual-
ity controls from crime labs. However, nothing indicates that prosecutors are making
significant attempts to improve the performance of forensic scientists.
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
case was substandard and should not be relied upon, such determinations
are unlikely to induce improved performance in the forensic sciences
generally. The jurors' assessments are not officially communicated. Juries
in criminal cases render general verdicts. A not guilty verdict, even if
it were influenced by sloppy crime lab practices, does not explicitly state
the jurors' views about the scientific evidence. Similarly, the jury might
convict on other grounds despite finding the scientific evidence
itself unreliable. Since the jury's determination of scientific evidence
reliability is never definitively known, it is not likely to spur better quality.
Thus, the procedural and substantive limitations of the court system
cannot adequately ensure the reliability of forensic science. No mechan-
ism currently in place assures quality.
V. EFFECT OF REGULATION ON
LABORATORY QUALITY
Only some medical laboratories were regulated before 1988.226 A
1987 House committee investigating the quality of clinical laboratories
concluded "that as much as 25% of all testing is done in laboratories
which are either unregulated by the federal government or subject to
diminished or ambiguous regulatory standards."
227
The uneven application of regulation had a beneficial side-effect. An
226. With the Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act of 1967 ("CLIA"), 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a (1982), the federal government regulated all laboratories sending specimens in inter-
state commerce. The Social Security Act also subjected labs in the medicare program to
federal regulation. 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397 (1982). CLIA exempted from federal regulation
very small laboratories, most laboratories located in physicians' offices, and laboratories
with local operations provided that they did not participate in medicare.
For an overview of how that regulation was conducted, see LaMotte & Robinson, supra
note 20.
227. H.R. REP. NO. 899, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 13-14, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3828, 3833-35 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT]. Not all labs that
fell within the purview of CLIA were regulated by the federal government:
Laboratories which are in hospitals accredited by the Joint Commission on the
Accreditation of Hospitals (now the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of
Health Care Organizations), or laboratories which are accredited by the College of
American Pathologists ... are exempted from the licensure requirement of CLIA.
Private accreditation bodies which have standards equal to or more stringent than
those of [CLIA] may be approved to accredit laboratories for the purpose of this
exemption from CLIA.
Id. at 11. In addition, many states had regulations affecting clinical laboratories, but the
House committee concluded, "While some of these state regulatory systems are
comprehensive and rigorous, others are rather cursory and fail to assure appropriate levels
of quality." Id.
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experimental condition was created whereby the effect of regulation on
the quality of laboratory performance could be meaningfully examined.
Studies consistently discovered that unregulated, unlicensed laboratories
performed lower quality work than licensed laboratories. 228 A survey of
the relevant literature concluded,
Each study... confirms that unregulated laboratories perform
considerably less accurately than regulated laboratories....
Unregulated laboratories do not engage in sufficient quality
control and they have more random error and less precision
than is found in conventional clinical laboratories.
The literature concludes that there is a significant decrease
in the accuracy of laboratory tests conducted in unlicensed
laboratories as compared to licensed laboratories and suggests
that: "the legislation and enforcement of laboratory regula-
tions improves the accuracy of clinical laboratory testing."
229
In 1986 the Oregon Public Health Laboratory surveyed forty unli-
censed and twenty licensed physician office laboratories. Even though
the unlicensed facilities had all volunteered, and presumably, therefore,
had confidence in their work, the quality control was considerably higher
in the licensed laboratories than in the unlicensed ones. "By all meas-
ures employed in the study, licensed physician office laboratories per-
formed better in proficiency testing programs and on internal index of
performance [than] did unlicensed POL's. Clear evidence exists to show
that laboratories inspected for state licensure produce less variability in
laboratory testing."
230
228. The House Report summarized the findings:
[N]umerous studies ... showed that the absence of regulation in physician office
laboratories has resulted in diminished quality. Data collection in California ...
suggest that unregulated laboratories perform lower quality work than regulated
labs. Studies in Idaho showed that, according to proficiency testing data, physician
office laboratories improved when quality assurance standards were improved.
Finally, a study of licensed and unlicensed physician office laboratories in Oregon
showed that licensed laboratories performed better than unlicensed labs.
Id. at 14.
229. Hearings, supra note 20, at 338-40 (statement of American Clinical Laboratory
Association) (quoting Grayson, Effects of Regulatory Controls on the Accuracy of Clinical
Laboratory Tests, 1 J. MED. TECH. 633 (1984)).
230. Id. at 229 (statement of Virginia L. Worrest, Medical Consultant). Cf. id. at 242
(statement of Herbert W. Dickerman, New York State Department of Health) ("Numerous
reports in the literature have demonstrated that voluntary proficiency testing simply does
not perfect laboratory performance as well as a mandatory program does. When labora-
tories must perform to obtain an operating permit, greater incentive exists to achieve state-
of-the art standards.").
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Similarly, the Nebraska Society for Medical Technology found that
fifty-five percent of the blood chemistry samples tested in unregulated
labs fell outside of the acceptable range while the percentage was only
thirteen percent at the accredited facilities.231 Another study discovered
that laboratories employing only certified medical technologists had a
mean accuracy score of ninety-five percent on proficiency tests. Labs
with all noncertified technologists recorded seventy-five percent accu-
racy.
232
These studies demonstrate that regulation improves clinical laboratory
performance better than noncompulsory programs. Perhaps, a laboratory
director best summarizes the situation: "Most of us would prefer that
regulation be on a voluntary basis. But frankly, voluntary systems don't
work worth a damn in the long run."
233
Congress responded to this evidence234 by enacting the Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, which mandate regula-
tion of all clinical labs.
235
231. See id. at 194 (statement of the American Society for Medical Technology).
232. See Lunz, Castleberry, James & Stahl, The Impact of the Quality of Laboratory
Staff on the Accuracy of Laboratory Results, 258 J. AM. MED. A. 361 (1987). This study
also found that the greater the percentage of certified technologists employed, the higher the
lab's accuracy.
Patricia Ashton of the American Society for Cytotechnology testified summarizing a
study showing that proficiency test scores had improved in regulated labs over a fourteen-
year program in New York. "The study concludes that periodic inspection and testing of
laboratories, withholding of permits from substandard facilities, and especially a
comprehensive program of continuing education, have contributed to this improve-
ment .. " Hearings, supra note 20, at 147 (quoting Collins & Patacsil, Proficiency Test-
ing in Cytology in New York, 30 ACTA CYTOLOGICA 633 (1986)).
233. Bogdanich, Medical Labs, Trusted as Largely Error-Free, Are Far From Infallible,
Wall. St. J., Feb. 2, 1987, at 1, col. 6, (statement of Walter Johnson, the director of the cyto-
genetics lab at Case Western Reserve University).
234. It did take considerable time and effort for the new legislation to be enacted:
Since Congress passed its laboratory legislation 20 years ago, it has tried five time
to strengthen the law. Each effort, opposed by organized medicine, failed....
Growing evidence of testing abuses, along with fear of malpractice litigation, has
begun to stir concern in some quarter of the medical establishment. Since late 1985,
the Journal of the American Medical Association has been running a series of arti-
cles on office testing. Physicians, the authors have written, "are unfamiliar with...
the subtleties of testing, the idiosyncratic personalities of 'foolproof' electronic
equipment, or even the basic concepts of quality control."
Id. at 14.
235. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-578, 102
Stat. 2903 (1988). The House concluded that not only were regulated labs superior to the
nonregulated facilities, it also found that the existing regulatory structure was "a seriously
flawed system for assuring compliance and an inadequate system of enforcement of Federal
standards .... " HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 12. The 1988 Amendments not only
extended regulation to more laboratories, they also closed loopholes in the compliance and
enforcement mechanisms. Mandating stricter compliance with existing regulations to pro-
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Nothing in the data indicates that the positive effect regulation has on
laboratory quality is limited to the clinical field. In fact, since the unreg-
ulated forensic laboratories, which bear many similarities to clinical labs,
perform poorly, a regulatory scheme imposed on crime labs can improve
the quality of forensic science.
Such regulation has been advocated in the area of DNA typing or
profiling. The State of New York recently convened the Forensic DNA
Analysis Panel (the "Panel") to study the implementation of the new
technology. This group, consisting of forensic science lab directors,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, police officers, judges, and legal and
scientific academics, noted:
There are no widely accepted criteria for quality control or
proficiency testing for forensic laboratories at a state or
national level. Concern is mounting in the scientific commun-
ity that the forensic laboratories performing DNA typing are
not following all of the necessary and appropriate practices. If
proper quality control procedures are not used, the reliability
of the data produced is questionable.
3 6
The Panel recommended that "a state accreditation process be developed
to monitor public and private laboratories providing forensic DNA
analysis services in New York state." The Panel further recommended
that only DNA typing evidence performed by accredited laboratories be
admissible.
3 7
Legal and scientific scholars also contend that mandatory quality
assurance standards are necessary for DNA typing. For example, Pro-
fessor Alan Westin concludes, "Both government and private labora-
tories doing DNA analysis for forensic use should meet designated qual-
ity standards and be subject to periodic inspections."
238
duce better scientific testing is consistent with a recommendation for pharmaceutical pro-
ducts. New drugs must undergo clinical trials to demonstrate the new products' safety and
efficacy. An examination of scientific misconduct in these trials brought forth the recom-
mendation that the Food and Drug Administration "should continue or even expand its
monitoring program [of these trials], while ensuring its rigor." Shapiro & Charrow, supra
note 115, at 736.
236. J. POKLEMBA, supra note 50, at 15.
237. See id. at 46,49.
238. Westin, supra note 212; cf. Lander, supra note 172, at 505 ("[Tlhere is an urgent
need for the scientific community to agree on clear guidelines for the procedures and stan-
dards needed to ensure reliable DNA fingerprinting. Legislators should also consider
whether licensing and proficiency testing should be required in forensics."). See also Com-
ment, supra note 156, at 701 ('To safeguard the performance and evidentiary value of DNA
printing, legislatures must regulate crime laboratories' performance.").
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In spite of pleas for mandatory quality assurance standards, no juris-
diction requires DNA laboratories to meet performance standards.
Members of the forensic science community strongly resist DNA labora-
tory regulation. Two forensic scientists contend:
In.principle, introduction of DNA analysis results is no dif-
ferent from the introduction of latent fingerprints, gunshot
residue analysis, bullet and cartridge case comparisons, or
comparisons of Fourier transform infrared (FTIR) spectra of
fibers, which are all different forms of pattern recognition and
comparisons. Provided reliable and reproducible techniques are
used, comparison of DNA autoradiographs is no different than
comparisons of gas chromatograms or striations on bullets.
There appears to be no need or reasons for any special
regulation, licensing, or oversight of forensic scientists or
laboratories because of the introduction of DNA typing. No
one is in a better position to understand the scientific and legal
requirements of evidence testing than forensic scientists them-
selves.
239
This position makes sense. As these scientists suggest, other forensic
procedures are demanding. Why regulate DNA typing when the rest of
forensic science is not subjected to regulation? The New York panel
concluded, it is true that "[q]uestions about the quality of the work being
done by the private [DNA] laboratories have not been satisfactorily
answered, and the laboratories' adherence to accepted scientific pro-
cedures has not been demonstrated. ' '24° That does not separate DNA
typing from other forensic procedures. Since crime labs are unregulated,
no forensic laboratory is routinely required to demonstrate its adherence
to accepted scientific procedures. Furthermore, the importance of DNA
testing cannot be used as justification for its being the only forensic pro-
cedure which is regulated. While DNA typing may have great value to
some criminal cases, other forensic techniques are used more often and
affect more cases.
241
239. Lee & Gaensslen, The Need for Standardization of DNA Analysis Methods, in
BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 212
(J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989). Jack Ballantyne, a forensic
scientist with the Suffolk County, New York, Medical Examiner, has also stated, "I do not
believe that the quality assurance procedures should be any more stringent for DNA than
for any other serological evidence." BANBURY REPORT, supra note 159, at 244.
240. J. POKLEMBA, supra note 50, at 26.
241. See Peterson, Impact of Biological Evidence on the Adjudication of Criminal
Cases: Potential for DNA Technology, in BANBURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY
AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 55 (J. Ballantyne, G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989).
See also Ballantyne, DNA Technology in a County Forensic Laboratory Setting, in BAN-
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These similarities raise the question of why all forensic laboratories
are not required to satisfy quality assurance regulations.
The federal government's response to this question has led to regula-
tion in only one area-urine drug testing for federal employees and for
workers in the transportation industry.242 To assure that urine drug tests
of employees are as accurate as possible, laboratories must be certified
and must meet continuing performance standards to maintain that
certification.
The federal government regulates and monitors clinical laboratories
and drug testing facilities analyzing workers' urine. Why, then, are
crime laboratories not subjected to similar mandatory quality assurance
programs? Arguments against regulation are not persuasive. First, some
may argue that forensic labs in comparison to the other facilities are not
important enough to require a regulatory structure. Admittedly, health
and jobs are important, but freedom and imprisonment are equally so. It
is also true as some argue that clinical laboratories affect significantly
more people than do crime laboratories. Although most people probably
have a clinical procedure done every one or two years, very few have
been involved with forensic scientists. But to conclude, therefore, that
the quality of forensic laboratories is unimportant is like contending that
the abilities of judges hardly matters because only a fraction of the popu-
lace is involved in litigation, or that the quality of police is trivial
because most of us are not arrested.
Forensic science is significant. A recent survey found reports from
BURY REPORT 32: DNA TECHNOLOGY AND FORENSIC SCIENCE 212 (J. Ballantyne,
G. Sensabaugh & J. Witkowski eds. 1989):
DNA typing methods are not expected to dramatically increase the number of cases
where blood is found to be associative with respect to the defendant and the crime
scene because... a powerful set of conventional genetic markers are available to
perform the task of excluding the majority of the population. However, the con-
verse is true for seminal stain evidence, in that a dramatic increase in the number of
rape cases is expected where the suspect is associated with the victim.
In fact, "the bulk of [crime lab] casework concerns the identification of drugs and alcohol."
Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 12, at 1733.
242. See Department of Health and Human Services Mandatory Guidelines for Federal
Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 23 Fed. Reg. 11,970 (1988); Procedures for Transporta-
tion Workplace Drug Testing Programs, 53 Fed. Reg. 47,002 (1988). The urine analyses
are similar to tests done in crime labs. See also Caplan, Drug Testing in Urine, 34
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1417, 1418 (1989) ("Urine drug testing should be considered a special
application of analytical forensic toxicology.").
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crime laboratories present in about a third of all criminal cases. 243
Forensic science enhances the accuracy of fact-finding. 244 It certainly
affects verdicts. Jurors believe that they comprehend scientific evidence
as well as or better than other evidence. 245 Furthermore, "[a]bout one
quarter [of jurors who] were presented with scientific evidence believed
that had such evidence been absent, they would have changed their
verdicts -from guilty to not guilty.' '246 Forensic science, thus, deter-
mines whether people are.jailed as well as whether the guilty are mistak-
enly freed.
Accurate forensic science is essential to justice, but abysmal quality
remains widespread. The quality of forensic science must be improved.
Since regulation can produce better performance, forensic laboratories
should be regulated.
VI. MODELS FOR THE REGULATION
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE
A. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Act as a Model
Just as regulation has improved the performance of clinical labora-
tories, regulation can force improvements in forensic science labora-
tories. The scheme embodied in CLIA, which has proved successful for
the regulation of clinical labs, provides a model for improving forensic
labs.2
47
243. See Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 12, at 1733. That study
found that murder and drug prosecutions almost always have lab reports. The use of
scientific evidence in criminal cases has grown rapidly over the last two or three decades.
Estimates in the early 1960s indicated that fewer than one percent of criminal cases
received a forensic science examination. See id. at 1731. It has been predicted that "the use
of scientific evidence will ... likely increase." Giannelli, supra note 9, at 1200. A recent
multi-jurisdiction survey of the use of forensic science found, however, that the usage rates
were fairly steady from 1975 to 1981. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden, & Mihajlovic, supra note
12, at 1734.
244. Symposium, supra note 5 (comment of Edward Imwinkelried).
245. See Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & MahajIovic, supra note 12, at 1748. See also Note,
supra note 225 (discussion of empirical studies examining the effect of scientific evidence
on jurors).
246. Peterson, Ryan, Houlden & Mihajlovic, supra note 12, at 1748. This survey also
discovered that the presentation of forensic evidence correlates with increased prison sen-
tences. For example, "the presence of a laboratory report adds about 23 months to
attempted murder sentences, 27 months to robbery terms, and 4 months to theft sentences."
Id. at 1746.
247. "The regulation of forensic laboratories has an excellent model, the Clinical
Laboratories Improvement Act... The law was enacted to ensure that such service labora-
tories, which are not subject to the same peer scrutiny as research laboratories, would none-
theless provide reliable products and service." Neufeld & Coman, supra note 157, at 53.
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Under that law, all clinical laboratories must be certified.248
Certification requires compliance with standards "designed to assure that
such laboratories will consistently perform tests in a valid and reliable
manner."249 There are four major components to the program: "mainte-
nance of a quality assurance and quality control program by the labora-
tory; maintenance of appropriate records, equipment and facilities; per-
sonnel standards; and proficiency testing." 2 0 Although all the standards
are meant to further accuracy in clinical lab results, "proficiency testing
[is] the central element in determining a laboratory's competency, since
it purports to measure actual test outcomes rather than merely gauging
the potential for accurate outcomes." 251 A lab must undergo quarterly
testing for each type of analysis that it performs.252 Most important, the
testing must be done in a blind fashion25 3 with the results made available
to the public.
254
In order to ensure that a laboratory routinely uses proper quality con-
trol measures, the laboratories can be inspected with or without prior
248. No laboratory can do any clinical analyses unless it receives a certificate issued by
the Secretary of Health and Human Services at least every two years. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(b)
& (c).
249. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3848.
250. Id. The law requires the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue stan-
dards for these four components and any other desirable ones. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(1)(A)-
(E).
251. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3849.
252. "The standards shall require that a laboratory issued a certificate ... be tested for
each examination and procedure... for which it has received a certificate .... The testing
shall be conducted on a quarterly basis, except where the Secretary determines for technical
and scientific reasons that a particular examination or procedure may be tested less fre-
quently (but not less often than twice per year.)" 42 U.S.C. § 263a(f)(3)(A).
253. To be certified, a laboratory must agree "to treat proficiency testing samples in the
same manner as it treats materials derived from the human body referred to it for laboratory
examinations or other procedures in the ordinary course of business." Id. § 263a(d)(1)(E).
The House Report concluded, "A significant deficiency in the current proficiency testing
regime is its inability to assure that proficiency samples are treated like patient samples....
The only way to guarantee that samples are treated by the same personnel, at the same
speed, using the same equipment as the patient specimens is [through] blind or on-site
proficiency testing." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3837. The drafters were con-
cemed that some labs "might run repeated tests on the sample, use more highly qualified
personnel than are routinely used for testing, or send the sample out to another laboratory.
Such practices obviously undermine the purpose of proficiency testing and
[§ 263a(d)(l)(E)] seeks to prevent them through this agreement." Id. at 3845.
254. "The Secretary shall establish a system to make the results of the proficiency test-
ing programs ... available, on a reasonable basis, upon request of any person." 42 U.S.C.
§ 263a(f)(3)(F).
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notice.255 The drafters of the law expected frequent audits, many of
them unannounced.Z2
6
Finally, the law provides a range of sanctions. The Department of
Health and Human Services can suspend, revoke, or limit a clinical
laboratory's certification.257 It can also take intermediate steps, such as
fines, to induce compliance.
58
Congress concluded that this rigorous, mandatory quality control pro-
gram was necessary after studying the performance of clinical labora-
tories and the positive effects regulation can have on the quality of those
labs . 5 9 If such a regime is necessary for clinical labs, a similar regula-
tory scheme-involving inspections, personnel standards, quality con-
trol, and external proficiency testing26° - seems in order to improve the
endemic poor quality of forensic laboratories. However, regulation of
crime laboratories, raises several difficulties not present with the regula-
tion of clinical facilities.
First, who is to devise, implement, and enforce such crime laboratory
quality control programs? The present standards for federal regulation
of clinical facilities build upon decades of national regulation and an
255. "The Secretary may, on an announced or unannounced basis, enter and inspect, dur-
ing regular business hours of operation, laboratories which have been issued a certificate
under this section." Id. § 263a(g)(1). To be certified, a laboratory must agree to permit the
inspections and make its records available to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
Id. § 263a(d)(1)(C) & (D).
256. "It is the Committee's intent that such inspection normally be conducted every two
years, but the Secretary could establish criteria or guidelines for more frequent or less fre-
quent inspections, depending on the identified needs and risks involved." HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 227, at 3846. "The Committee expects the Secretary to have many of
these inspections conducted on an unannounced basis, in order to observe the laboratory
during typical operations, rather than under ideal circumstances arranged in preparation for
a prearranged inspection." Id. at 3853.
257. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(i)(A)-(G).
258. Id. § 263a(h). "This provision would authorize the Secretary to impose one or more
of a range of sanctions on a laboratory which is no longer in substantial compliance with
[CLIA]. The intermediate sanctions include directed plans of correction, civil monetary
penalties for each day of non-compliance, and payment of the costs of onsite monitoring."
HousE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3853.
259. The federal government imposed even more strict regulations on laboratories doing
employee urine drug analyses. See supra text accompanying note 242. Laboratories doing
urine drug analyses for government employees or for employees in the transportation indus-
try must be certified. 53 Fed. Reg. 47,013 (1988). Before certification, a laboratory must
undergo three cycles of blind testing without producing any false positives. Id. at 47,015.
False positives on proficiency testing after certification can result in certification suspension
or revocation. The regulations also require the laboratories to have a procedures manual
and a quality assurance program for all phases of testing. Id. at 47,011.
260. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 345-46 (statement of American Clinical Labora-
tory Association) ("These components are interdependent and no one element is more
important than another.").
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even longer history of mandatory state programs. 261 Consequently,
federal regulators have considerable information for determining
appropriate personnel standards, in-house quality control programs,
record-keeping requirements, and appropriate proficiency testing pro-
grams. Potential forensic laboratory regulators, on the other hand, lack
such data. Little thought has been given to forensic personnel standards
and quality control programs. Consensus does not even exist over such
basic matters as protocols for routine analyses. Regulation of forensic
labs truly must start from scratch. The imposition of a rigorous,
comprehensive, mandatory scheme will require extensive study and
effort.
A CLIA-type regulatory scheme requires well-staffed institutions,
especially for monitoring in-house quality control programs and for on-
site inspections. To meet these demands, the Secretary of Health and
Human Services does not have to depend solely on his own department;
the Secretary can also approve private nonprofit organizations as accred-
itation bodies if those organizations use standards at least as stringent as
those required under CLIA.262 Such organizations exist and have been
effectively enforcing their own accreditation standards for decades.
263
Similarly, the Secretary can exempt from federal regulation laboratories
regulated by states with stringent standards. 264 Many states have such
regulation. This situation contrasts with that of forensic labs. Since no
institutions currently regulate crime laboratories, the source of potential
forensic regulators is not clear. New organizations would have to be
created or significant new duties would have to be given to existing
organizations.
Besides a workforce, experience and knowledge, money will be
necessary for forensic laboratories to be well regulated. For clinical
regulations, congress found a politically expedient, if somewhat
disingenuous, method of funding. Laboratories are charged fees for
certification. 265 This allows the regulation of clinical laboratories
261. Clinical labs have been regulated by the federal government since 1967. For the
history of that regulation, see LaMotte & Robinson, supra note 20, at 39; HOUSE REPORT,
supra note 227, at 3831-32. New York City and a number of states had regulated clinical
facilities before this. See Hamblin, Growth and Development in California, in FEDERAL
LEGISLATION AND THE CLINICAL LABORATORY 14 (M. Schaeffer ed. 1981) (brief over-
view of state and local regulation).
262. 42 U.S.C. § 263a(e)(2)(A)(ii).
263. For example, the College of American Pathologists has a rigorous, voluntary
accreditation program for clinical labs. LaMotte & Robinson, supra note 20, at 40.
264. 42U.S.C. §263a(p)(2).
265. "The Secretary shall require payment of fees for the issuance and renewal of
certificates." 42 U.S.C. § 263a(m)(1).
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without the use of tax money, although the public ultimately pays for the
regulatory scheme. 266 A legislature, however, will not find such a con-
venient method of funding forensic regulations. Overwhelmingly, crime
labs are public agencies that cannot pass additional costs on to insurance
companies or consumers. Public money must be directly allocated if
forensic facilities are to be regulated.
Finally, CLIA-style sanctions also pose problems for the regulation of
forensic science. Fines imposed on crime laboratories would almost
always have to be paid out of the public till. It is unlikely that a regula-
tor would so sanction a governmental crime lab. Even if this occurred,
the penaltyr would probably not have much deterrent or rehabilitative
effect on an organization that does not make money. Regulators are also
unlikely to suspend or revoke an accreditation necessary for a forensic
laboratory to operate or present its results in court. Proficiency testing
has taught that "accreditation on the basis of adherence to certain stan-
dards of accuracy ... would apparently mean that a good number of
laboratories would be shut down." 67 Often, a major city may be depen-
dent on a single crime lab, and its forced closing would have a huge
effect on criminal justice. It would take great political will to enact and
enforce such regulation even if it improved the accuracy of forensic sci-
ence.
268
While the pervasive poor quality of forensic science cries out for
regulation like that imposed on clinical facilities, the difficulties in devis-
ing and implementing such regulations, as well as the fierce resistance by
the forensic science community to any kind of enforced quality control,
may make needed regulation politically infeasible. Nevertheless, less
rigorous regulations may present fewer difficulties and still provide
beneficial results.
B. Mandatory Proficiency Testing
A certification program that only required labs to participate in
proficiency testing could be a significant step towards achieving better
crime lab quality. Such a program would not impose personnel
266. "Given rising federal expenditures for health care and the scarcity of federal money
to carry out enforcement activities, the Committee has determined that the costs of such
regulation should be borne by the laboratories.... The Committee understands that consu-
mers bear the ultimate costs of regulation and notes that the proper performance of tests not
only protects patients from undergoing unnecessary and dangerous treatment, but ulti-
mately saves money." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3858.
267. M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 97.
268. Id.
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standards, require in-house quality control measures, prescribe methods
of analyses, or mandate a certain level in proficiency testing accuracy.
Such limited regulation would certainly be a big departure from an ideal
program, 269 but the restricted scheme would not encounter many of the
problems of CLIA-type regulations.
Limited regulation avoids the difficult problem of creating institutions
to devise and implement a thorough, mandatory quality control program.
The institution of good proficiency examinations alone will be much
easier than the imposition of an entire quality control program. Of
course, the creation of a comprehensive proficiency testing program will
take effort, but it can draw upon the knowledge gained from past and
continuing forensic testing programs. Similarly, the proficiency com-
ponent will require fewer people270 and less money271 than an entire
quality control program.
Sanctions in a limited program would also pose fewer problems than
in a full quality control program. A laboratory would not be forbidden
from doing analyses or from presenting evidence in court because it did
not have appropriate methods manuals, because it was not staffed or run
269. Valuable unannounced audits would also be given up. Cf. LaMotte & Robinson,
supra note 20, at 41 ("The internal quality control systems of CLIA laboratories are
evaluated by annual, unannounced, on-site inspections. By not announcing their visits,
examiners get a truer picture of a laboratory's routine quality control system."). See also
Hearings, supra note 20, at 115 (comments of Dr. Loyd R. Wagner, Vice-President, Col-
lege of American Pathologists):
Proficiency testing is the testing of an event in time, and it simply reflects what that
laboratory did on that particular situation. It is one of the measures of laboratory
quality, but it cannot be utilized alone to assess whether or not a laboratory is per-
forming quality work. There are other things like quality control, space, other
activities that go along with that, that better assess quality.
Such an abbreviated regulatory system would also not require some easily instituted pro-
cedures, now seldom in effect, that would guarantee improved accuracy such as replication
of the test by another analyst or at least an independent reading of the same test by another
analyst. See supra note 204 for the effect of such replication on error rates.
270. Cf. Pereira, supra note 74, at 6: ("The operation of a reliable [forensic] quality
assurance system has heavy manpower resource implications.... One might ask 'Can we
afford it?'-I think the more appropriate question is 'Can we afford to be without it?").
271. Although I have not tried to calculate how much money it would take for a
comprehensive proficiency testing program, the testing done by the Collaborative Testing
Services gives some idea of costs. In 1989, Collaborative Testing Services charged $52 for
each proficiency test. BROCHURE, supra note 28. There are almost 350 forensic labora-
tories in the country. Lee & Gaensslen, Forensic Science LaboratorylForensic Science
Program Cooperation and Relationships: The View From the Forensic Science Labora-
tory, 33 J. FORENSIC SCL 1071, 1071 (1988) ('Today, there are approximately 40 federal
and 295 nonfederal forensic science laboratories in the United States."). All these labs do
not do analyses in all of the possible forensic areas, but if each lab is tested quarterly in
twenty different categories, then the total cost would be about $1,500,000.
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by people with a certain education, or because the accuracy of its results
did not reach a predetermined level. Thus, sanctions would not be
imposed because an outside body had determined how a laboratory
should operate or had determined that the lab's proficiency was too low,
but only on the objective ground that a facility failed to participate in
proficiency testing.
Proficiency testing can significantly raise the quality of forensic sci-
ence, but the testing must be mandatory for all crime laboratories. As
we have seen, voluntary proficiency testing is not sufficiently effec-
tive.272 Particularly, noncompulsory testing for forensic facilities is
undersubscribed. 273 The starting point for improving forensic laboratory
performance is fuller knowledge about the problems. Complete
proficiency testing of all laboratories is essential to gain that
knowledge.
274
The proficiency testing must also be blind.275 The important issue for
criminal justice is not how accurately laboratories perform when they are
aware of being tested, but how well they do on actual cases. 276 We can
draw few useful inferences about real casework by administering trials
272. "Numerous reports in the literature have demonstrated that voluntary proficiency
testing simply does not perfect laboratory performance as well as a mandatory program
does." Hearings, supra note 20, at 242 (statement of Herbert W. Dickerman, New York
State Department of Health).
273. Cf. id. at 368 (statement of Mark Birenbaum, American Association of Bioanalysts)
("Voluntary proficiency testing programs for [physician office laboratories] sponsored by
the medical profession have been notoriously under-subscribed for years."). Of course,
those labs that do participate in proficiency testing are atypical; they are usually the better
ones. See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
274. As the British have noted, a forensic proficiency program should also test all the
lab functions, not just its scientific analyses: "The whole system is tested; not all problems
which have come to light related to scientific technique; some aspects of the work are par-
ticularly prone to clerical error." Pereira, supra note 74, at 4. Cf. Caskey & Hammond,
supra note 177, at 127, 129 (contending that human error is the most common problem in
the use of DNA based technology and that the experience in medical genetic diagnoses
shows that chain of custody difficulties are the most frequent). See also Hearings, supra
note 20, at 21.
275. "Passing a battery of blind tests should be required before a crime laboratory is
allowed a license to make determinations that affect an individual's freedom." Note, supra
note 50, at 494. See Thompson & Ford, supra note 197, at 69 ("General concerns about the
difficult nature of the [DNA profiling] procedure and its susceptibility to error can most
likely be addressed only through blind proficiency testing of the analysts who actually per-
form the tests in forensic laboratories."); Note, supra note 188, at 928 ("Periodic evalua-
tions of laboratories, including 'blind tests,' should be performed by independent, disin-
terested experts to ensure that the results of the DNA tests are accurate and that lab proto-
cols are accurate and that the lab protocols are properly implemented.").
276. Cf. Lunz, Castleberry & James, The Impact of the Quality of Laboratory Staff on
the Accuracy of Laboratory Results, 258 J. AM. MED. A 361, 361 (1987) ("The ultimate
test of (laboratory) competence is the ability to perform the task accurately in the appropri-
ate environment.").
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that the analysts know to be tests. Studies indicate that performance will
be better on known examinations than on either blind tests or real case-
work.277 To learn about the accuracy and reliability of lab work, foren-
sic facilities must be subjected to blind testing that simulates real cases
as much as possible.
278
In addition, the results of the proficiency testing must be made public.
The true state of forensic science will not be known until the testing
results from all laboratories are disclosed. This information will not only
reveal the extent of the problems, but also how, for example, education
and training of analysts, size of budgets, and kinds of equipment corre-
late with performance. Such data is essential for determining the neces-
sary steps for improvement.
The dissemination of such information should also serve as a direct
spur to improvements. The Clinical Laboratories Improvement Amend-
ments, as we have seen, make testing results public. The drafters of the
Amendments recognized that
277. See supra note 22. See also BANBURY REPORT, supra note 159, at 247 (com-
ments of British forensic scientist David Werett).
278. A forensic scientist, in explaining the quality assurance program in Great Britain,
has also explained the importance of blind proficiency testing:
Our trials fall under two distinct headings; these are declared trials where partici-
pants receive material to test and are fully aware that they are under scrutiny and
undeclared trials which enter laboratories disguised as genuine cases.... Unde-
clared trials are generally regarded as more profitable. With these, not even Direc-
tors of the laboratories are told about them until after the event. They are much
more difficult to set up but have the advantage of testing the whole system from the
documentation on receipt at the laboratory to the quality of the notes and the
scientific work, the way in which the statement is laid out and the information con-
veyed and also the time taken to complete the case.... Because this type of trial is
so highly appreciated, [the Home Office Central Research Establishment] is devot-
ing more of its effort in this direction.... This system of trials enable the Con-
troller, the Directors and senior members of the laboratories to evaluate the general
performance of the Service and to identify any particular area of weakness.
Pereira, supra note 74, at 3-4.
The view expressed in the House Report is similar:
[P]roficiency testing ... is considered one of [the] best measures of laboratory per-
formance. It is arguably the most important measure, since it reviews actual test
results rather than merely gauging the potential for good results....
A significant deficiency in the current proficiency testing regime is its inability
to assure that proficiency samples are treated like patient specimens.... The only
way to guarantee that samples are treated by the same personnel, at the same speed,
using the same equipment as patient specimens is [through] blind or on-site
proficiency testing.
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3836-37.
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[t]he release of such information would help physicians select
laboratories on the basis of quality. Second, it may serve as a
deterrent to laboratories violating standards. Third, it would
give consumers and their representatives an opportunity to
assess the performance of individual laboratories on an objec-
tive basis. Finally, release of such information would stimu-
late constructive debate about, and result in development of a
consensus on, proper measures of quality.279
Public information about forensic proficiency testing can have much the
same effects. As programs in other disciplines have established,280 pub-
lication of proficiency testing results will give crime labs the data they
need to improve themselves. When the proficiency results are available,
a laboratory can see where other facilities are performing better, and
seek information to produce more accurate analyses. For example, the
lab may find out that while it is using one method of analysis, other facil-
ities are using a different technique with consistently better accuracy.
281
Widespread dissemination of the test results will allow all scientists to
279. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 227, at 3859. As discussed supra note 254 and
accompanying text, CLIA requires that the results of proficiency testing be available to the
public. Furthermore, the Secretary must make additional information public that would be
useful for evaluating lab performances, including whether a lab had been subject to sanc-
tions, denied participation in federal programs, or been convicted of fraud or billing abuses.
42 U.S.C. § 263a(n) (1988).
280. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 20, at 147 (statement of Patricia Ashton, American
Society for Cytotechnology) ("The [clinicall proficiency testing program in Ontario,
Canada showed that test results pinpointed specific areas where continuing eduction was
needed. Program officials developed and distributed educational programs for these special
problems."). See also Mason, Effect on Clinical Chemistry, in FEDERAL LEGISLATION
AND THE CLINICAL LABORATORY 110 (M. Schaeffer ed. 1981) ("One of the noteworthy
advances in clinical chemistry that would have been virtually impossible in the absence of
widespread proficiency testing is the development of data bases useful for documenting the
level of overall performance for individual tests.").
281. See Gilbert, Progress and Analytic Goals in Clinical Chemistry, 63 AM. J. CLINI-
CAL PATH. 960 (1975). Gilbert examined five years of data from the clinical laboratory
proficiency testing done by the College of American Pathologists, noted that different
methods of analyzing the same substances had different accuracy rates, and concluded:
the major potential route for further improvement lies in encouraging widespread
method change, with discontinuance of methods with poor precision and increased
utilization of methods with good precision. The most widespread problem appears
to be the need to eliminate poor methods, and it is hoped that data from the Survey
program can play a major role in making participating laboratories aware of the
need for change in providing reliable data that can be used as a guide in the selec-
tion of better methods.
Id. at 972-73.
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examine tle data to see where further studies would be most fruitful.
This would improve use of resources, which is particularly important in
a field where so little research is done. A thorough examination of
findings may reveal that errors consistently occur in certain analyses,
identifying important areas for investigation where present procedures
are not particularly precise.2 82 For example, in a 1986 proficiency test
for GLO system typing, the false positive rate unexpectedly reached
nearly fifty percent.283 Since the analytical mistakes on the typing of
other systems did not approach this level, the data suggest a particular
problem in typing the GLO system that should prompt more research.
Wide dissemination of proficiency testing data will enable as many peo-
ple as possible to scrutinize the information, find possible problems, and
seek solutions.
Furthermore, proficiency testing results must be made public to help
courts mak:e informed rulings on the admissibility of forensic evidence.
Since the reliability of a technique is a component of admissibility,
courts should examine proficiency testing results when evaluating
scientific evidence. In addition to assessing scientists' and technicians'
assertions about a scientific procedure, courts should have all the per-
tinent data on those issues. The outcomes of mandatory proficiency test-
ing should be a prime source of that information.284 If those results, for
282. Id. at 972. Gilbert found that the proficiency testing revealed that analyses of cal-
cium and magnesium produced less accurate and reliable results than analyses of other sub-
stances. He concluded:
The reason[ ] the results fall short of the desired goals is not clear, and the analysis
warrants further study.... The data from the Survey program suggest that the
[accuracy] goal is beyond the present level of technology.... It is difficult to
believe that the failure to achieve this goal represents incompetent performance on
the part of the practicing laboratories.
Id.
283. "Since the blood samples were drawn from only two sources, the groupings in the
other systems confirm that there was no sample mix-up. Degradation in the GLO system
with time is known to occur. The samples should have been at most only 7-10 days old
when received by the labs.... Although the manufacturer's experience is that degradation
does not begin until about 5 weeks for dried stains, even when it does occur a GLO 1
should not be confused with a 2-1." CTS 86-11, at 1-2.
284. The courts should also be aware of the difficulty or impossibility of designing
meaningful proficiency testing for some areas of "scientific" expertise. Judges should real-
ize that in such fields the opinion is, at best, based on deductions, not on empirical science.
Bite mark evidence provides an example. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text
for a discussion of bite mark identification research. How can a meaningful proficiency
program be designed to test those who claim the ability to identify bite marks? Interest-
ingly, a defense expert in State v. Sager, 600 S.W.2d 541 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), did try to
verify his testimony empirically. He concluded that defendant's cuspid would have left a
mark that was not present in the pictures of the victim and performed an experiment: "In
the morgue, we found a female cadaver of rather small breast size, and ... we pressed the
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example, showed persistent, widespread difficulties in typing the GLO
factor in bloodstains, courts should weigh this information in determin-
ing whether that typing is admissible.
Of course, such benefits as understanding the extent of crime labora-
tory problems, learning the best areas for research, and informing the
courts how well a particular test has been done could all be achieved by
releasing composite proficiency testing data, and keeping individual lab
performances confidential, as the LEAA study did. That secretive sys-
tem, however, would prevent other important advances. As the drafters
of CLIA recognized, public disclosure of how labs perform can provide
a powerful incentive to improve quality. If the identities of the labora-
tories are kept confidential, poorly performing facilities could not
directly communicate with those doing better, thus, they would be
deprived of the most efficient way of learning how to do better. Perhaps
more important, forensic laboratory funding agencies ought to know the
quality of individual facilities. With that information, government can
expand facilities that perform well at the expense of those that do not.
More analyses will be done accurately as a result.
The criminal justice system also needs to know about the quality of
individual laboratory performances, both to spur more accurate and reli-
able performance and to dispense justice. Just as physicians and consu-
mers with appropriate information can produce a greater number of
correct analyses by choosing the better clinical facilities, consumers of
forensic analyses can similarly affect quality when they know how indi-
articulated models [of defendant's teeth] into the breast of the cadaver material as firmly as
we could.... Mark Sager's teeth left cuspid marks on that cadaver." Id. at 567. Such a
demonstration, however, only highlights the difficulty of devising a meaningful proficiency
program in this area. Cf. Whittaker, Some Laboratory Studies on the Accuracy of Bite
Mark Comparison, 25 INT'L DENTAL J. 166 (1975). To test the accuracy of bite mark
identifications, bites were placed in prepared pig skin placed over a rubber cylinder approx-
imating an arm. This study found that when pictures were taken immediately after the bite,
examiners could only make correct identifications about 70% of the time. When pictures
were taken one hour after the bite, accuracy fell to 35%, and plummeted to 9-16% with pic-
tures taken twenty-four hours after the bite. Id.
Cf. Risinger, Denbeaux & Saks, supra note 20, at 774 n.186 (discussing whether person
claiming to be able to identify wines should be allowed to testify). They note that many
people like to claim such expertise, and while that may be socially acceptable, "nobody
ought to be subject to determination of legal rights without greater validation than the
assertion of the practitioner." Id. This truth is not invalidated because a wine-tasting
society or a journal attests to the skill's of the society's members or because the wine tast-
ing invokes technical-sounding terms in testimony. "Either the proposed witness must be
applying techniques that are replicable, and therefore available for validation to all who
would take the trouble (which is not the eise), or some blind testing validation would
appear to be an absolute necessity." Id.
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vidual laboratories and analysts perform.
285
Juries should also know how particular laboratories and analysts per-
form on proficiency testing. When jurors determine what weight to give
scientific evidence, they should have as much pertinent information as
possible. Jurors' conclusions about the weight to be given to a finger-
print expert's opinion may logically change when they learn that the
expert made mistakes ten percent of the time on proficiency testing.
Without disclosure of those proficiency testing results, a proper assess-
ment of weight cannot be made.286 Better verdicts will be obtained if the
results of proficiency tests are known.287 Furthermore, attorneys,
285. Prosecutors aware that a laboratory they use performs poorly should exert pressure
on that laboratory to improve its performance, and if they have the option, make a consu-
mer choice to have more reliable facilities do their analyses. Without identification of how
individual laboratories perform, prosecutors cannot take these quality-improvement actions.
Since defense attorneys are not as frequent consumers of forensic science services as
prosecutors, defense attorneys have fewer opportunities to spur quality through their
choices. Nonetheless, without proficiency testing information, they cannot exert what
influence they have.
The coexistence of a high degree of proficiency in many laboratories with the
endemic presence of "unacceptable proficiency" in others causes both prosecutor
and defense attorney to be faced with the dilemma of which laboratory is which.
The defense attorney especially has no way of knowing whether he is dealing with a
credible or a defective laboratory result.
Bradford, supra note 11, at 905.
286. Cf. Grunbaum, supra note 67, at 502-03 ("At present, no mechanism exists by
which one can distinguish between the analysts offering reliable testimony and those whose
work is scientifically unacceptable.").
287. It has been observed:
In order to determine the significance of test results, fact-finders should be presented
with information regarding the base rates for common phenomena analyzed by
forensic scientists; the accuracy limits of the tests and analytic techniques used
(such limits have been determined for virtually all biomedical laboratory tests) and
the accuracy of the tests in practice, as determined by quality control studies run on
the laboratories.... Judges and lawyers will then have to become sufficiently con-
versant with the statistical principles involved in order to employ these background
data in assessing the testimony presented.
M. SAKS & R. VAN DUIZEND, supra note 25, at 76.
But see Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, supra note 167, at 228 (com-
ments of Miron Straf):
But to say that the expert passed the test by being correct 95% of the time really
does not help the fact-finder too much, because the issue in question concerns a par-
ticular case to which that probability does not necessarily apply. It would be addi-
tional evidence to be considered, but the distinction between the prior tests and the
specific question at trial must be made clear.
A concern for accurate verdicts should also compel forensic laboratories to keep com-
plete records of all their activities. "Standards for record keeping are even more crucial if
Harvard Journal of Law & Technology
knowing that proficiency testing results will be presented to the jury, will
be concerned about the quality of the laboratories they use. Disclosure
of testing results to jurors will provide a powerful incentive for prosecu-
tors and defense attorneys to choose the best laboratories and to exert
pressures for improved performances.
The proposal that crime laboratories be required to take part in fre-
quent proficiency testing with results made public is quite modest. It
does not require the drafting and enforcement of detailed regulations, or
the creation of a large new bureaucracy. Nor would it prevent innova-
tion. 88 Money, of course, is always a concern. But, since the required
funds are not inordinate, at least this much regulation should be imposed
on forensic laboratories.
289
the results are admitted into court, since the records are one of the few ways for the oppos-
ing party to review the accuracy of the test." Note, supra note 50, at 493. See also Baird,
supra note 203, at 175; Winek, supra note 56, at 181.
288. Cf. Gilbert, supra note 281, at 973. Gilbert noted that clinical chemistry calcium
analyses lack precision and concluded:
The data... suggest that the goal is beyond the present level of technology.... It is
difficult to believe ... that this could be corrected by laboratory regulation. On the
contrary, it would appear far more probable that regulation would inhibit the free
development of alternative methods by encouraging or even enforcing a single
preconceived solution to a complex problem.
Id. Shapiro, Biotechnology and the Design of Regulation, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 1 (1990)
("Regulation [of modem technology] can prevent, or at least mitigate, some of [the]
dangers [to people and the enVironment], but it can also inhibit innovation and product
development.").
289. This more limited proposal should have support within the forensic science com-
munity. See, e.g., LEAA, supra note 1, at 257. ("There is a need for continuous
proficiency testing programs at either the national, state or local levels to provide a means
to monitor the progress of efforts to upgrade and maintain high quality crindnalistics ser-
vices."); Kelly & Sunshine, supra note 49, at 1414. ("No one can deny the value of an
ongoing proficiency testing program .... Forensic toxicology will never achieve true pro-
fessional stature until all concerned realize this goal."). Brunelle & Cantu, Training
Requirements and Ethical Responsibilities Performing Ink Dating Examinations, 32
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1502, 1504 (1987) ("Forensic scientists should not attempt to examine
actual ... cases until they have been tested. Proficiency testing demonstrates the com-
petency of the examiner's work."); Thomson, supra note 175, at 513 (advocating a particu-
lar method of testing). A survey of forensic science students found that they "are in strong
agreement that even qualified forensic scientists will make occasional mistakes and should
be required to demonstrate their competencies on proficiency tests. They believe
scientist[s] who recognize they are incompetent and fall to take'steps to improve their qual-
ity are unethical...." Peterson, Teaching Ethics in a Forensic Science Curriculum, 33
J. FORENSIC SCI. 1081, 1083 (1988).
While mandatory, blind, public proficiency testing may gamer some support from
forensic scientists, it may also meet with strong resistance.
The FBI ... opposes independent proficiency testing, arguing that no outsider is
qualified to evaluate the bureau's performance. In addition, at a recent FBI-
sponsored symposium on DNA typing that attracted 300 forensic scientists from
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CONCLUSION
All available information indicates that forensic science laboratories
perform poorly. Logic, justice, and concern for the wise expenditure of
money require improvement in forensic science performance. Current
regulation of clinical labs indicates that a regulatory system can improve
crime laboratories. Lack of manpower, money, experience, and an
appropriate institutional superstructure make comprehensive regulation
of crime labs infeasible. However, forensic facilities should at least be
required to undergo mandatory, blind proficiency testing, and the results
of this testing should be made public. The testing would be an important
first step in correcting inherent problems in the forensic science system.
around the country, FBI personnel were alone in opposing proposals requiring
laboratories to explain in writing the basis for their conclusions and to have their
reports signed by the scientists and technicians who conducted the test. Neufeld &
Colman, supra note 157, at 53.
At a symposium on scientific evidence, Professor Joseph Peterson, one of those in
charge of the LEAA proficiency study, noted:
The laboratories in our study insisted upon confidentiality in reporting their results
for fear that their credibility might be impaired if they submitted erroneous results.
Some laboratories refuse to participate in quality control programs because of fear
that even minor deficiencies might erode their credibility in the courtroom.
Symposium, supra note 5, at 648. Professor Andre Moenssens responded, "They are afraid
of losing the unearned credibility they attained simply by labeling themselves a forensic
science laboratory." Id.

